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PREFACE
The papers in this volume were presented during the thirtieth annual
Public Lecture Series sponsored by the Department of Economics at
Western Michigan University. The Lecture Series was made possible
through the financial support of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ
ment Research and the College of Arts and Sciences of Western Michi
gan University.
Several of my colleagues in the Economics Department and at the
Upjohn Institute assisted with the progress of the Lecture Series,
including Raymond E. Zelder, William D. Bosshardt (now at Florida
Atlantic University), and Timothy J. Bartik. I thank Randall W. Eberts
and Robert G. Spiegelman of the Upjohn Institute for their continued
support of the Series. Judith K. Gentry and Natalie M. Lagoni pro
duced the book expeditiously. I am grateful to all for their help, as well
as to the authors for their cooperation.
Susan Pozo
Kalamazoo, Michigan
January 1996
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Introduction
Susan Pozo
Western Michigan University

Ask an academician, a government worker, a policy analyst, a politi
cian, and a member of the general public what the underground econ
omy is all about and you will surely get a wide variety of answers. This
diversity is reflected in this volume, where six different papers about
the underground economy—its many facets, its various consequences,
and a multitude of interpretations—are presented.
Our fascination with the underground economy is as many-faceted
as are our definitions of it, but it is safe to assume that we are intrigued
with the underground economy in part because it is difficult to directly
observe and directly measure. Whereas one can be reasonably assured
of estimates of automobile production in the United States in a given
year, we are less confident of the estimates offered for tax compliance,
domestic marijuana consumption, the volume of illegal gambling, or
the extensiveness of barter trade. Hence we dig deeper and ask, how
were these numbers obtained? If alternative assumptions are made,
how would the estimates change? Will a different methodological
approach confirm or contradict these estimates?
Because of its nature, because participants in the underground econ
omy hide their participation, direct measurement of the magnitude of
underground economic production and participation is usually not pos
sible. We normally have to find other methods, often relying on indirect
measures to find traces of underground economic activity. In this book,
alternative methods are used to track the underground economy, rang
ing from monetary measures to direct survey methods to experimental
techniques.
The chapters by Edgar Feige and by Peter Reuter focus on measur
ing the size and volume of underground economic activity. Feige uses
monetary techniques to measure the volume of unreported economic
activity taking place. Previous studies estimating the size of the under
ground economy, which is presumed to bear some relationship to the
level of unreported income, have used the currency ratio method. In
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this method increases in the currency-to-checkable-deposit ratio are
assumed to be associated with increases in unreported income because
individuals find it easier to camouflage unreported income if it is kept
as cash. However, Feige notes that the estimates offered thus far using
the currency-to-deposit ratio or some variant of it have assumed that all
U.S. currency circulates domestically. We are continually reminded,
however, that U.S. currency plays an important role in many foreign
countries, as evidenced in part by its use in black and parallel-dollarcurrency markets. Feige extensively examines what is known about
U.S. currency holdings abroad to derive estimates of the proportion of
U.S. currency that circulates domestically. With currency estimates
taking into account the volume of overseas holding of U.S. currency,
Feige is able to obtain and report estimates of the size of the under
ground economy using a variant of the currency-to-deposit ratio
method that better reflects U.S.-only underground economic activity.
Reuter, on the other hand, takes a hard look at a specific subsector of
the underground economy—the illegal drug market. This market is, to
the best of our knowledge, the largest of all the illegal markets, and
thus its size is of concern to those interested in learning about the
extensiveness of the underground economy.
Reuter suggests that U.S. government estimates pertaining to the
size of this market are grossly inadequate and inconsistent. He cleverly
shows how individually scrutinized estimates can be shown to be
implausible and how the collective estimates of related markets or vari
ables within the market are inconsistent. Why are such poorly engi
neered figures offered to the public? Overall, they do not offer
guidance for good policy making and hence do not result in alterations,
improvements, or development of drug policy. They are often offered
instead to legitimize policy decisions that are derived independent of
good estimates.
Reuter notes that good estimates are important and that they could
serve a valuable function in evaluating, for example, the effectiveness
of policies to reduce illegal drug consumption or the scope of drug
markets.
The papers by Richard Freeman and James Aim are concerned with
criminal behavior of individuals. Freeman concentrates on youth, in an
attempt to gain an understanding of what leads to criminal behavior.
What policies could be implemented if we wish to reduce criminal
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activity among our youth? Since criminal activity during youth seems
to be associated with subsequent behavior and economic attainment, it
is especially important to understand how our current economic poli
cies may encourage or deter youth from engaging in crime. Freeman
obtains data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to under
take his investigation and arrive at conclusions regarding participation
in underground activities.
Aim looks at a different category of criminal activity—tax evasion.
He too asks how economic policy affects the degree of tax cheating
that takes place. To get around the problem of getting individuals to
truthfully admit the degree to which they cheat on taxes, Aim employs
experimental methods to track tax compliance. Under these carefully
controlled methods and with careful experimental design he is able to
generalize how changes in the variables in the hands of policy makers
can alter behavior, causing the general compliance rate to rise or caus
ing tax cheating to increase.
The papers by Ann Witte and Alejandro Fortes serve as an overview
of the underground economy in the Americas. Witte's paper points to
some of the ambivalent attitudes we have had regarding the under
ground economy in the United States over the past several decades. In
many cases we argue that certain behaviors and participation in the
underground economy are not acceptable. We do not always seem
entirely convinced of this position, however, and we end up engaging
in less enforcement. Witte suggests that what constitutes the under
ground economy has changed over time. Variations in enforcement
serves as a precursor to real changes in institutions and laws pertaining
to underground activity. There is significant fluidity in the definition of
what is legal and what is not, and participation in the underground
economy does not necessarily mean that one is "beating the system."
Fortes adds another dimension or perspective to the underground
economy discussion. This results from his studies of underground
economies in Latin America. While there is reasonable consensus of
what constitutes the underground economy in the industrialized econo
mies, the consensus is less broad for those who study developing econ
omies. This may be because of the more diverse form taken by the
underground economy in less-developed countries, and perhaps
because there is a less clear distinction between what we term formal
and informal production in these economies. The linkages between the
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underground and aboveground economies are stronger in developing
economies, making for more difficult delineation of the two categories
of production.
Despite the additional challenges faced by researchers who measure
the underground economy for developing nations, Fortes offers esti
mates of the magnitude of this sector for many of the Latin American
economies over the past several decades. He employs several different
methodologies and concludes that there is considerable informal pro
duction taking place in these countries.
Though the underground economy is a somewhat elusive and vari
ously defined concept, these studies suggest that a great deal is known.
By using various approaches, economists and others have actually
learned much about unrecorded and illegal production. Despite the
diversity of approaches, many common conclusions seem to emerge.
First, the underground economy is significant in size. Second, growth
and persistence in the underground economy are not relegated to a par
ticular historical period, geographic region of the world, or stage of
development. Both developed and developing economies seem to be
faced with significant underground sectors. Third, economic policy can
play a significant role in determining whether economic agents partici
pate to a greater or lesser degree in the underground economy.
Nonetheless, despite knowing a great deal about the underground
economy, this collection of papers also brings to our attention that
much has yet to be learned. Because of the diverse nature of under
ground economic activities, a variety of approaches is probably the
best route to better understand the underground. Unlike many eco
nomic inquiries, it may be more appropriate and fruitful to employ
economists (and noneconomists) from almost all the different subspecialties to add to our body of knowledge about the underground econ
omy. Labor economics, macroeconomics, public finance, criminology,
experimental economics, urban economics, and international econom
ics all have contributed and have more contributions to make so that we
can better understand the underground economy. The studies presented
here attest to this.

Overseas Holdings of U.S. Currency
and the Underground Economy
Edgar L. Feige
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Many public policy decisions require analytical and empirical
knowledge concerning the size, growth, causes, and consequences of
the "underground economy." This paper seeks to clarify the meaning of
underground activity, updates various discrepancies and fiscal esti
mates of its size and growth, and examines the empirical implications
of new evidence concerning the growing use of U.S. currency through
out the world for indirect monetary estimates of the underground econ
omy in the United States.
The popular term "underground economy" is inexact, covering a
wide range of economic activities that encompass the production and
distribution of illegal goods and services, as well as legal activities
whose concealment from or misrepresentation to governmental author
ities involves tax evasion or benefit fraud. Given the diversity of hidden
activities, it is necessary to develop a taxonomy of "underground econ
omies" that identifies specific types of underground behaviors and sug
gests appropriate methods for estimating their size and their unique
economic implications. The general penchant to hide underground eco
nomic activities often precludes direct observation of their occurrence,
necessitating the use of indirect measures that seek to uncover the foot
prints of hidden activities left behind in the sands of observable eco
nomic indicators. Currency, being an anonymous medium of exchange,
is regarded as the preferred means of payment for economic transac
tions that economic actors seek to conceal. As such, cash stocks and
flows are a natural starting point in the search for knowledge concern
ing the underground economy. The total amount of currency in circula
tion is also one of the best-measured macroeconomic indicators, since
the production and distribution of currency by the government is
strictly monitored and carefully recorded. 1 However, our knowledge
concerning the location and circulation of the public's holdings of U.S.
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currency is meager. There are no reliable estimates of the varying
amounts of U.S. currency circulating overseas, therefore no way of
determining the domestic money supply and its change over time. This
paper develops alternative means of calculating the proportions of cur
rency held domestically and overseas and presents estimates of net out
flows of U.S. currency over time. New estimates of domestic holding
of U.S. currency are then used to reestimate the size and growth of the
domestic underground economy.
One of the most puzzling macroeconomic anomalies is the huge
amount of U.S. currency outstanding ($390 billion) and its surprisingly
persistent growth. Despite widespread predictions of the advent of the
cashless society, and decades of cash-saving financial innovations, the
per capita holdings of U.S. currency increased from $160 in 1961 to
$1,450 by the end of 1994. Adjusting for inflation, real per capita cur
rency increased by 70 percent, and the proportion of the Ml money
supply composed of currency rose from 20 percent to 30 percent.
Roughly 60 percent of the outstanding stock of currency is now in the
form of $100 bills.
The suggestion that the average American family of four now holds
$5,800 in currency, of which $3,480 is in the form of $100 bills,
appears to be implausible. Moreover, since the average turnover rate of
currency is estimated to be fifty times per year, the average American
would have to be making pro rata cash transactions of $72,500 per
year, a figure which is plainly unbelievable. Federal Reserve surveys
(Avery et al. 1986, 1987) of currency usage by American households
determined that adult U.S. residents admit to holding only 12 percent
of the nation's currency in circulation outside the banking system.
Allowing for U.S. business holdings of currency, the whereabouts of
more than 80 percent of the nation's currency supply is presently
unknown. These anomalous findings give rise to the "currency
enigma" (Feige 1990b, 1994a), which consists of a stock and a flow
component. Our inability to identify the holders and location of a large
fraction of the U.S. currency stock gives rise to a $300 billion problem
of "missing currency" (Sprenkle 1993). This missing stock of currency
is used as a means of payment for the purchase of goods and services.
If all of the missing currency turns over at the same rate as that esti
mated for U.S. households, it would effect a flow of "missing pay
ments" amounting to almost $15 trillion.
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Two complementary hypotheses are put forward as possible expla
nations of the currency enigma. Some fraction of the missing currency
may in fact be held by U.S. households to conduct unreported transac
tions in the U.S. underground economy. A considerably larger portion
of the missing currency is more likely to be held abroad by foreigners
who conduct transactions with U.S. dollars to effect payments in their
own countries and as a store of value. This paper examines the extent
to which the currency enigma can be resolved by appeal to both the
underground economy hypothesis and the "world dollarization"
hypothesis.
The first section of the paper presents a taxonomic framework for
defining different types of underground activities, reviews alternative
methods of estimation, and updates available estimates of various
"underground economies" in the United States.2 The following three
sections describe alternative methods for estimating the amount of U.S.
currency held abroad and present preliminary estimates of overseas
currency holdings. These sections present a monetary demographic
model (MDM) and a note ratio model (NRM) that can be employed to
obtain indirect estimates of the proportions of currency held domesti
cally and overseas, as well as direct estimates of net outflows of U.S.
currency. To anticipate the results, a factor model composite measure
of overseas currency flows suggests that foreigners do appear to hold a
large fraction of U.S. currency, perhaps as much as 40 percent. The
final section examines the implications of overseas currency holdings
for the measurement of the domestic underground economy.

Defining and Measuring Underground Economies
The early literature on the underground economy lacked an accepted
taxonomy for classifying various underground activities. Underground
activities were variously described as subterranean, irregular or infor
mal, hidden, grey, shadow, clandestine, parallel, and black, but these
descriptions were rarely augmented with explicit definitions that aided
analytic and empirical investigation of the underlying phenomena. It is
now well understood that there are a variety of underground economies
spanning both planned and market economies, be they developed or
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developing. Agents engaged in underground activities circumvent,
escape, or are excluded from the institutional system of rules, rights,
regulations, and enforcement penalties that govern formal agents
engaged in production and exchange. Different types of underground
activities are distinguished according to the particular institutional
rules they violate. Employing this criterion, we identify four specific
types of underground economic activities: illegal; unreported; and
unrecorded; and informal. The metric for measuring the dimensions of
each underground activity is the aggregate income generated by the
activity. Figure 1 presents a taxonomy of underground economies.
The illegal economy consists of the income produced by those eco
nomic activities pursued in violation of legal statutes defining the
scope of legitimate forms of commerce. The most notable illegal activ
ities are the production and distribution of prohibited substances (e.g.,
drug traffic) and services such as prostitution, pornography, and black
market currency exchange. Estimates of income produced from illegal
activities are typically derived from crime-related statistics and range
from $70 to $100 billion. In 1982, unreported income from drugs and
gambling was estimated to be roughly $26 billion (Abt Associates
1984, pp. 62, 112), and the retail value of drugs sold in the United
States in 1990 was estimated to be roughly $40 billion (Office of
National Drug Control Policy 1991, p. 5).
The unreported economy consists of those economic activities that
circumvent or evade fiscal rules as codified in the tax code. A summary
measure of the unreported economy is the amount of unreported
income, namely, the amount of income that should legally be reported
to the tax authority but is not so reported. Since illegal income is tax
able, the unreported economy includes both legal and illegal source
income that is not properly reported to the fiscal authority. A comple
mentary measure of the unreported economy is the "gross tax gap,"
namely, the difference between the amount of tax revenues legally due
the fiscal authority and the amount of tax revenue voluntarily paid.
The "net tax gap" represents the difference between the amount of
revenue due and the amount actually collected. The difference between
the gross and net measures represents the revenues collected as a direct
result of enforcement activities. Benefit fraud, comprising false claims
for benefits (welfare or unemployment payments) or subsidies to
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which the individual is not legally entitled, should formally be
included in "tax gap" measures.
The unrecorded economy consists of those economic activities that
circumvent the institutional rules that define the reporting requirements
of government statistical agencies. A summary measure of the unre
corded economy is the amount of unrecorded income, namely, the
amount of income that should (under existing rules and conventions)
be recorded in national accounting systems (e.g., National Income and
Product Accounts) but is not so recorded. Unrecorded income repre
sents a discrepancy between total income or output and the actual
amount of income or output captured or enumerated by the statistical
accounting system designed to measure economic activity. Since
national accounting conventions differ with respect to their inclusion of
illegal incomes, unrecorded income may or may not include compo
nents of the illegal sector.
The term "informal economy" has been used so frequently, and
inconsistently, in the development literature that it requires special
attention. The informal economy comprises those economic activities
that circumvent the costs and are excluded from the benefits and rights
incorporated in the laws and administrative rules covering property
relationships, commercial licensing, labor contracts, torts, financial
credit, and social security systems. A summary measure of the infor
mal economy is the income generated by economic agents who operate
informally.
Estimating the size of various underground economies remains, at
best, an inexact science. However, more precise definition of alterna
tive underground economies has reduced the tendency to compare dis
parate measures, and improvements in tax compliance and monetary
methodologies is narrowing the range of comparable estimates.
Updated Estimates of Unreported Income in the United States
Since underground economic activity typically subjects the partici
pant to the risk of some form of sanction if discovered, agents engaged
in the activity have an incentive to conceal their involvement. This pro
pensity for secrecy creates special problems for the social science
observer who attempts to measure underground behavior. A variety of
direct and indirect measurements of various types of underground
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activity have been proposed and each has well-known limitations
(Feige 1989). Earlier empirical efforts to measure the size and growth
of underground activities revealed that underground economies were
large enough to be of economic significance and had grown consider
ably during the later half of the 1960s and throughout much of the
decade of the 1970s. Costly regulation, rising tax rates, and a growing
distrust of government were cited as the primary causes of increased
underground activity. The conservative politics of the 1980s sought to
reverse these trends by reducing government regulations, decreasing
the burden of taxation, and restoring a greater sense of trust and confi
dence in the government by reforming the tax system and reducing
what were perceived to be wasteful government expenditures. One of
the questions we seek to examine is whether these efforts had any
effect on reducing the size and growth of the underground economy.
Various macroeconomic measures have been mentioned as possible
indicators of underground activities. These include the adjusted gross
income (AGI) gap discrepancy measure produced by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA); the audit-based discrepancy measures of
unreported taxable income produced by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS); and estimates of unreported income derived from various speci
fications of monetary models. These measures are reviewed and
updated.
Discrepancy Measures

The U.S. government produces two discrepancy measures that are
often cited as indicators of underground activity. The first of these,
compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, calculates the discrep
ancy between adjusted gross income as reported to the Internal Reve
nue Service and an independent estimate of AGI derived from National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) estimates of personal income.
This AGI gap is not officially acknowledged as a measure of the under
ground economy; however, with several qualifications (Carson 1984;
Feige 1989), the AGI gap can be interpreted as a lower bound measure
of noncompliance in the reporting of taxable income.
Figure 2 displays the AGI gap estimates published by the BEA in
1985 and the most recently revised estimates. The latest government
figures reveal that the earlier gap estimates had been much too low,
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requiring upward revision of $115 billion in 1983. By 1992, the AGI
gap had risen to $500 billion. As a percentage of AGI, the gap reached
its peak of 16.1 percent in 1987 and then fell to an estimated 14 percent
of AGI in 1992.
Figure 2. Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap
Bureau of Economic Analysis Estimates
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An alternative discrepancy measure of unreported income is pre
pared by the IRS on the basis of their Taxpayer Compliance Measure
ment Program (TCMP). Responding to reports of a large underground
economy based on monetary estimation methods, the IRS undertook a
series of studies (IRS 1979, 1981, 1983) to examine the extent of noncompliance with U.S. tax laws. Their first study (IRS 1979) concluded
that in 1976, between $75 and $100 billion of legal source income was
not properly reported on individual tax returns. The IRS estimated that
the resulting revenue loss was between $12 and $17 billion. In addi
tion, unreported illegal source income was estimated to be between
$25 and $35 billion, with an added revenue loss of $6 to $8 billion. In
their 1983 report, the estimate for legal source unreported income in
1976 was increased by $30 billion and the associated estimated loss of
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tax revenue was more than double the initial estimate. On the other
hand, the 1983 report slashed the estimate of illegal source income to
only $13 billion and cut the corresponding revenue loss from the illegal
sector to roughly $4 billion.
Feige (1989) demonstrated the sensitivity of the results from the
early TCMP studies to small variations in the questionable set of
assumptions required to estimate magnitude of noncompliance. The
admission by the IRS that 1981 total unreported income amounted to
some $283 billion and a corresponding revenue loss of $90 billion led
the BEA to undertake a major revision of the NIPA accounts. The
BEA's 1985 "comprehensive revision" raised estimated personal
income for 1984 by $100 billion. Although their comprehensive revi
sion included changes in definitions and statistical methods, the single
most important element of the revision was the adjustment for income
previously unrecorded due to understated tax source data. For 1984,
the personal income adjustment for unrecorded wages, salaries, and
nonfarm proprietor incomes amounted to $101 billion, demonstrating
the empirical connection between unreported and unrecorded income.
The latest IRS estimates of unreported income (IRS 1988) are based
on their TCMP audits of tax returns in the years 1973, 1976, 1979, and
1982 and include estimates of unreported income and the correspond
ing losses in tax revenue projected out to 1992. The IRS (1988) esti
mates of unreported legal source income for the years 1973-1982 are
presented in figure 3, along with their projected unreported income for
the years 1983-1992.
In each of the audit years, a sample of roughly 55,000 tax filers was
subjected to examination by IRS auditors who attempted to determine
the amounts of income that should have been reported and the amounts
that were unreported. Final estimates of unreported income of filers
and nonfilers for those years were obtained by combining information
from audits, information returns, and special surveys. The IRS projec
tions for the period 1985-1992 were based on Office of Management
and Budget forecasts of personal income combined with an assumption
of constant rates of noncompliance between 1982 and 1992. The pro
jections also assume that tax payer behavior was unaffected by the tax
reforms enacted in 1986. Figure 4 depicts the discrepancy between
projected AGI used in the 1988 IRS report and the actual AGI reported
on subsequent tax returns.
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Figure 3. Unreported Legal Source Income
Internal Revenue Service Estimates
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By 1992, actual reported AGI fell more than $500 billion short of
the IRS projections. The overestimates of projected reportable income
and the assumption that compliance rates were unaffected by tax cuts
and tax reforms suggest that the IRS projections of unreported income
are overstated.3
Whereas the earlier IRS studies reported estimates of both legal and
illegal source unreported income, the 1988 study is limited to estimates
of unreported legal source income. The IRS (1983) study estimated
that in 1981, illegal source income amounted to $34.2 billion, or
roughly 15 percent of the revised legal source estimate for 1981. If ille
gal income remained at roughly the same percentage as legal income, it
would add an additional $88 billion of unreported illegal source
income to the estimate of $585 billion of unreported legal source
income for 1992.4
Figure 5 reports alternative IRS estimates of the "gross tax gap" on
legal source income of individuals and corporations. The gross tax gap
Figure 5. Estimates of the Gross Tax Gap
Legal Source Income
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overstates the amount of revenue lost to the government due to noncompliance to the extent that IRS enforcement activities collect some
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of the amounts due. The yield from these enforcement activities was
estimated to be $15.4 billion in 1981, $18.9 billion in 1984, and $21.9
billion in 1987 (IRS 1990, table 2, p. 10). The gross tax gap understates
the loss of revenue to the government because it excludes revenue lost
on illegal source income as well as revenue losses from noncompliance
with other federal taxes including employment, excise, gift, and estate
taxes and customs duties. For the year 1987, income taxes accounted
for only 56 percent of federal budget receipts. Another 36 percent came
from employment taxes and 5 percent from gift, estate, and excise
taxes. There is virtually no information available on the revenue losses
from noncompliance with these other important revenue sources, nor
are there estimates of the amount of government expenditures wasted
as a result of benefit fraud.
Currency Ratio Models
The most common method for estimating the size of the unreported
economy relies on some variant of the general currency ratio model
described in Feige (1989). The most restrictive specification of the cur
rency ratio model (Cagan 1958; Gutmann 1977) assumes that currency
is the exclusive medium of exchange for unreported transactions, that
the ratio of currency to checkable deposits is only affected by the
growth of unreported transactions, that the income velocities of
reported and unreported transactions are identical, and that in some
base period, unreported income was zero so that the observed base
period currency deposit ratio serves as a proxy for the desired currency
ratio in the official economy.5
Figure 6 displays estimated unreported income as a percent of
recorded AGI as obtained from the simple currency ratio model under
the assumptions that in 1940 there was no unreported income and that
all currency outside of the banking system was held by the domestic
public. As has been noted in earlier studies, the ratio of unreported
income rose sharply during World War II and then declined and
remained relatively stable until the early 1960s. Unreported income
then grew from less than 5 percent of AGI in 1960 to 15 percent by
1980.
The percentage of unreported income reached a plateau during the
early 1980s and actually declined around the time of the 1986 Tax
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Reform Act. The percent of unreported income then rose steeply
between 1987 and 1991. Figure 6 also presents the results of a more
general specification of the currency ratio model.6 The general cur
rency ratio model (OCR) employs the IRS estimate of unreported
income for 1973 as an appropriate benchmark; it assumes that 75 per
cent of unreported income transactions are effected by currency and
that the remaining 25 percent are effected by checkable deposits. The
resulting estimates display a time path similar to that of the more
restrictive estimates, however the percent of unreported activities is
considerably higher in all periods.
Figure 7 displays three estimates of total unreported income from
both legal and illegal sources for the period 1972 through 1993. 7 The
IRS projections are remarkably similar to those obtained by the simple
currency ratio model suggesting that by 1991, total unreported income
amounted to roughly $650 billion or 17 percent of reported AGI.
Assuming that this unreported income had been subject to a mar
ginal income tax rate of 20 percent, $130 billion of income tax reve
nues would have escaped government collection, roughly 62 percent of
the federal budget deficit.
The OCR model results suggest that unreported income grew gradu
ally during the first half of the 1980s, declined in the mid-1980s and
then resumed its growth until the early 1990s. Unreported income
appears to have doubled during the last half of the decade and
exceeded $1 trillion during the early 1990s. All of these currency ratio
model estimates are predicated on the assumption that U.S. currency is
exclusively used to effect domestic transactions in either the official or
the underground economy. There is, however, a growing body of anec
dotal evidence suggesting that U.S. currency also circulates as a
medium of exchange in foreign countries. If a large and perhaps vari
able fraction of U.S. currency is held outside of the U.S., this would
tend to overstate the size of the domestic underground economy as esti
mated by conventional currency ratio models.
Federal Reserve (Avery et al. 1986, 1987) Surveys of Currency and
Transaction Account Usage (SCTAU) reinforce the notion that a sub
stantial portion of U.S. currency holdings cannot be accounted for by
the behavior of U.S. households. In both 1984 and 1986, SCTAU deter
mined that U.S. households admitted to holding at most 12 percent of
the nation's currency supply. Since business firms are very concerned
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with efficient cash management in order to minimize interest losses
associated with cash inventories, they are likely to hold considerably
smaller cash inventories than households. The scant evidence on U.S.
currency holdings by business firms (Anderson 1977; Sumner 1990)
suggests that domestic firms hold less than 3 percent of currency in cir
culation.
A conservative estimate of the stock of currency required to sustain
the estimated cash payments made in the unreported economy can be
obtained by employing the IRS projection that total unreported income
in 1992 amounted to $675 billion. Assuming that roughly 75 percent of
this unreported income is effected by cash and taking currency turn
over (the income velocity of currency) to be roughly fifty turnovers per
year yields a stock of currency used for underground transactions that
is less than 4 percent of currency in circulation with the public. 8 In
short, since U.S. households admit to holding only 12 percent of the
nation's currency in circulation, firms hold roughly 3 percent, and
underground transactions absorb another 4 percent, the ownership of
roughly 80 percent of circulating U.S. currency is currently unknown.
This anomaly of missing currency gives rise to the stock component of
the "currency enigma" (Feige 1994a). A similar problem arises with
attempts to allocate the flow of payments sustained by the outstanding
currency stock to different sectors of the economy. The admitted
household holdings of 12 percent of U.S. currency circulating outside
of the banking system give rise to an estimated volume of cash pay
ments of $1.7 trillion for 1992, roughly 41 percent of recorded per
sonal consumption expenditures. Estimated cash holdings of business
firms analogously give rise to some $400 billion of intermediate pay
ments, amounting to roughly 7 percent of total intermediate payments.
An additional $675 billion of cash payments can be allocated to under
ground transactions. If the stock of the remaining "missing" currency
circulates at roughly the same rate as currency held by U.S. house
holds, it would give rise to an additional volume of unaccounted cash
payments in excess of $10 trillion.
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain these monetary
anomalies. One explanation is that the U.S. underground economy is
substantially larger than current estimates suggest, and that domestic
holdings of U.S. currency are much larger than the amounts of cur
rency households admit to holding on currency surveys. The more
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plausible "world dollarization" hypothesis suggests that a substantial
fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad by residents of other nations.
The complementary "hoarding" hypothesis suggests that overseas
holdings of U.S. currency are largely held as stores of value rather than
being used as a medium of exchange. The dollarization hypothesis
requires independent estimates of the fraction of U.S. currency held
abroad. The hoarding hypothesis requires evidence confirming that
overseas holdings of U.S. currency circulate at slower rates than
domestic currency holdings.
Anecdotal reports of U.S. currency circulating in parts of Latin
America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Russia are widespread,
as are suggestions that foreign demand for U.S. currency can fluctuate
quite dramatically. Since the size, variability, and velocity of foreign
holdings of U.S. currency have important implications for the measure
ment of the domestic underground economy and for the conduct of
domestic monetary policy, we turn our attention to efforts to locate the
"missing" U.S. currency.

Indirect Methods for Estimating Foreign Holdings
of U.S. Currency
Although there is much anecdotal evidence concerning the wide
spread use of U.S. currency overseas, until very recently there was no
systematic research undertaken to determine the location of the U.S.
currency supply. Several different approaches are presently being
explored to estimate both the stock of foreign holdings of U.S. cur
rency and the migration of currency into and out of the country.9
The introduction in 1996 of a newly designed U.S. currency series
with modern counterfeit protection provides a unique opportunity to
establish a currency census system (CCS), which while fully preserv
ing the anonymity of individual currency usage, could monitor key
characteristics of the currency population. Relevant information on the
life cycle of a currency note could be electronically captured as notes
are routinely and anonymously processed by high-speed sorting
machines when they are issued and returned to the Federal Reserve
Banks. The proposed CCS would eliminate any burden of human
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reporting. By maintaining automated records of a note's age, quality,
birthplace, location, and final redemption, a CCS information system
would provide the data required to construct currency migration matri
ces and all other demographic characteristics of the note population. 10
In the absence of a location-specific enumeration of currency holdings,
it is necessary to rely on direct sources of information concerning
inflows and outflows of U.S. currency as well as on indirect methods
for estimating the changing proportion of U.S. notes held overseas.
The Monetary Demography Model

This section develops a model capable of estimating the proportions
of notes held domestically and overseas. Given estimates of these pro
portions and knowledge of the total stock of currency outstanding, one
can estimate the overseas stock of currency and also obtain estimates
of net currency outflows from the changes in foreign holdings over
time. The proportion of U.S. currency circulating domestically (P<0 and
the proportion circulating overseas (P°) can be estimated from a simple
monetary demography model (MDM) of the currency population.
Consider the general problem of estimating the proportions P\ and
P2 of members in two subpopulations C\ and C2 which comprise the
total population C. Let X represent any characteristic of the total popu
lation C, and Xi and X2 respectively represent the corresponding char
acteristic of the subpopulations C\ and C2. The unknown proportions
PI and P2 can then be derived from the following equation:
(Eq. 1)

X = Pl -Xl +P2 -X2.

Since PI + P2 = 1, it follows that:
(Eq. 2)

P1 = (X-X2)/(X1 -X2) and

A meaningful solution for the parameters PI and P2 exists so long as
the characteristics of the subpopulations are different (Xj *X2), and the
calculated proportions lie between 0 and 1. For example, if we know
that the average weekly income (X) of the entire U.S. population is
$600 and the average weekly income of the population located east of
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the Mississippi is $800 (Xj) and the average weekly income of the pop
ulation west of the Mississippi is $500 (X2), it follows that one-third of
the population lives in the eastern portion of the country and two-thirds
of the population lives in the western portion.
This simple demographic model can be generalized to find the pro
portion of members in any exhaustive set of subpopulations so long as
the characteristics describing the subpopulations are different. In the
foregoing example, the characteristic measure was simply a scalar rep
resenting the mean of the income distribution for the entire population
and for each of the subpopulations. More generally, the characteristics
(X, Xj, and X2) may be vectors representing univariate or multivariate
distributions of the total and subpopulation characteristics. Examples
of measurable characteristics which might be employed to estimate the
MDM are the age, quality, velocity, denomination, series, or seasonal
characteristics of the total and subpopulations.
Given estimates of any note population characteristic X, and the cor
responding domestic (X<0 and overseas (X") note characteristics, the
proportion of notes circulating domestically ((3d) can be estimated as:
(Eq.3)

(p<0 = (X-X°)/(X<'-X<').

The MDM employing age and quality characteristics
Applying general demographic concepts to currency populations
leads naturally to a consideration of possible differences in the age and
quality characteristics of denomination-specific notes circulating
domestically and overseas. Estimates of the age, quality, and quality by
age distributions of the domestic and overseas subpopulations were
obtained from a special study conducted by the Federal Reserve. 11
Based on a sample of some four million individual notes, note quality
was ascertained by recording light reflectivity measures from an opti
cal desitometer that scanned individual notes during routine note pro
cessing by high-speed sorting machines located at Federal Reserve
Banks in each of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts. Individual note
serial numbers were recorded for a subsample of approximately
150,000 notes drawn from domestic and overseas sources in order to
determine the date on which each note was sent by the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing to a Federal Reserve Bank. An inventory model
was then employed to estimate the date the note was actually placed
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into circulation, thereby establishing its date of birth. Each note's age
was then determined as the difference between the sample date and the
note's date of birth. Therefore, for each note denomination ($1; $5;
$10; $20; $50; $100) it was possible to construct the univariate age and
quality distributions for notes sampled domestically and overseas.
Casual observation suggests that domestic notes are likely to be
used predominantly as a medium of exchange, whereas overseas notes
are more likely to be held as a store of value. Thus for any denomina
tion, it was expected that the univariate age and quality distributions of
domestic and overseas notes and the corresponding bivariate quality by
age distributions would differ greatly. Domestic notes, sampled on
their return to the Federal Reserve, were expected to be relatively
younger than overseas notes and generally of poorer quality for a given
age. Given these expected differences in domestic and overseas charac
teristics, age, quality, and quality by age distributions were thought to
be promising characteristics for estimating the proportion of notes held
overseas.
Surprisingly, preliminary analysis of the quality and quality by age
distributions of the domestic and overseas samples revealed that they
were not sufficiently different to obtain robust estimates of the propor
tions of notes held domestically and overseas. Initial efforts to estimate
the MDM were therefore based on differences in the univariate age dis
tributions between overseas and domestic notes for each specific note
denomination population. Denomination-specific age distributions for
the entire note population were derived from FR-160 data on note
births and deaths (redemptions) combined with estimates of average
note lifetimes.
Employing the age characteristics of the relevant populations, the
problem then is to estimate the proportion of U.S. currency circulating
domestically ((3*0 and the proportion circulating overseas ((5° = 1 - p<0
from the MDM(A) specified for each denomination as follows:
(Eq. 4)

A = $dAd + (1 - fiW, and
$d = (A-A°)l(Ad -A°)

where A, Ad and A° represent the denomination-specific age distribu
tions for the total, domestic, and overseas note populations, respec-
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lively. Estimates of the proportion of notes of different denominations
circulating abroad in mid-1989 were then obtained from estimates of
the overall, domestic, and overseas age distribution of the notes. 12
Table 1 presents the resulting denomination-specific estimates of the
proportion of notes held overseas. The MDM model estimated for the
Table 1. Estimates of the Demographic Model
(MDMEC*" 1; Cdenld; C^IKA)}
Age Distribution Characteristics
Denomination
$ value of
Estimated
of
value
$
composition
notes in
share of each
denomination circulation notes overseas of overseas
1989
currency
1989
overseas 1989
(billions)
(percent)
Denomination (percent)
(billions)
1.43
1.57
4.00
35.7
$1
1.88
2.07
4.99
37.6
$5
3.95
$10
1.98 - 3.59
10.25
19.3 - 35.0
24.09
21.86 - 37.89
$20
54.67
49.0 -69.3
11.89
45.3
13.10
26.25
$50
55.21
50.12
$100
98.17
51.1
100.0
89.2 - 106.8
198.33
45.8 - 53.0
Total

age distribution characteristics suggests that in 1989, between 45.8 and
53 percent of the U.S. currency stock was held overseas. Of these over
seas holdings, 68.3 percent was held in the form of large denomination
bills ($100 and $50); approximately 28 percent was held in mid-sized
denomination bills ($20 and $10) and 3,6 percent was held in the form
of small denomination bills ($5 and $1).
The MDM employing seasonality, series, and coin/bill ratio
characteristics
Porter and Judson (1995) employ several variants of the MDM to
estimate the proportion of currency held overseas by exploiting
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assumed differences in the seasonality, series, and coin/bill ratio char
acteristics of domestic and overseas holdings of U.S. currency.
Since the seasonal component characteristic of the total U.S. cur
rency population (5) is directly measurable, but the seasonal character
istics of the domestic (5*0 and foreign (S°) are unobservable, Porter and
Judson assume that for the period 1947-1994, the seasonal component
of domestic U.S. currency holdings is identical to the observed sea
sonal pattern of the Canadian currency supply. 13 They furthermore
assume that there is no significant seasonal component in the foreign
demand for U.S. currency, so that the seasonal characteristic of over
seas holding of U.S. currency (5°) can be assumed to be equal to unity.
The seasonal variant of the MDM(S) model can then be estimated from
the equation:

(Eq.5)

S=$dSd + (l-$d)S°

where the seasonal characteristics are time dependent and:
S = SUS
Sd = SCAN
S°«l.
From Equation (3), it follows that the domestic share of currency hold
ings (p<0 is estimated as:
(Eq.6)

p'=(S-l)/(S«-l).

Table 2 presents Porter and Judson's reported estimates of the
denomination-specific share of U.S. currency held overseas for 1989.
The denomination-specific MDM(S) yields an overall estimated pro
portion of currency abroad of 62.4 percent for 1989 compared to the
estimated range of 45.8 to 53.0 percent from the MDM(A) age charac
teristic model. Concerning the composition of the currency held
abroad, the MDM(S) results suggest that 67.8 percent of foreign hold
ings are in the form of large denomination bills, and correspondingly
29.7 percent and 2.5 percent are held in the form of mid-sized and
small denomination notes.
A second variant of the MDM estimated by Porter and Judson
exploits differences between the series composition characteristic (57?)
of domestic and overseas notes to estimate the proportion of $100 and
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$50 circulating abroad. In 1991, the Federal Reserve introduced a 1990
series note which was distinguished from the pre-1990 series notes in
circulation'by a polyester strip and microprinting to deter counterfeit
ing. Let the series composition characteristic (SR) be the proportion of
the circulating note population (N) made up of new 1990 series notes
(A/90) so that (S/0 =
Table 2. Estimates of the Demographic Model
(MDMtC** 1; C**" 1 *; C^'MS)}
Annual Seasonal Characteristics
Estimated
$ value of $ value of Denomination
share of each outstanding
notes
composition of
denomination
notes
overseas
overseas
overseas 1989
1989
1989
currency
Denomination
(percent)
(billions)
(billions)
(percent)
$1
10.0
4.00
0.40
0.32
$5
54.2
2.70
4.99
2.18
$10
44.2
4.53
10.25
3.66
$20
59.1
54.67
32.31
26.09
$50
50.7
26.25
13.31
10.75
$100
72.0
70.60
98.17
57.00
Total
62.4
123.85
198.33
100.0

Since the series composition of the total currency population is
known, Porter and Judson require estimates of (SR) for both the
domestic and overseas components. They assume that the series com
position of "overseas" notes is adequately proxied by an estimate of the
series composition of notes processed by the New York Federal
Reserve, and that an estimate of the series composition of the notes
processed by all other Federal Reserve Banks adequately reflects the
"domestic" composition. 14 The MDM(SR) for series composition can
then be represented as:
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(Eq. 8)

SR = $dSRd + (1 -

where:
(SR) = A/90 / Nis known and, by assumption,
SR° « SR™.
The proportion of notes held domestically can be estimated as:
(Eq. 9)

= (SR - SR°)/( SR" - SR°) « (SR - SRNY) I (SRNonNY - SRNr).

Porter and Judson employ two different procedures for estimating
the domestic and overseas series composition characteristics, and table
3 presents their upper and lower bound estimates for the $50 and $100
denominations.
Table 3. Estimates of the Demographic Model
{MDM[Cdenl; Cdenld; Cdenio]:(SR)}
{MDM[C; C*; C°]:(C/N)}
Series and Coin or Coin/Note Ratio Characteristics

Estimated
share of each
denomination
overseas 1994
(percent)
Lower bound
Denomination series model

Estimated
share of each
denomination
overseas 1994
(percent)
Upper bound
series model

Estimated
Estimated
share of each
share of
denomination overseas
overseas 1994 currency 1989
(percent)
(percent)
Average
series model Coin ratio

$1-$20

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

$50

28.0

48.0

38.0

n.a.

$100

55.6

70.7

63.2

n.a.

Total

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

20.9

A third variant of the MDM employs the ratio of coins to notes as
the characteristic distinguishing domestic and overseas holdings of
currency. Since the coin/note ratio of the total U.S. currency population
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is directly observable, it remains to identify the coin/note ratio of
domestic and overseas holdings. Porter and Judson assume that the
domestic coin ratio can be represented by Canada's coin/note ratio and
that the overseas ratio is identically zero since virtually no U.S. coin is
held overseas. Let C/N represent the population ratio of coins to notes,
(C/N)d represent the domestic coin ratio, and (C/N)° the overseas coin
ratio. If (3d represents the fraction of U.S. currency held domestically,
then it follows from equation (3) that the MDM(C/N) can be repre
sented as:
(Eq. 10)

(C/N) « $d(C/N)d + (1 - $<*) (C/N)°.

By assumption,
(C/N)d ~(C/N)CAN and
(C/N)° « 0
therefore, (Equation 3) reduces to:
(Eq. 11)

(3* = (C/N) I (C/N)CAN.

As displayed in table 3, Porter and Judson's MDM(C/2V) estimate of
the share of U.S. currency held abroad in 1989 is 20.9 percent. 15
In order to examine the robustness of the MDM(S) results presented
by Porter and Judson, the model was reestimated employing the XI1
ARIMA method for calculating the multiplicative seasonal component
of notes in circulation for the United States and Canada. 16 Our reestimation of the MDM(S) confirms the Porter and Judson findings that the
model is incapable of producing sensible estimates at monthly or quar
terly frequencies. In particular, monthly and quarterly estimates of the
overseas share of U.S. currency reveal a strong seasonal component,
suggesting that the assumption that (S° « 1) may be unsustainable.
Even annual time series estimates of the overseas shares obtained from
the annual average of monthly seasonal components is quite different
from that derived by Porter and Judson, employing a seasonal ampli
tude metric of the difference between the December and February sea-
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sonals. Figure 8 presents the Porter and Judson time series of the
estimated share overseas [MDM(S):DEC-FEB] and the corresponding
estimate based on the average of monthly seasonal components
[MDM(S):Monthly Average]. The figure also includes the range of
1989 point estimates from the age characteristic model [MDM(Al)]
and [MDM(A2)], the overseas shares derived from the coin ratio model
[MDM(C/N)], and the average share of $100 notes derived from the
series characteristic model [MDM(SR)].
As displayed in figure 8, the monetary demography models produce
a wide range of estimates of the overseas share of U.S. currency and
different temporal patterns of the change in overseas holdings. Given
the diversity of results, and the strong assumptions required to produce
them, it is difficult to place much confidence in the foregoing findings.
Figure 8. Share of U.S. Currency Overseas
Monetary Demography Model Estimates
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The age characteristic model required the elimination of sample outli
ers before convergence could be obtained. The coin ratio model pro
duces negative overseas shares for the period 1972-82, and the
seasonal characteristic estimates produce implausible results at
monthly and quarterly frequencies. Both the seasonal and serial char
acteristic models require strong assumptions concerning the unob-
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served domestic and overseas characteristic specifications. Given these
difficulties, we now turn to several alternative approaches for estimat
ing the share of U.S. currency held abroad.

Note Ratio Models
The Note Ratio Model (NRM) provides an alternative means for
obtaining indirect estimates of the share of currency held abroad. The
known amount of U.S. notes in circulation (N) can be decomposed into
the unknown amount of notes in domestic circulation (Nd) and the
unknown amount circulating overseas (AP). Let Z denote any variable
that is assumed to affect the demand for notes. Then,

(Eq. 12)

N/Z = Nd/Z + N°/Z.

As with the MDM models, assume that the domestic U.S. ratio can be
proxied by the same ratio in Canada so that:

Nd/Z~(N/Z)CAN.
Substituting the Canadian ratio [(N/Z)CAN] into Equation (12), multiply
ing through by Z and dividing both sides by N yields a solution for the
unknown fraction of notes overseas (p°).

(Eq. 13)

(p") = N°/N = [N - (N/Zf™ • Z)]/N.

The simple note ratio model (NRM) is estimated for several variants
where Z alternatively represents:
(i) Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)
(ii) Personal Disposable Income (PDI)
(iii) Population (POP) x Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Figure 9 presents the estimated share of U.S. currency held overseas
from each of the variants of the note ratio model: NRM(PCE),
NRM(PDI), and NRM(POP, CPI). The results suggest that the share of
U.S. notes held overseas declined for almost a decade between the
early 1960s and the early 1970s and then rose significantly over the
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next two decades. The peak in overseas holdings appears to have
occurred in 1990 when roughly 30 to 35 percent of U.S. notes in circu
lation are estimated to be held abroad. The time series of estimated
shares of currency held abroad derived from the note ratio models yield
markedly lower shares abroad than those estimated by the seasonal
variant of the MDM and higher shares than those estimated by the
MDM(ON).
Figure 9. Share of U.S. Currency Overseas
Note Ratio Models
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Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of annual estimates of the
share of currency overseas obtained from each of the indirect methods.
The correlation matrix reveals relatively high correlations between all
of the NRM estimates and the MDM(CYN) estimate of overseas shares.
Comparing the MDM(S) estimate obtained from annual averages of
the estimated monthly seasonal components with the MDM(S):Dec.Feb. estimate (employing the difference between December and Febru
ary seasonal components) reveals that the two alternative methods of
computing the seasonal estimates yield very different results. The cor-

Table 4. Correlation Matrix of Indirect Annual Estimates of Share of Currency Overseas: 1962-1994
MDM(C/N)
MDM(C/N)
1.000
MDM(S)
0.079
MDM(S):Dec.-Feb.
0.601
NRM(PCE)
0.879
NRM(PDI)
0.744
NRM(POP,CPI)
0.835

MDM(S)
0.079
1.000
0.393
-0.136
-0.026
-0.301

MDM(S):Dec.-Feb. NRM(PCE)
0.601
0.879
0.393
-0.136
1.000
0.678
0.678
1.000
0.864
0.916
0.231
0.828

NRM(PDI) NRM(POP,CPI)
0.744
0.835
-0.026
-0.301
0.864
0.231
0.916
0.828
1.000
0.552
0.552
1.000

u>
to
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relation between the two seasonal model estimates is only .393, sug
gesting that the model is quite sensitive to the arbitrary choice of a
metric. The MDM(S) displays low and negative correlations with the
other estimates, whereas the smoothed MDM(S):Dec.-Feb. series dis
plays positive correlations with the other estimates.
Indirect Estimates of Net Outflows of U.S. Currency

Given the wide range of estimates of the share of currency abroad
produced by different models, we turn our attention to estimating the
net outflows of currency implied by each of the MDM and NRM mod
els. Given the known total stock of notes in circulation and indirect
estimates of the share of currency abroad, we obtain year-end estimates
of the total stock of currency estimated to be held abroad. 17 The differ
ence in these estimated year-end overseas stocks yields estimates of the
annual net outflows of currency from the U.S.
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix of the estimated net outflows
derived from each of the indirect methods, and figure 10 displays the
estimated net outflows. The net outflow estimates from the different
Figure 10. Annual Net Outflows of U.S. Currency
NRM and MDM Estimates
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix of Annual Estimates of Net Outflows of Currency Overseas: 1962-1994
MDM(C/N)
1.000
MDM(C/N)
0.884
MDM(S)
MDM(S):Dec.-Feb.
0.859
0.770
NRM(PCE)
0.660
NRM(PDI)
0.872
NRM(POP,CPI)

MDM(S)
0.884
1.000
0.990
0.793
0.732
0.853

MDM(S):Dec.-Feb. NRM(PCE)
0.770
0.859
0.793
0.990
0.791
1.000
0.791
1.000
0.726
0.758
0.763
0.847

NRM(PDI)
0.660
0.732
0.758
0.726
1.000
0.769

NRM(POP,CPI)
0.872
0.853
0.847
0.763
0.769
1.000

Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Indirect Annual Net Outflow Estimates ($ Millions)
Mean
Std. Dev.

MDM(C/N)
3,704
7,938

MDM(S)
7,041
6,627

MDM(S):Dec.-Feb. NRM(PCE)
7,122
3,148
6,593
5,502

NRM(PDI)
2,834
3,653

NRM(POP,CPI)
3,297
5,279
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models appear to be more highly correlated with one another than the
estimated net outflows. The net outflow estimates from the different
models appear to be more highly correlated with one another than the
share estimates, suggesting that the indirect methods may produce
more accurate estimates of outflows than shares abroad. The major dif
ference between the estimated net outflows is their magnitudes. As dis
played in table 6, the MDM seasonal estimates yield average annual
outflows that exceed the highest estimate produced by the other models
by more than $3.3 billion per year. Given these disparities, we turn our
attention to direct estimates of net outflows of U.S. currency.

Direct Estimates of Net Outflows of U.S. Currency
Large shipments of U.S. currency into and out of the United States
are typically handled by a small number of commercial banks that spe
cialize in the business of bulk currency transport. These large currency
shipments have been informally reported to the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York cash office since 1988. Although the period spanned by
these confidential estimates is short, and the data are not comprehen
sive, being limited to major shippers operating in the New York Federal
Reserve District, they provide useful information on a portion of bulk
cash shipments to and from the United States. 18 Interviews with Fed
eral Reserve officials suggest that much of the currency employed for
bulk overseas currency shipments by the major transporting banks is
supplied by the New York Federal Reserve Bank in the form of $100
denomination notes. Employing FR-160 data, Feige (1994a) observed
a correlation of .979 between the net value of $100 denomination notes
(NYNET) injected into circulation by the New York Federal Reserve
and the net amount of currency shipped overseas as recorded in the
confidential data series on bulk shipments abroad informally collected
by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Feige (1994a) employed
(NYNET) as a proxy for net outflows of bulk currency shipments for
the period 1974-1988, and this proxy was subsequently used by Porter
and Judson (1995) as a proxy measure of total currency flows overseas.
The second direct measure of currency inflows and outflows is col
lected as part of the regulatory responsibility of the U.S. Customs Ser-
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vice. Enacted in October 1970, the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act (also known as the "Bank Secrecy Act") required per
sons or institutions importing or exporting currency or other monetary
instruments in amounts exceeding $5,000, to file a Report of Interna
tional Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments. These
reports, commonly known as CMIRs, have been collected by the U.S.
Customs Service since 1977. In 1980, the required reporting limit was
raised to $10,000. Although the CMIR data system was established
with the aim of recording individual instances of cross border inflows
and outflows of currency and monetary instruments, its micro data
components can be usefully aggregated to study the size, origin, and
destination of cross border currency flows. Since its inception, the
CMIR data system has collected 2.3 million inbound filings and more
than 300,000 outbound filings. With the cooperation of the U.S. Cus
toms Service and the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the information contained in the mil
lions of accumulated confidential individual CMIR forms was com
bined by a specially designed algorithm that aggregated currency
inflows and outflows by mode of transport and by origin and destina
tion.
The CMIR data system represents the most comprehensive source
of direct information on currency flows. It differs from the informal
Federal Reserve data system (proxied by NYNET) in several important
respects. It contains all reported currency inflows and outflows whether
physically carried by individuals or shipped by financial institutions.
The only excluded transactions are those that fall below the reporting
requirements, direct shipments by Federal Reserve Banks, and ship
ments that circumvent the legal reporting requirements. The CMIR
data are therefore more inclusive than the Federal Reserve informal
series, which is limited to bank shipments to and from the New York
Federal Reserve District by large bulk shippers.
Figure 11 displays the net outflows of U.S. currency as derived from
the two direct sources of information pertaining to net outflows. The
figure contains the NYNET proxy for the Federal Reserve informal
series as well as the total net outflows as reported in the CMIR reports
(CTNET). Figure 11 also displays two key components of the CMIR
source data, namely the series of transported net outflows reported by
financial institutions (CSNET) and the net outflows physically carried
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by individuals (CCNET). The total net outflow series derived from the
CMIR reports differs markedly from both the NYNET series and the
net outflow series derived from indirect methods. In particular, CTNET
suggests a significantly lower volume of net outflows than any of the
other estimates. The source of the difference is largely due to the indi
vidual component (CCNET), which suggests that individuals physi
cally transported larger amounts of currency into the United States than
out of the United States for all periods except 1990. Since individual
transactions are not recorded in the informal Federal Reserve data, it is
necessary to examine more closely the conceptual relationship
between CMIR direct source information on net outflows and the
information on net outflows obtained by other direct and indirect
means.
Figure 11. Direct Estimates of Net Outflows
NYNET and CMIR Annual Estimates
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Conceptual and Empirical Comparisons
of Direct Measures of Currency Flows

Table 7 presents a conceptual comparison of the coverage of the
CMIR reporting system and the Federal Reserve reporting system. The
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table reveals that there are major differences in the conceptual content
and coverage of the CMIR and FED currency flow data systems. In
order to derive meaningful comparisons between the information con
tent of the two reporting systems, it is first necessary to obtain mea
sures of currency inflows and outflows that are conceptually
comparable between the two data systems. 19 An algorithm was there
fore written to aggregate the micro CMIR data records into currency
flows that would be comparable to FED data in both content and cover
age.
Table 7. Content Comparison of CMIR and FED Currency Flow
Reporting Systems
Federal Reserve
Aggregate transactions of
large bulk shippers
2.3 million inflow records Approximately 62,000
Number of records
300,000 outflow records records (7 years x 12
months x 8 banks x 93
countries)
Monthly— 1988-1994
Monthly— 1977-1994
Time periods
New York banks
Major
banks
reporting
All
Private institutions
New York Federal
Federal Reserve banks Not included
Reserve
Not reported
Reported cross border
Individuals
currency transport £
$5,000 (pre-1980);
> $10,000 (1980-1994)
Entire U.S. (all Federal New York Federal
Domestic coverage
Reserve Branch
Reserve Districts)
93 countries
220 countries
Overseas coverage8

Characteristics
Level of aggregation

CMIR
Individual transactions

a.The countries reported in the two data systems do not match exactly. Differences reflect tempo
ral name changes and different levels of country aggregation (i.e., United Kingdom vs. England
and Scotland). A separate comparison algorithm was written which resolves these difficulties and
creates two country sets: those included in both the Federal Reserve and CMIR data systems and
those included in the CMIR system but not in the FED system.

Table 8 (A and B) presents an aggregation scheme for the CMIR
data system that creates observations on particular currency inflows

Table 8(A). CMIR-Currency Inflow Matrix: Notation
Shipped by bank

Mode of transport

Destination district
NY district
All other districts
Total CMIR

FED
countries
CSINYF
CSIOF
CSIF

All other
countries
CSINYO
CSIOO
CSIO

Carried by individual
Country of origin
Total
All other
FED
Total
carried
countries
countries
shipped
CCINY
CCINYO
CCINYF
CSINY
CCIO
CCIOO
CCIOF
CSIO
CCI
CCIO
CCIF
CSI

Total CMIR

CTINY

cno
CTI

Table 8(B). CMIR-Currency Outflow Matrix: Notation
Total CMIR
Carried by individual
Shipped by bank
Mode of transport
Destination country
Total
All other
FED
Total
All other
FED
carried
countries
countries
shipped
countries
countries
District of origin
CTONY
CCONY
CCONYF CCONYO
CSONY
CSONYF CSONYO
NY district
CTOO
CCOO
CCOOO
CCOOF
CSO
CSOOO
CSOOF
All other districts
CTO
CCO
CCOO
CCOF
CSO
CSOO
CSOF
Total CMIR
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and outflows that are conceptually comparable to the currency inflows
and outflows believed to be captured in the Federal Reserve data sys
tem.20 Individual CMIR currency inflow and outflow transaction
reports are aggregated by mode of cross border transport and by the
geographic origin and destination of the currency flow. Thus, for cur
rency inflows, total CMIR inflows (C77) were first disaggregated by
mode of transport into transactions involving shipment by a financial
institution (CS7) and transactions involving currency physically carried
by individuals (CCT). Shipped inflows (C57) were then further disag
gregated by country of origin and Federal Reserve District of destina
tion. It was then possible to recombine the shipped inflows into four
exhaustive categories reflecting:
1. All shipments whose country of origin was contained in the FED
data system and whose destination was the New York Federal Reserve
District (CSINYF);
2. All shipments whose country of origin was not in the FED data
system but whose destination was the New York Federal Reserve Dis
trict (CSINYO);
3. All shipments whose country of origin was included in the FED
data system but whose destination district was not New York (CSIOF);
and
4. All shipments whose country or origin was not in the FED data
system and whose district of destination was not New York (CSIOO).
Table 9 (A and B) presents the same inflow and outflow matrix for
the FED data system, indicating that the only conceptually comparable
currency flows captured by both data systems is CSINYF=FSI and
CSONYF=FSO. None of the other flows captured by the CMIR data is
available in the FED data. The Federal Reserve data system excludes
currency shipments whose origin or destination are the eleven nonNew York Federal Reserve Districts as well as shipments whose origin
and destination are countries other than those appearing in the FED
data system. The FED data also excludes all inflows and outflows of
currency physically transported by individuals.
In order to gauge the empirical importance of the conceptual infor
mation content excluded from the FED data system, table 10 (A and B)

Table 9(A). FED-Currency Inflow Matrix: Notation
Mode of transport

Destination district
NY district
All other districts
Total FED

Shipped by bank
FED
countries
FSI
NA
NA

All other
countries
NA
NA
NA

Table 9(B). FED-Currency Outflow Matrix: Notation
Shipped by bank
Mode of transport

District of origin
NY district
All other districts
Total FED

FED
countries
FSO
NA
NA

All other
countries
NA
NA
NA

Carried by individual
Country of origin
Total
All other
FED
Total
carried
countries
countries
shipped
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

Total FED

Carried by individual
Destination country
Total
All other
FED
Total
carried
countries
countries
shipped
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

Total FED

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

Table 10(A). CMIR-Currency Inflow Matrix: Percent of Total Currency Inflows (CTI) by Source
Mode of transport

Destination district
NY district
All other districts
Total CMIR

Shipped by bank
FED
countries
50.9
15.5
66.4

All other
countries
0.5
1.2
1.7

Carried by individual
Country of origin
Total
FED
All other
Total
shipped
countries
countries
carried
51.5
3.8
0.5
4.2
16.7
23.7
27.6
3.9
68.2
27.4
4.4
31.8

Total CMIR

55.7
44.3
100.0

Table 10(B). CMIR-Currency Outflow Matrix: Percent of Total Currency Outflows (CTO) by Source
Mode of transport
Shipped by bank
Carried by individual
Total CMIR
Destination country
All other
FED
Total
All other
FED
Total
District of origin
countries
countries
shipped
countries
countries
carried
NY district
82.9
0.9
83.8
1.7
0.1
1.8
85.6
All other districts
4.4
6.2
1.8
5.2
2.9
8.1
14.4
Total CMIR
87.3
2.7
90.0
3.1
6.9
10.0
100.0
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presents a percentage breakdown of the various disaggregated inflows
and outflows contained in the CMIR data for the period 1988-1994
which corresponds to the time interval covered by the Federal Reserve
statistics.
A major finding is immediately apparent from table 10 (A and B)
concerning the relationship between Federal Reserve data as proxied
by NYNET and CMIR data. Only 50.9 percent of all recorded CMIR
inflows are likely to be captured by the FED data system, whereas 82.9
percent of all CMIR outflows are likely to be recorded by the FED data
system. Since the CMIR data system includes many inflows of cur
rency which are not represented in the FED data source, the FED net
outflow series will overstate the net outflows of currency abroad and
therefore give the misleading impression that a larger fraction of U.S.
currency is held abroad.
Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations of various
direct measures of average quarterly gross currency inflows and out
flows. Comparing the means of the Federal Reserve and CMIR inflow
and outflow estimates reveals that the CMIR data are considerably
more inclusive than the Federal Reserve estimates.21 Recorded average
quarterly CMIR total currency inflows (CTI) exceed Federal Reserve
(FSI) recorded bulk receipts of currency by some $2.86 billion. Simi
larly, recorded average CMIR total currency (CTO) outflows exceed
Federal Reserve (FSO) bulk currency shipments by $1.39 billion per
quarter. However, when conceptually comparable magnitudes are com
pared we find that CMIR estimates of bulk shipments to the New York
Federal Reserve District from countries included in the FED data sys
tem (CSINYF) are, as expected, very close to the FED data (FSI). This
is true to an even greater extent for comparable outflows.
Comparing conceptually comparable magnitudes reduces the inflow
discrepancy to less than $.2 billion (2,765-2,567) and the outflow dis
crepancy (6,015-5,869) to $.15 billion. The average quarterly inflows
of all commercially shipped currency (CSI) recorded by the CMIR
data still exceed the Federal Reserve's estimated inflows (FSI) by
roughly $1.13 billion while the average CMIR shipped outflows (CSO)
exceed the Federal Reserve's estimates of outflows (FSO) by $.67 bil
lion per quarter. These discrepancies are due to the fact that 16.7 per
cent of total CMIR currency shipped inflows arrive at banks outside the
New York district, and 6.2 percent of CMIR outflows originate at banks
outside of New York. The Federal Reserve's data appear to understate
gross inflows to a greater degree than they understate gross outflows,

Table 11(A). Descriptive Statistics of Direct Measures of Quarterly Gross Currency Inflows, 1988-1994
$ (Mil.)
Mean
Std. Dev.

CCI
1,729
1,074

CSI
3,700
2,062

CSINYF
2,765
1,756

cn
5,429
2,219

FSI
2,567
1,742

NYIN
2,028
1,271

Table 11(B). Descriptive Statistics of Direct Measures of Quarterly Gross Currency Outflows, 1988-1994
$ (Mil.)
cco
cso
CSONYF
CTO
FSO
NYOUT
Mean
724
6,535
6,015
7,259
5,869
6,265
Std. Dev.
583
2,473
2,532
2,539
3,250
3,045
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leading to an overstatement of net shipped currency outflows. This is
true to an even greater extent for the shipment proxy (NYNET). As dis
played in table 10, individuals physically transport 31.9 percent of total
gross inflows but only 10 percent of total gross outflows. 22 Since the
FED data do not include currency physically transported by individu
als, the overstatement of net outflows is further accentuated. Any con
clusions derived from Federal Reserve data or from series closely
correlated with FED data (such as NYNET), are therefore likely to
overstate net outflows and therefore lead to the erroneous conclusion
that foreign holdings of U.S. currency are increasing at a faster rate
than is in fact the case.
This conclusion is subject to one caveat. It is likely that the CMIR
filing compliance rate is higher for currency physically carried into the
United States than for currency physically carried out of the United
States, since U.S. Customs forms are routinely collected from incom
ing travelers. During the period 1988-94, there were roughly nine
inflow filings for every one outflow filing, and the average size of
reported outflows was almost four times larger than the average size of
the corresponding reported inflow. The underreporting of physically
transported outflows and their large average size would induce a down
ward bias to the carried currency component of CMIR net outflows.
In summary, the CMIR data represent the most comprehensive
direct measure of currency inflows and outflows. We have shown that
the one component of the CMIR data that can be directly compared
with other direct data sources is very reliable. As displayed in table 12,
the CMIR measure of net shipped New York outflows (CSNYFNET) is
almost identical to the conceptually comparable figure (FSNET)
yielded by the FED data system. The total CMIR quarterly net out
flows (CTNET = CSNET + CCNET) are approximately $.47 billion
lower than the average of quarterly net outflows estimated from the
note ratio models (PCE; PDI; POP.CPI) whereas the NYNET and
SEANET estimates are approximately $2.4 billion higher. The CMIR
data's lower estimate of net outflows appears to be entirely due to the
component (CCNET) representing physical transport of currency by
individuals. This component is negatively correlated or uncorrelated
with other net outflow measures. The individual component of the
CMIR either reflects a unique information signal not contained in the
other series or it may be the result of a compliance bias that differen-

Table 12. Direct and Indirect Measures of Quarterly Net Currency Outflows, 1988-1994
$(Mil.)
Mean

CCNET
-1,005

CSNET
2,835

CTNET CSNYFNET PCE
1,830
3,250
2,391

PDI
1,839

POPCPI
2,661

NYNET SEANET FSNET
4,237
4,201
3,303
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tially effects the incoming and outgoing reporting of individual trans
port of currency.
Unrecorded Travel and Remittance Flows

The only inflows and outflows not captured by the CMIR direct
measures are those flows that fall below the reporting requirement and
those flows that should legally be reported but escape detection due to
noncompliance. If these flows are relatively large, and outflows sub
stantially exceeded inflows, they could account for some of the
observed disparities between the CMIR measure and other estimates of
net outflows.
Three flows require further investigation. Unrecorded inflows
include U.S. currency carried into the country by foreign travelers vis
iting the United States below the filing threshold; unrecorded outflows
include U.S. currency taken abroad by U.S. travelers and net remit
tances of currency sent abroad. To estimate the size of these flows we
examined annual data on total expenditures net of airfares made in the
United States by foreign travelers to this country and total expenditures
made by U.S. travelers abroad for the period 1962-1994.23 To simulate
the net outflows of currency deriving from travelers we assumed that
prior to the widespread use of credit cards, foreign travelers to the U.S.
made 20 percent of their purchases of goods and services with U.S.
currency brought into the country from abroad, whereas U.S. travelers
carried U.S. currency out of the country to cover 10 percent of their
expected overseas expenditures. These proportions were reduced over
time to allow for the growing use of credit cards. Net remittances are
estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, whose economists sug
gested that, at most, 10 percent of remittances involve transfers of U.S.
currency. Our simulations over several sets of plausible assumptions
revealed that annual net outflows of U.S. currency from travel and
remittance sources rarely exceeded $.5 billion and in most recent
years, net outflows from these sources were actually negative. We con
clude that the net currency flows arising from travel and remittance
transactions that may be excluded from CMIR reports are too small to
account for the disparities between CMIR net outflows and those esti
mated by indirect means. If anything, travel flow estimates tend to
accentuate the observed discrepancies.

48 Overseas Holdings of U.S. Currency and the Underground Economy

Composite Estimates
Given the diversity of indicators of the unknown net flows of cur
rency overseas, it is desirable to combine these alternative measures in
order to obtain a single composite estimate of net currency outflows
based on all available information. One approach is to use a factor
analysis model to estimate the common signal or latent variable (L,)
associated with several alternative indicators of net overseas currency
flows (M,-r). In the factor model,

each of the Af,- indicators of net outflows is linearly related to the latent
common factor (L,). The |J,-'s represent the factor loadings and the e,,
are the temporal measurement errors in each of the i measures of net
currency outflows.24 Since different estimates of net outflows are avail
able for different time periods and different frequencies, we estimated
several factor models for both annual and quarterly frequencies in
order to examine the stability of the results. The variables employed
and the periods covered by the various estimates are as follows:
Annual Factor Model 1 (API) - Period 1962-1994
Six variables: Net outflows: MDM(S); NRM(PDI); NRM(PCE);
NRM(POP,CPI); MDM(C/N); TRAV.25
Quarterly Factor Model 1 (QF1) - Period 1961:1 - 1994:4
Four variables: Net outflows: NRM(PDI); NRM(PCE);
NRM(POP,CPI): MDM(ON).
Quarterly Factor Model 2 (QF2) - Period 1977:1 - 1994:4
Seven variables: Net Outflows: CCNET; CSNET; NYNET;
NRM(PDI); NRM(PCE); NRM(POP,CPI); MDM(ON).
Figure 12 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of annualized
net outflows derived from each of the foregoing factor models. The
temporal pattern of all the estimates is broadly similar, suggesting a
rising level of net outflows during the decade of the 1980s and a signif
icant upward shift in net outflows during the early 1990s, largely asso
ciated with the increased use of U.S. currency as a co-circulating
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medium of exchange in Eastern Europe and the newly independent
republics of the former Soviet Union. The annual model (AF1), incor
porating MDM, NRM, and TRAV results produces the highest esti
mated net outflows during the most recent years, whereas the sevenvariable quarterly model (QF2) employing direct (CMIR) and proxy
estimates (NYNET) as well as MDM and NRM estimates produces the
lower bound net outflow estimates. Given these alternative factor
model net outflow estimates, it remains to determine what current
share of overseas holdings is consistent with the net outflow evidence.
To examine the plausibility of alternative assumptions concerning the
current share of U.S. notes held abroad, we conducted a series of simu
lation experiments to determine the implied share of currency held
domestically, given alternative assumptions concerning the present
share of U.S. notes abroad.
Figure 12. Estimated Factor Model Net Outflows
1962-1994 Annual Net Outflows
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Figures 13 and 14, respectively, display the implied shares of cur
rency held domestically over time assuming that the current share of
Figures 13 and 14 respectively, display the implied shares of currency
held domestically over time assuming that the current share of notes
held overseas is 40 percent and 60 percent. For the 40 percent Figures
13 and 14 respectively, display the implied shares of currency held
domestically over time assuming that the current share of notes held
overseas is 40 percent and 60 percent. For the 40 percent abroad simu
lation, all of the factor model estimates imply a feasible range of
domestic holdings between 0 and 100 percent, whereas the 60 percent
abroad simulations produce infeasible estimates which suggest that
prior to the mid-1970s no U.S. currency was held domestically.26
Figure 13. Domestic Share of U.S. Currency
Simulation: 1994=40% of Notes Overseas
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On the basis of the foregoing simulations, we conclude that the most
plausible estimate of the share of U.S. notes presently held abroad is
roughly 40 percent, which implies that roughly 36 percent of U.S. cur
rency is held abroad.27 Employing this current value, figure 15 displays
the implied time series of the share of currency held overseas between
1973 and 1994 for each of the factor model net outflow estimates.
Given the considerable range of overseas shares implied by the three
factor model estimates, we conclude that precise estimates of the
domestic money supply remain elusive.
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Figure 14. Domestic Share of U.S. Currency
Simulation: 1994=60% of Notes Overseas

100

62

64

68

70

72

74

76

78 80
Year

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

AF(1)-6Var. -»- QF(1)-4Var. -*- QF(2)-7Var.

Figure 15. Foreign Holdings of U.S. Currency
Percent of Currency Held Abroad
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Implications of Foreign Holdings of U.S. Currency
for Estimates of the Domestic Unreported Economy
The provisional estimates of overseas holdings suggest that earlier
currency ratio model estimates of the unreported economy were misspecified insofar as they erroneously assumed that the entire stock of
U.S. currency was held domestically. It is now possible to reestimate
the currency ratio models employing the new alternative estimates of
the domestic stock of U.S. currency.
Figures 16 and 17 display estimates of total unreported income
obtained from both the simple C/D model and the OCR model employ
ing alternative factor model estimates of the domestic U.S. currency
stock. Figure 18 displays the OCR estimates of unreported income as a
percentage of AGI.
Total unreported income appears to have grown secularly until
1985, declined briefly around the time of the 1986 tax reform, and then
peaked in 1991. The temporal pattern of the alternative OCR estimates
of unreported income as a percent of AGI tells essentially the same
story. Unreported income appears to have grown rapidly from 1966
and peaked as a percent of AGI in 1980. The percent of unreported
income then declined until 1987, rose again until 1991, and fell again
to a lower level approximating levels last observed in the early 1970s.
Of the three factor model estimates of the domestic currency supply,
the QF2 estimate may be the most reliable, being based on quarterly
frequencies and the largest amount of direct and indirect information
concerning net currency outflows. The QF2 estimates from both the
simple C/D and GCR models suggest that total unreported income in
1993 was roughly $700 billion, representing approximately 20 percent
of AGI.
The main conclusion to be drawn from these revised estimates of
unreported activity is that once account is taken of foreign holdings of
U.S. currency, the range of uncertainty concerning the magnitude of
unreported income is substantially reduced. The difference between
the unadjusted GCR estimates of unreported income and the IRS esti
mates for 1992 (figure 7) amounted to more than $400 billion. The
revised estimates displayed in figure 17 reveal that the difference
between the IRS estimate and the QF2 estimate is now reduced to
roughly $100 billion.
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Figure 16. Total Unreported Income
Adjusted C/D Models: 1973=IRS Base
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Figure 17. Total Unreported Income
Adjusted GCR Models: 1973=IRS Base
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Figure 18 reveals that unreported income as a percent of AGI varies
considerably over time. Whereas earlier studies of the underground
economy reported its secular growth in both absolute and relative
terms, the most recent data suggest that since 1980, unreported income
as a percent of AGI has fluctuated quite dramatically. The two most
plausible explanations of these fluctuations in unreported income are
changes in average tax rates and changes in the level of dissatisfaction
with government.
Figure 19 displays the relationship between the QF2 revised esti
mates of unreported income as a percent of AGI to the average effec
tive federal tax rate, and figure 20 displays the relationship between
unreported income and an index of dissatisfaction with government.28
Figure 19 reveals that tax evasion does appear to rise in response to
higher average taxes, and conversely falls when the incentives to cheat
are reduced by lower average tax rates. Similarly, in figure 20 we find
the expected relationship between tax evasion activity and the level of
dissatisfaction with government. The dramatic fall in the level of dis
satisfaction with the government between 1980 and 1984, coincides
with a fall in the relative level of tax evasion. Conversely, the increases
in the level of dissatisfaction with government observed between the
mid-1980s and 1990 are associated with a relative increase in tax eva
sion activities. It seems that when taxpayers perceive their public rep
resentatives to be dishonest, and when they perceive a decline in the
public benefits obtained from their tax dollars, they are more likely to
engage in tax evasion.
The finding that a substantial portion of U.S. currency is held over
seas provides a partial resolution of the currency enigma. It will be
recalled that Federal Reserve surveys suggest that U.S. households
admit to holding roughly 12 percent of the nation's currency, firms
account for roughly 3 percent, the unreported economy employs
roughly 4 percent, and foreign holdings amount to roughly 36 percent.
These estimates suggest that we have accounted for 55 percent of the
nation's currency supply, leaving 45 percent still to be explained. Por
ter and Judson (1995), who place considerable emphasis on their ver
sion of the MDM(S) and MDM(SR) results, suggest that a much larger
fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad—between 50 percent and 70
percent. Our analysis suggests that these estimates of overseas hold-
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Figure 18. Unreported Income as a Percent of AGI
Adjusted GCR Models: 1973=IRS Base
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Figure 19. Unreported Income and Tax Rate
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ings are too high. We are more inclined to believe that survey respon
dents may systematically underreport the amounts of currency they
hold and that surveys of currency usage may understate actual domes
tic holdings because of self-selection biases. Whether these domestic
cash hoards are derived from underground activities that we continue
to underestimate, or from legitimate activities that are simply underrecorded in our NIPA accounts, remains to be resolved.
The finding that roughly 36 percent of the stock of U.S. currency is
currently overseas raises another monetary puzzle. Are foreign hold
ings of U.S. currency being used solely as a store of value or do they
function as a co-circulating medium of exchange? Preliminary evi
dence (Feige 1994) based on an investigation of the age and quality of
Figure 20. Unreported Income and Dissatisfaction
1973-1994
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some 200,000 individual notes suggests that the age/quality distribu
tions of domestically circulating notes and notes returning to the
United States from abroad are quite similar. These findings suggest that
the velocity of domestically held currency is on average not that differ-
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ent from the velocity of currency held abroad. If foreigners' holdings
of U.S. currency circulate at the same rate as that of U.S. household
holdings, they would generate a flow of annual cash payments
approaching the size of the GDP of the United States. Thus, the partial
resolution of the currency enigma for the United States merely creates
another monetary anomaly for the rest of the world. The world econ
omy appears to subsume a U.S.-sized unrecorded economy that
employs U.S. currency as its medium of exchange. The world's cur
rency enigma deepens when one considers that our revised estimates of
U.S. per capita currency holdings are still modest compared with the
per capita currency holdings of other developed European and Asian
nations. The problem of missing currency is not limited to the U.S. dol
lar but also extends to other major currencies, most importantly to the
German mark and the Japanese yen.
NOTES
1. Currency in circulation refers to the amount of currency held outside of the Treasury and
Federal Reserve. Except for small amounts of currency that may have been inadvertently lost or
destroyed by the public (Laurent 1974), currency in circulation includes the holdings of financial
intermediaries and the public. Reliable data on financial intermediary holdings of vault cash are
readily available, and it is therefore possible to obtain accurate estimates of the total stock of cur
rency outside the banking system. For a complete description of the cash payments system, see
Feige (1994).
2. The taxonomy of "underground economies," which identifies the interrelationships between
the illegal, unreported, unrecorded, and informal economies, is discussed in Feige (1989,1990a).
3. On page A-101 of the IRS (1988) report, the IRS acknowledges the major limitations of its
projections of unreported income: "Because we essentially hold constant rates of noncompliance
through 1992, these estimates do not reflect recent trends in noncompliance. Second,we assume
that tax reform has no impact on individual's behavior in terms of either their propensity for noncompliance or the types of incomes individuals will receive in future years. Third, these projec
tions are sensitive to changes in macroeconomic model projections of incomes in future years."
4. The IRS estimates reported above are based on the recommendations of the tax examiners.
Since some of these recommendations are challenged by the taxpayer, the IRS also prepared an
alternative set of estimates on an assessed basis. These are reported in Appendix E (IRS 1988).
5. As described in Feige (1989), the foregoing restrictions imply that the ratio of unreported
(Yu) to reported (Yo) income can be estimated as follows:
Yw/K? = (C-koD)l(ko+l)D
where:

C = Currency
D = Checkable Deposits
ko = Co/Do.
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6. The general currency ratio model (OCR) permits a relaxation of several of the assumptions
employed in the simple currency ratio model. In particular, currency needs no longer to be the
exclusive medium of exchange in unreported transactions, and any year for which an independent
estimate of unreported income is available can serve as a benchmark.
The GCR model can be solved to obtain the equation for the ratio of unreported income
which is:
Yu/Yo = (ku+l)(C-koD)/(ko+l)(kuD-Q
where:
ku and ko respectively represent the currency-deposit ratios in the unreported and in the
reported economies.
7. The IRS estimate is the sum of the legal source unreported income estimate displayed in
figure 3 plus a IS percent imputation for illegal source income. The imputation for illegal source
income is based on the illegal source income estimates reported in the earlier (IRS 1983) study.
The currency ratio models yield estimates of total unreported income from all sources.
8. The methodology for estimating the velocity (turnover) of currency is described in Feige
(1990b). The estimates are based on the Federal Reserve's Survey of Currency Usage, which finds
that the income velocity of household cash holdings is roughly fifty turnovers per year. Share
weighted denomination-specific velocities are obtained by estimating the average lifetime of each
note denomination derived from FR-160 data on currency issues (births) and redemptions
(deaths).
9. The research reported here is one of several approaches undertaken as part of a broader
study for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury Depart
ment Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on estimating foreign holdings of U.S.
currency.
10. The application of demographic theory and methods to currency populations is developed
in Feige (1990b), which includes estimates of age-specific currency mortality and survival rates.
Feige (1994) presents a full demographic model describing the life cycle of the individual note
and the dynamics of note populations and cohorts.
11. See the 1990 Federal Reserve Soil Level Impact Task Force (SLITF) study entitled "Com
prehensive Assessment of U.S. Currency Quality, Age & Cost Relationships."
12. The estimates presented for denominations $1, $5, $50, $100 are averages obtained from
Baselines 1 and 2 of the SLITF study. The Baseline 1 model for the $10 denomination and the
Baseline 2 estimates for the $20 denomination failed to converge even after significant outliers
were deleted from the samples. We therefore report a range of estimates for these two denomina
tions. The similarity of the age distributions of overseas and domestic notes suggests that the
reported results are likely to contain a wide margin or error.
13. The assumption is justified by the argument that the U.S. and Canada have identical cur
rency denomination structures and that the Canadian dollar is rarely used overseas.
14. Porter and Judson claim that almost all currency sent to and received from abroad is pro
cessed by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The veracity of this assumption can be tested by
an examination of CMIR data disaggregated by Federal Reserve District of origin and destination.
The CMIR data reveal that only 52 percent of all reported currency inflows for the period 1977
and 1994 had the New York Federal Reserve District as their point of destination. The New York
District was reported as the point of origin for 85 percent of total outflows during the period.
15. The reported results include an adjustment of the coin/note ratio to take account of the
introduction of a one dollar coin in Canada in July 1987. The Bank of Canada continued to issue
one dollar notes until June 30,1989, at which time there were 246 million of the one dollar coins
in circulation. By the end of 1989, the number of one dollar coins in circulation had risen to 464
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million. The reported results are based on a time series forecast of what the coin/note ratio would
have been in the absence of the introduction of the one dollar coin.
16. Porter and Judson obtained the seasonal components employing the STL seasonal adjust
ment procedure applied to the currency component (coin plus notes) of the Canadian and U.S. Ml
series. In our replication, we employed the XI1 ARIMA procedure on the Canadian and U.S.
notes in circulation series, since neither Canadian nor U.S. coins are assumed to circulate over
seas. The results reported by Porter and Judson are not based on the ratio of seasonal components
as specified by Equation (6), but rather on the ratio of the seasonal amplitudes of the U.S. and
Canadian series, derived by taking the difference between the December and February seasonals
(Porter and Judson 1995, pp. 16-17). Our replication efforts suggest that the results are relatively
insensitive to the use of different seasonal adjustment procedures and the substitution of the note
series for the currency component series. However, the time series estimates of the share abroad
are quite sensitive to the use of the seasonal amplitude metric employed by Porter and Judson. In
particular, when the MDM(S) model is estimated on a monthly or quarterly basis, and the esti
mated monthly or quarterly overseas share is estimated as the ratio of each of the seasonal compo
nents minus one as suggested by Equation (6), the estimated monthly and quarterly shares abroad
fluctuate wildly within a year, often yielding estimates of the share abroad that exceed 100 per
cent.
17. Throughout the analysis we assume that all U.S. coin is held domestically.
18. During the inter-war period between 1923 and 1941, the Federal Reserve published data
on net currency shipments to European countries (Banking and Monetary Statistics: 1914-1941,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1943, pp. 417-418). Over the entire period for
which data are available, cumulative net inflows from Europe amounted to 4.8 percent of the aver
age outstanding stock of currency during the period. The average annual net inflow of currency
from Europe amounted to .25 percent of the average outstanding currency stock.
19. In order to maintain strict confidentiality of individual records in the CMIR data system,
aggregations were performed at the offices of the U.S. Treasury (FINCEN). Subsequent analysis
was performed on the aggregated data. Since Federal Reserve Banks are not required by law to
file CMIR statements, the CMIR shipment series were augmented to include direct overseas cur
rency shipments to and by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
20. The remaining minor incompatibility derives from the fact that CMIR records were cre
ated by Federal Reserve District whereas the FED data includes only observations for the New
York Federal Reserve Branch of the New York Federal Reserve District. CMIR observations for
the New York District therefore include the negligible transactions of the Buffalo Branch.
21. Under current CMIR reporting requirements, direct Federal Reserve Bank overseas cur
rency shipments are not importable on CMIRs but are included in the FED shipment series. In
order to make both series comparable, direct Federal Reserve Bank shipments were added to the
CMIR shipment series.
22. The series on individual inflows and outflows appear to be very different from the bulk
shipments undertaken by financial institutions. Two explanations are possible for this important
disparity. The data on physical transport by individuals include travel transport companies such as
airlines or cruise ships that may generate U.S. currency outside the United States and regularly
transport it back for deposit in their domestic bank. The discrepancy may also be due to differen
tial rates of compliance with CMIR reporting. Individuals transporting currency out of the country
are not monitored as carefully by the U.S. Customs as individuals returning to the United States. It
is therefore possible that there is a lower rate of reporting compliance with physically transported
outflows than with physically transported inflows.
23. The data were generously provided by the United States Travel and Tourism Administra
tion, Washington, D.C.
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24. A general discussion of factor analysis models can be found in Mulaik (1972). Bollen
(1989) contains a review of factor analysis in the context of latent variables.
25. TRAV is an annual estimate of the net outflow of U.S. currency resulting from travel to
and from the U.S. and net cash remittances sent abroad.
26. It should be noted that the individual net outflow results are even more sensitive to initial
starting overseas values. In particular, the MDM(S) net outflow results only produce feasible esti
mates if we assume that between 65 and 75 percent of currency is presently overseas, whereas at
the other extreme, the CMIR net outflows only produce feasible estimates in the 15 to 25 percent
range.
27. Throughout the analysis, we assume that all U.S. coin is held domestically.
28. The average effective federal tax rate is simply the sum of federal government tax receipts
divided by AGI. The dissatisfaction with government index is constructed as an equally weighted
average of three normalized indices representing answers to the University of Michigan's Institute
for Social Research (ISR) surveys concerning whether government officials can be trusted,
whether they are crooked, and whether the government wastes taxpayers' money. I am indebted to
the ISR for providing the underlying data.
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The Mismeasurement
of Illegal Drug Markets
The Implications of Its Irrelevance
Peter Reuter
University of Maryland

The largest illegal market in the United States currently is that for
illegal drugs. It may be, in terms of share of Gross National Product,
the largest ever. Given the poor quality of estimates of income from
any other illegal market, the statement is hard to challenge but I believe
that one can make a reasonable case that, compared with the other can
didates (e.g., prostitution, illegal gambling, counterfeiting), illegal
drugs are likely to generate much higher total revenues to sellers. Cer
tainly numbers are presented in a variety of fora, predominantly politi
cal, suggesting that it is a major economic activity both in the United
States and globally. Figures such as $500 billion for world sales are
thrown around quite glibly. 1
Even brief scrutiny of the global numbers suggests that they are
grossly overstated. Though drug markets are large and involve a sur
prisingly large number of Americans on a part-time basis, the total
value of annual sales in the United States is likely to be around $50 bil
lion, less than 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product and less than 2 per
cent of personal consumption expenditures.2 The global figure is likely
to be no more than twice this. One hundred billion dollars represents a
large market, but in the context of total global trade flows of almost $3
trillion, it is a very modest share indeed. That share declines to the triv
ial when account is taken of the fact that most of the value added is
domestic, so that valuing the trade at import prices reduces it to proba
bly no more than $20 billion.
In recent years, the federal government has developed systematic
estimates of domestic expenditures that do indeed provide a reasonable
basis for scaling the size of these markets. However, these coexist with
an essentially madcap series of federal figures on international produc
tion and prices that make a mockery of the whole enterprise. These
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estimates and their components are so inconsistent and erratic that they
demonstrate what might reasonably be called a "reckless disregard" for
the truth. Moreover, though it would be surprising if the government
estimates of domestic expenditures were (say) only half of the true
value, the year-to-year fluctuations in these estimates may be wrong
even in direction, let alone scale.
Does this mismeasurement matter? For those interested in the size
of the underground economy, the answer is clearly yes; estimates of the
largest illegal market are potentially of considerable significance.
However, the estimates were not developed for those purposes, but to
help in the development of drug policy. If policy making with respect
to drugs were rational, or at least as analytically driven as, say,
monetary policy, then the exaggeration would be a serious problem. I
shall argue that the numbers are in fact just decorations on the policy
process, rhetorical conveniences for official statements without any
serious consequences. Indeed, the irrelevance of the numbers is itself a
condemnation of drug policy decision making.
This paper has three sections. The first examines the official esti
mates of drug production, both in the United States and the rest of the
world, and sales in the United States, showing how implausible they
are. The second describes the process that generates the estimates and
its bureaucratic imperatives. Finally, I consider the policy interpreta
tion of the mismeasurement.

The Estimates
The U.S. devotes considerable resources to estimation of drug pro
duction by other nations.3 Those estimates, published each year in the
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (INCSR), are essen
tially without competition internationally; certainly they are regarded
as more authoritative than any other reports, such as the documents of
the United Nations International Drug Control Program, which them
selves often cite the INCSR estimates. The failure to include estimates
of U.S. domestic production, particularly of marijuana is a conspicuous
omission, explained awkwardly by the specific use to which Congress
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intended to put these numbers, namely, providing incentives to other
countries to improve their drug control efforts.4
No detail has ever been published on the methodology of these esti
mates, beyond the fact that they are generated from estimates of grow
ing area, crop per acre, and refining yield per ton of raw product; the
information sources, even the technology used to produce them (for
area estimates) are classified. But while the estimation task is clearly a
difficult one, the current estimates have unnecessarily low credibility.
They show inexplicable inconsistency over time and across sectors of
the industry. Some numbers are simply implausible.
Consider as an example of the unprincipled variation over time, esti
mates of Burmese opium production, consumption, and export. Burma
has been estimated to be the largest producer of opium for the illicit
market since the early 1980s; since 1989 it may have accounted for
over half of world production. In the 1991INCSR, the opium available
for refining (primarily into heroin) for 1988 was estimated to be 679
metric tons; the figure for 1989 was 1600 metric tons, an increase of
more than 140 percent.5 The difference reflected two factors: (1) A rise
in total production, generated by a 25 percent increase in cultivation
and an unexplained increase in yield per acre; and (2) a dramatic
reduction in exports of opium (as opposed to heroin). The result was
that estimated heroin production increased from 68 tons to 128 tons.
Then in the following year, the 1992 INCSR revised the figure for
domestic consumption in 1988 downward from 400 tons to 150 tons,
reflecting a downward revision in the number of Burmese opium users
from 400,000 to 34,000. Yet this did not lead to any change in the esti
mate of the amount available for refining in 1988. Also odd is that a 25
percent increase in the estimated number of Burmese heroin users from
12,000 in 1988 to 15,000 in 1989 led to a more than doubling of the
estimate in Burmese domestic heroin consumption from 2.0 tons to 4.5
tons.6
These are figures that do not bear close scrutiny, either individually
or collectively. The number of opium users in Burma is unlikely to fall
by 90 percent in one year; clearly some analyst in 1992 decided that
previous assumptions about the number of opium users in Burma were
overstated. Given that the United States has had the thinnest diplomatic
relations with Burma since about 1989, it is highly unlikely that this
change resulted from acquisition of any substantial new data. Simi-
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larly, the decision to increase the estimated average consumption of
Burmese heroin addicts in 1989 was probably no more than some ana
lyst's distant judgment. The reasonable stability of the total in recent
years hides implausible variation in the components of the estimates.
The totals have little credibility.
The problems are illustrated even more graphically by the published
estimates for Mexican marijuana production in the late 1980s. 7
Whereas Burma is distant and hostile, with a government that has little
control in many of the major opium producing areas, Mexico is close,
an ally for most purposes, and (except for Chiappas since 1994) firmly
in control of its drug producing territory. Yet the Mexican estimates
have relied on often inconsistent and inadequately described methodol
ogies, leading some analysts, including one at the Bureau of Interna
tional Narcotics Matters (INM), to conclude that actual production is
"unknowable" and that the agency's estimates are at best rather unsci
entific guesswork.8
The preface to the 1988 annual report of the National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC, an interagency group
chaired by the Drug Enforcement Administration) warns that "there is
little reliable data upon which to base estimates of the quantities of
drugs involved" (NNICC 1988). Yet, notwithstanding the lack of first
hand evidence of illicit activity that limits accurate production mea
sures, it is often claimed that "the general trends portrayed can be con
sidered reliable" (NNICC 1984). In the 1980s, this was belied by
discrepancies in the trends for the two official series for these esti
mates, provided by NNICC and the INCSR. For example, the NNICC
estimate of net production (after eradication) rose in 1986 to 5,460
metric tons from 4,125 the year before; the INCSR estimates for the
same years were 2,800 in 1986 and 2,700 in 1985. Note that they differ
substantially both in absolute value and in the trend; the NNICC fig
ures were higher and rising while the INCSR figures were lower and
essentially flat. In 1987 INM showed a slight decrease (about 5 per
cent) while the NNICC showed an increase of about one-third. INM
officials explained the discrepancy in the mid-1980s as follows: "The
Department of State considers its country estimates more reliable
because the data were derived principally from aerial surveys. There
are, however, no survey data on marijuana cultivation in Mexico; the
State Department relied on random reports from Mexico that were
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higher than the NNICC figure, which is an extrapolation of seizure
data" (General Accounting Office 1988, p. 53). This is less an explana
tion than an evenhanded condemnation of both estimates!
The fundamental unsoundness of the whole series of estimates was
demonstrated vividly at the end of the decade. The U.S. estimate of
Mexican marijuana production was dramatically increased in the 1990
INCSR, from a total of 5,700 tons in 1988 to 47,000 tons in 1989, as
the result of changes in estimation techniques.9 No details of those
changes were provided in the published document. Yet it was possible
to determine, with no great technical skill, that these figures were
implausibly high and should never have been published.
Consider the various ways that Mexican marijuana might have been
disposed of: seizures, domestic Mexican consumption, exports to
Europe, and exports to the United States. Mexican domestic consump
tion is thought to be quite low, notwithstanding the important historical
association of marijuana in the United States with Mexican immigrant
groups in the 1930s, a major factor in the passage of the Marijuana
Stamp Act in 1937. The State Department estimated the total in the late
1980s to be 100 tons. There are no reports of Mexican exports to Euro
pean markets, probably because Mexico is not well located to compete
with North African, Middle Eastern and domestic production in
Europe, which is primarily a hashish rather than marijuana market any
way. Seizures are usually estimated at a few hundred tons. Nonethe
less, assume that all these figures are major underestimates and that the
total for seizures, Mexican consumption, and European exports was
12,000 tons.
This would leave 35,000 tons for consumption in the U.S. markets.
How many marijuana users would have to purchase the Mexican prod
uct to dispose of this? Rhodes et al. (1995, p. 20) estimated that a joint
in 1993 had an average of 0.136 ounces (0.39 grams) of marijuana.
However, Mexican origin marijuana is believed to be of lower potency,
so let us assume that each joint contains 1 gram; this will bias the cal
culation in favor of finding large figures plausible.
A very heavy user of marijuana consumes about three joints per
day. Giving the user time off for colds and work-related drug tests,
assume that he or she consumes this amount 333 days a year; this (con
veniently) gives a total of 1 kilogram of marijuana annually. That
implies that we need 35 million very heavy marijuana smokers to con-
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sume 35,000 tons; that would be about half of all persons aged 15-35,
the heavy user ages (Chen and Kandel 1995). And this does not take
into account consumption of domestic U.S. production or what is
imported from Jamaica, Colombia, etc. Yet reasonable estimates of the
total number of heavy users (at least one joint per day) are only about
one-tenth of the 35 million needed to dispose of the imports from Mex
ico. Moreover, other estimates of total U.S. consumption have been far
lower; e.g., Kleiman (1989) came up with figures for 1985 of only
about 5,000 tons and prevalence was still declining in the late 1980s.
Perhaps as the result of this critique, the 1991 INCSR announced a
further revision in estimation methodology. The estimate of area har
vested was increased, reflecting a dramatic downward revision in the
estimate of acreage eradicated. However, a new distinction was intro
duced between "usable plant yield" and "whole plant yield"; the
former, more relevant to consumption estimates, was put at only half
the latter. The new 1989 estimate of usable plant available for export
after domestic consumption and Mexican seizures was 29,700 tons.
Though an improvement over the previous figure, it was still utterly
implausible, requiring U.S. consumers to account for far more than is
consistent with current estimates of prevalence. Only in 1991 did the
official figures start to approach even remotely plausible levels, though
still being far higher than other estimates of total U.S. consumption.
Though I will not describe all the twists and turns since then, it is
worth noting the current state of estimates. The 1994 INCSR lists the
following series for usable plant yield:
Table 1. Estimates of Mexican Marijuana Production
(in metric tons)
1989_____1990_____1991_____1992_____1993

30,200

19,700____7,795_____7,775_____6.280

SOURCE: 'International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (1994).

Only for the 1990 figure is any footnote explanation offered suggesting
a change in methodology; yet no one seriously maintains that 1993
Mexican cannabis production is 20 percent of its 1989 level. The
wholly implausible 1989 figure remains in the series, though the
INCSR makes numerous later year revisions.
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Another means of establishing the implausibility of the 1989 and
1990 figures is to consider their implications for Mexican export earn
ings. The farmgate price of marijuana in Mexico was estimated to be
$50 to $100 per pound; the border price, after distribution within Mex
ico, was estimated at $136 to $455 per pound. Even taking the lower
bound of the border price (which seems very low, given other price
estimates for wholesale prices in the United States), the 35,000 tons of
marijuana exports generates earnings of $11 billion for 1989, com
pared to recorded export earnings of $40 billion; surely this would be
enough to make nonsense of analyses of Mexican currency fluctua
tions.
These figures should never have survived a review process. As the
above analysis suggests, it is easy to establish that they are far outside
the plausible range. Yet the estimation process is so detached from
analysis of domestic indicators that these figures have been able to sur
vive for many years. Colleagues of mine at RAND have recently devel
oped elementary "mass conservation" models that impose consistency
checks on estimates; 10 the Mexican figures do not survive in that kind
of framework. The discipline is simple enough that one may reason
ably ask why it has not been done before.
International Price Series

The federal government also publishes "The Illicit Drug Wholesale/
Retail Price Report," which contains price data for foreign production
covering both intermediate and final product. Though prices are in
principle easier to observe than quantities, these series show obvious
inconsistencies. This is not the place for a lengthy description of all the
anomalies of these series. Instead let me just provide two illustrations:
1. In every year for which the data are published, the price for
refined cocaine is lower in Colombia than the other two major produc
ing countries (Bolivia and Peru). Yet it is also asserted that most
exports of Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine go through Colombia. It is
difficult to tell an economically plausible story in which Colombian
exporters prefer to buy the more expensive product in foreign coun
tries, and then incur the cost and risk of shipping it into Colombia for
re-export. If there is some constraint on expanding production in
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Colombia, the price for that cocaine should be higher, representing its
transportation cost advantage. 11
2. The relative prices of the intermediate product, base, and the final
product (HCL) move erratically for both Bolivia and Peru. In 1990 the
difference between HCL and base prices in Peru is reported to be
$3,480; in Bolivia in the same year the difference is $1,525. In 1992
the Peruvian margin has increased to $4,950, while the Bolivian mar
gin has slipped to $1,150. Given the low transportation cost for base
and the ease of processing, the large and growing difference between
processing costs in the two countries seem quite implausible.
The heroin series are no better. The price of morphine, an intermedi
ate product in the refining of illicit heroin, is sometimes recorded as
higher than the final product. The export price of heroin from South
east Asia is stable in the late 1980s, notwithstanding large increases in
estimated product and falling prices elsewhere.
Expenditure Estimates

Only recently have domestic counterparts to the foreign production
estimates become available from the government. Though estimates of
the number of persons using illicit drugs are produced annually 12 and
attract a great deal of attention, there has never been a similar interest
in quantities and expenditures; the sources and implications of this lack
of interest are discussed in the final section. The Office of National
Drug Control Policy has been sponsoring such estimates since 1991
but they have attracted little attention or scrutiny. 13 The most recent
available figures are given in tables 2 and 3.

In contrast to the international figures, these estimates are thor
oughly documented and have their origins in very diverse types of cal
culations. The cocaine and marijuana estimates are derived from the
household survey data, supplemented by various other surveys that
cover populations (e.g., prisoners and college dormitory students) not
included in the household survey, or which provide more data about
the average amounts consumed by particular groups of users. Given
that a small share of all users account for a large share of total cocaine
consumption, particular attention is given to ethnographic studies that
include consumption figures for heavy users. 14
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Table 2. Total U.S. Consumption of Illicit Drugs, 1988-1993
(in metric tons)

Cocaine
High
Low
Heroin
High
Low
Marijuana

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

311
244

382
286

230
215

293
230

280
224

283
224

9
5
910

11
5
880

13
6
850

10
4
750

9
3
715

11
9
740

SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, tables 5 and 6).
NOTE: The manjuana consumption totals are estimated from figures provided in table 6 on the
number of users, number of joints per months per user, and the weight of marijuana per joint.

Table 3. Total U.S. Expenditures on Illicit Drugs, 1988-1993
(in billions of 1994 dollars)

Cocaine
Heroin
Marijuana
Other drugs
Total

1988
$41.1
11.2
8.9
3.2
64.4

1989
$42.5
11.5
9.0
2.8
65.8

1990
$38.9
10.3
9.6
2.3
61.1

1991
$35.2
8.2
9.0
2.4
54.8

1992
$33.1
7.0
10.1
2.2
52.4

1993
$30.8
7.1
9.0
1.8
48.7

SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, table 8).

Heroin estimates are generated by a different process, since The
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse is thought to miss most of
the population of frequent heroin users, who tend to be transient if not
homeless and difficult to track down for interviews. The estimates are
generated by a complex procedure from the number seeking admission
to treatment and interviews with intravenous drug users in a large scale
ethnographic study. 15
Note first that the marijuana consumption estimates in table 2 are
almost an order of magnitude smaller than implied by the Mexican
production estimates, though most of that production is destined for
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the U.S. market. Even the recent INCSR estimates for Mexico are at
least eight times those for total U.S. consumption. That seven hundred
tons in 1993 generated almost $10 billion in retail sales; assuming
prices are measured with reasonable accuracy, certainly much more so
than quantities, then the notion that the United States imports 6,000
tons, with domestic sales value of $70 billion seems particularly
implausible.
Though the heroin and cocaine expenditure series are carefully pro
duced and show no internal anomalies, it is useful to also examine their
relationship to official price series and another international production
series produced by the federal government. The price data (table 4)
come from a series maintained by the Drug Enforcement Administra
tion called STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evi
dence). 16
Table 4. Retail Prices for Cocaine and Heroin, 1988-1993
(in 1994 dollars per pure gram)

1988

Cocaine
High
Low
Heroin
High
Low

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

$186
146

$165
123

$200
187

$168
132

$163
130

$161
120

$3,007
1,612

$2,713
1,343

$2,199
997

$2,543
1,046

$2,614
968

$2,553
837

SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, taWe 4).

Note the odd relationship between the heroin price and quantity
series in tables 2 and 4. Though prices fall by somewhere between onesixth and one-half (depending on whether one uses the high or low
price figures) between 1988 and 1993, total consumption (as reported
in table 2) is essentially flat over this period. Moreover, the consump
tion totals are very low, given estimates of the total number of depen
dent users (ca. 500,000) and recent estimates of how much users
purchase weekly, now that heroin is both purer and cheaper than it was
in the early 1980s. One recent study estimated that in New York and
Chicago, median weekly consumption was about 700 milligrams,
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yielding an annual total of about 35 grams (Boyum and Rocheleau
1994); taken nationally that would generate a total consumption of
about 18 tons.
The cocaine price and quantity series also produce some implausi
ble relations. In 1990 it is believed that the Colombian government's
crackdown on the Medellin traffickers led to a sharp, temporary,
decline in total exports, perhaps partly compensated for by a run-down
in inventories of traffickers. Prices rise by between 20 and 50 percent
from 1989 to 1990 and consumption falls by between 25 and 40 per
cent, suggesting a rather higher elasticity of demand than might have
been expected but otherwise not an implausible set of figures. In 1991,
when the crackdown had ended, prices fell to the 1989 levels but con
sumption was much closer to the 1990 figure, rising only between 7
and 26 percent.
A review of the official supply side figures in table 5 points to a
much more substantial problem of consistency. Separately from the
cocaine consumption figures, the same research group also produces a
series labeled "Cocaine available for consumption in the United States
(after discounting [sic] for Federal seizures)." These are supply side
estimates, produced by taking estimates of total production in the
source countries (Bolivia, Colombia,and Peru) and then subtracting
estimates of what is seized along the way, consumed elsewhere
(including Western Europe) and seized by U.S. federal government
agencies. The estimates for 1989 to 1993 are produced in table 5. Note
that these figures are substantially higher than the domestic consump
tion estimates reported in table 2; indeed, in 1990 the high end of the
range is twice the high end for domestic consumption.
Table 5. Trends in the Cocaine Supply, 1989-1993
1989
Cocaine available for
consumption in the U.S.
(metric tons)

1990

1991

1992

1993

361-473 348-463 337-481 376-539 243-340

Retail value of cocaine in the
U.S. (in billions of dollars) $52-68
SOURCE: Rhodes et al (1955, table B).

$67-90

$51-72

$55-79

$33-46
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Some of the difference may be explained by seizures made by state
and local agencies; in 1987 these agencies were estimated to have
seized about half as much as their federal counterparts (Godshaw, Koppell, and Pancoast 1987). Over the period considered here, federal sei
zures were between about 100 and 120 tons. However, even subtracting
50 or 60 tons from the supply side series, the supply side estimate in
most years is substantially higher than the domestic estimate.
But of more immediate concern to us is the lack of any notable
change in the supply available to the United States in 1990; the drop
from 1989 is about 3 percent. This of course is inconsistent with the
observed increase in U.S. retail price in 1990 and the reduction in esti
mated consumption, as well as with the official (and plausible view)
that the Colombian crackdown had a substantial effect. Reference to
the European market or local seizures does not help explain this incon
sistency, since these series are unlikely to exhibit year-to-year changes
large enough to explain much of this. To make this lack of change in
1990 even more dramatic, note that the only year of substantial change
is 1993, when the estimated supply dropped by about one-third. Yet
this decline is not reflected, as one might have expected, in either the
domestic consumption or retail price figures; indeed, prices dropped by
about 5 percent!
The supply side series undermines the credibility of the domestic
estimates. Or it may simply be that any figures generated from distant
lands by unknown processes should be viewed as worthless.
Estimates of world consumption or expenditure have no known
provenance. Five hundred billion dollars is the standard figure cited in
official and unofficial publications. The U.S. State Department, despite
its imperialistic estimation of production and (often) consumption in
individual foreign countries, does not attempt a global estimate. I
believe it unlikely that the global figure is much more than twice the
U.S. total. Though the United States accounts for only 5 percent of
world opium production (through its heroin consumption), most opium
and heroin are sold in Asia at prices that are a minuscule proportion of
the U.S. street price. The United States still consumes most of the
world's cocaine production. For marijuana, again most of the world
production is consumed in countries with much lower retail prices.
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The Production Process
I will assume the reader is convinced from the above that the official
numbers (prices, quantities, expenditures) are seriously flawed, though
the domestic expenditure estimates may be exempt from that judg
ment. While I might claim to have expertise in this area, having spent
ten years in empirical research related to drug policy, clearly none of
the flaws exposed here require any special technical skill or insight to
discover; all that is required is a willingness to subject the series, indi
vidually and as a group, to some modestly serious analytic scrutiny.
This section offers some observations as to why the numbers persist in
such disarray.
The current drug production estimates are generally detached from
the policy process. Though it is worth noting that it would be hard
under any circumstance to produce estimates with the authority and
precision of the standard indicators of economic activity, one reason
they are of low quality is that they simply have no consequence for any
senior decision makers. This is an example of a principle called GOGI
(garbage out, garbage in), the converse of the usual GIGO (garbage in,
garbage out); since no one uses the estimates for any important pur
pose, they are produced without care or scrutiny. The State Department
is required by statute to produce the international production figures
annually. It cannot simply claim an incapacity to meet the statutory
requirement. Nor, I suspect, is there any justification for large invest
ments in improving the available data. There is still no excuse for pro
ducing implausible figures or inconsistent series but, given the lack of
political or external analytic scrutiny, not much incentive to do other
wise.
The Mexican marijuana production figures illustrate dramatically
the detachment of the estimates from the policy process. The increases
and declines in the INCSR estimates have no apparent consequence for
U.S. policy decisions. Congress did not feel the need to take new mea
sures against Mexico when suddenly the State Department produced
figures suggesting that the U.S. marijuana market was completely
dominated by Mexico; nor did the administration make any noticeable
change in policy. There was no cry for increased domestic efforts
against marijuana because of the sudden discovery that American users
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were consuming vastly more than had previously been estimated. The
1989 figure was initially explained simply as the result of changes in
estimating techniques, not in the underlying realities. Nonetheless, the
implication of the new figures was that Mexico was swamping the
United States, and indeed the world, since its 30,000 tons accounted
for five-sixths of the officially estimated global total. Surely this would
be reason for alarm, for a call to Mexico to deal with a problem that
must be much more serious than previously realized. Yet, the harshness
of U.S. political rhetoric about Mexico's drug control efforts was much
diminished at the end of the 1980s, precisely when these estimates
were at their highest levels.
The price series are even more separated from the policy process
they are supposed to inform. They serve no bureaucratic purpose that I
have been able to discern and are almost never cited politically or in
the media. One can reasonably ask why they are produced at all. Per
haps the need of U.S. officials to appear authoritative in public discus
sions is sufficient motivation to produce the numbers, without
providing a good reason for doing the job well.
With no audience for these estimates, agencies are motivated to give
them little attention. My impression is that no one of any prominence
at the Drug Enforcement Administration or the Department of State
ever spent time as an analyst or producer of these estimates. Both agen
cies, with very different organizational cultures, share a marked lack of
interest in numeracy.
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the National Insti
tute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the principal federal research agency con
cerned with illicit drugs, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, which produces the major indicator series
such as the NHSDA and Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) sys
tem, play peripheral roles in the estimation process described here.
They are much more data- and analysis-oriented agencies than DEA or
the Department of State, but as public health bureaus have never been
much interested in markets per se, seen as principally the concern of
law enforcement agencies. Though the NHSDA does provide critical
information for the consumption estimates sponsored by Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), NIDA itself has only recently
started to give attention to questions about expenditures and consump
tion in the survey.
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The Potential Uses of Quantity, Price, and Revenue Estimates
What is needed by way of measurement? Clearly this is entirely a
policy-driven enterprise, without any scientific goals. In this respect it
differs from the collection of data on domestic use and abuse, which
serves a variety of scientific purposes (for example, understanding the
etiology of the drug use) as well as programmatic planning. So the cen
tral question, putting aside the detail of the statutory requirements
imposed on the executive branch by the boundlessly ambitious and
imperialistic Congress, is what decisions these figures could usefully
inform. At the moment only the certification process makes even a pre
tense of being connected to these estimates, and a pretense is all that it
is. Certification decisions are driven by politics rather than numbers;
i.e., the administration forgives U.S. friends even when they are
deemed noncooperative (for example, Colombia in 1995), and con
demns those with whom it is not on good terms (e.g., Burma, Iran, and
Syria). 17 Without a specification of policy needs, the estimates will
continue to flounder.
Sensible estimates of quantities, prices, and revenues could, in prin
ciple, serve a number of important functions. For example, the efficacy
of interdiction may be crudely estimated by comparing seizures with
estimated shipments or by estimating the margin between import and
export prices, which represents the smugglers' margin. 18 Export prices
from individual producing countries could be a useful measure of how
stringently that nation enforces laws against growers and refiners. The
revenue estimates provide a basis for estimating the impact of asset
forfeitures; for example, if total revenues are $50 billion, then $2 bil
lion in asset forfeitures constitutes a 4 percent tax, stochastically
applied. These kinds of calculations are helpful in developing and
understanding the promise and limits of these kinds of programs.
In 1971 Max Singer published an oft-cited article arguing that if one
believed the official numbers with respect to the prevalence of heroin
addiction, the dependence of addicts on theft, and the price of a heroin
habit, then New York City did not exist anymore; it had been stolen by
junkies. My first published article on drug policy was an extension of
that critique, pointing out that though the measurement enterprise had
become more elaborate, it still produced striking inconsistencies (Reu-
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ter 1984). Another ten years on, the process has become yet more elab
orate. There is coherence and good documentation for the revenue
estimates, but the process is still capable of producing much nonsense.
Until these series and estimates are integrated into the policy process,
they are unlikely to get much better.
NOTES
1. For a scholarly claim citing $500 billion, see Tullis (1991). For the United Nations use of
this figure, see United Nations Drug Control Program (1994, p. 1). A respected journalist, Jessica
Mathews (1995), recently retailed this figure, citing federal enforcement agencies.
2. The most systematic estimate, using the household survey described below (note 12), is 1.8
million persons selling in 1991 (Caulkins and McCaffrey 1993). It is likely that most of them sell
on a very occasional basis (see Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990).
3.1 infer this from the publications and contacts over the years with participants in the estima
tion process. No cost figures have ever, to my knowledge, been published.
4. If a nation is not certified as making maximum efforts to control production and export,
then the United States will not provide certain aid and will vote against loans from multilateral
financial institutions such as the World Bank.
5. Ten tons of opium yield one ton of heroin.
6. The implied annual heroin consumption per addict is 300 grams, 10 to 20 times the figure
for the United States. For a recent estimate of weekly heroin consumption per addict of about 700
milligrams, about 35 grams per annum, see Rocheleau and Boyum (1994). No doubt heroin is
vastly cheaper in Burma, but incomes are also on the order of 1 percent of U.S. levels.
7. This section draws extensively on Reuter and Ronfeldt (1992).
8. See Kleiman (1989).
9. "New analytic methodologies have enabled the U.S. government to assess more accurately
the extent of marijuana cultivation during the past several years" (INCSR 1990, p. 13). The report
included no revision of previous years' estimates.
10. Separate models are available for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana (Resetar and DombeyMoore 1994; Childress I994a; Childress 1994b).
11. In theory it is possible that the Colombian cocaine prices are not really market prices but
instead internal prices for an integrated producer, set low for some intrafirm bargaining. This
seems implausible, given that there are some independent cocaine producers in Colombia.
12. The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), with sample sizes between
20,000 and 32,000 in recent years, produces these estimates.
13. The latest of three published versions is What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs:
1988-1993 (Rhodes et al. 1995).
14. For example, Everingham and Rydell (1994) estimate that 22 percent of cocaine users
account for 70 percent of total consumption.
15. Details are provided in Rhodes et al. (1995, appendix 1).
16. On using STRIDE systematically, see Caulkins (1994).
17. In 1995, much to the chagrin of Colombian leaders, the president offered only a qualified
certification, invoking a "national interest" waiver clause that allows for certification even if the
nation is not meeting the criterion of making maximum effort to suppress the trade.
18. For a price-oriented analysis of interdiction effectiveness, see Reuter, Crawford, and Cave
(1988).
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The Supply of Youths to Crime
Richard B. Freeman
Harvard University
and
National Bureau of Economic Research

Crime is a major problem for the United States, creating misery for
its victims, costing the country substantial resources on the criminal
justice system and private crime-prevention activities, and turning
many inner-city neighborhoods into social disasters for residents and
the rest of the society. Young men, usually out of school young men
with limited skills and employment or earnings prospects, commit a
disproportionate number of crimes. Inner-city black youths are the
most crime-prone group in the society, with other inner-city blacks as
victims.
From the 1980s through the early 1990s, the number of persons
incarcerated increased massively, incapacitating many criminals and
increasing the risks of being caught and penalized for crimes. These
factors should have greatly reduced the crime rate. Yet the standard
administrative measure of crime, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR), stabilized in the 1980s. It fell from 1980 to 1984, then rose
through 1991, then fell modestly through 1993. The standard survey
measure of victimizations, the National Crime Victimization Survey,
which typically shows two to four times as much crime as the UCR
due to crimes not reported to the police, recorded a sizable drop in
crime, but the declines was far below what could be expected on the
basis of the incapacitation of so many criminals and the increased risk
of apprehension and incarceration. Crimes that are best measured—
murder and auto thefts—showed no sign of falling: murders stabilized,
while auto thefts increased.
Why has crime remained high? If, in 1976, a political leader had
announced a tough anti-crime program that would triple the number
incarcerated and increase the risk of imprisonment for crime, we would
all have expected drastic reductions in crime rates. But no such drastic
reductions occurred. The economist naturally seeks an explanation in
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terms of the labor market determinants of the supply of young men to
crime. For crime to persist at high levels despite massive incarcera
tions, there must be offsetting increases in the returns to crime or an
outward shift in the supply schedule of young men due to other factors,
such as increased drug use, family breakdown, social disorder, etc.
In this paper I explore whether changes in labor market factors may
explain some of the persistence of high crime in the United States.
First, I show that participation in crime among American men has
become so large that crime is an integral part of the lives of many men.
Then I examine the argument that the 1980s-1990s job market was an
important factor maintaining the crime rate. I present evidence that
youths often combine crime and legitimate work and sketch out a "for
aging" model of the supply of youth to crime that helps explain this
pattern of behavior. There is a brief conclusion.

Dimensions of Criminal Participation
How many Americans are involved in serious crime?
A useful identity for examining criminal involvement decomposes
the number of crimes per capita as follows:
(1)

# crimes/population = (# in crime-prone group/population)
x(# who commit crimes/# in crime-prone group)
x (# crimes/# who commit crimes).

The first term on the right-hand side of (1) measures the share of the
population typically involved in crime. For simplicity, I take the crimeprone group as consisting of men, disproportionately those aged
between 18 and 34 years. Despite considerable attention given to the
effect of the age distribution on crime, changes in this share have had
only modest effects on the crime rate (Phillips and Votey 1990), so I
will not focus on demographic developments in this paper.
The remaining terms in (1) reflect the behavior of the crime-prone
group. The second term is the criminal participation rate—the propor
tion of the group who commit crimes. The third term is the average
intensity of criminal activity—the number of crimes committed per
criminal.
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There are four ways to estimate the criminal participation rate. First,
administrative records on the number apprehended and convicted of
crime (and thus "under the supervision of the criminal justice system")
provide one estimate of the number involved in crime in the recent
past. The number is a lower bound because it excludes criminals who
have not been apprehended or who have "beaten the rap." In 1993
roughly 1 man was incarcerated in the United States for every 50 men
in the workforce. For every person incarcerated, an additional 2.1 were
on probation and 0.5 were on parole. This gives a figure of 1 man
"under the supervision of the criminal justice system" per 15 men in
the workforce. One in 15 involved in such serious crime as to be under
supervision? My immediate reaction when I did this calculation was to
say, I must have made a numerical mistake. The number seems outlandishly large. But here are the estimates for 1993: 1
859,400 men in state or federal prison
428,800 in jail
1,288,200 total incarcerated
2,690,400
600,700
3,291,100
4,579,300
69,600,000

probated after conviction for crime
on parole
probated or paroled
under supervision of criminal-justice system
male workforce

Since most crimes are committed by younger men (aged 18-34), the
estimate of the criminal participation rate of young men is even larger:
1 out of every 9 men aged 18-34 in the United States is under supervi
sion of the criminal justice system. The figures for blacks are: 1 black
man in prison for every 11 men in the workforce; 1 black man under
supervision of the criminal justice system for every 4 men in the work
force. Combine race and age, and you find the remarkable fact that 37
percent as many black men aged 18-34 are under supervision of the
criminal justice system as in the labor force.
These numbers are a decimal place beyond comparable statistics in
other advanced countries. Since many of the incarcerated are recidi
vists in crime—studies show percentage re-arrested are on the order of
50 percent to 70 percent depending on the number of years covered
(Needels 1993) and have poor employment records years into the
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future (Freeman 1992)—this population can be viewed as a relatively
permanent part of U.S. society—our equivalent of Europe's long-term
unemployed. Leaving prison is not like leaving long-term unemploy
ment—a step back toward a relatively permanent legitimate job. It is
often simply a return to criminal life until the police apprehend the exoffender again.
The second source of data on criminal behavior is the self-reported
criminal activity of individuals. These data are possible contaminated
by reporting bias. If people don't admit to criminal activity, selfreported crime would understate criminal participation. If, on the other
hand, young men think it "cool" to claim to commit crimes, selfreported numbers would overstate criminal participation. Criminologists have explored these biases through studies that ask people
whether they had been arrested and then comparing their responses to
police records. The evidence shows that young white males report
criminal activity roughly accurately, but that young black males underreport criminal participation (Hindelang and Hirschi 1981), possibly
because criminal involvement among blacks extends beyond "hard
core" youths. The proportion of young men who admit to committing
crimes on major surveys ranges from 20 percent to 40 percent (Free
man 1992).
The third source of data is the number of arrests. To be sure, not
everyone arrested is guilty of crime, but the number of arrestees does
indicate the number of persons whom police believe have committed
crimes—X might be wrongfully arrested but somewhere there is Y
who in fact committed that crime. The number of arrests in the United
States is immense. In 1992 there were 9.9 million arrests of men
(including those under 18) and 2.2 million arrests of men for the
crimes judged most serious by the FBI index of crimes (U.S. Depart
ment of Justice, Sourcebook, 1994, table 33). Most of those arrested
were between the ages of 16 and 44 (85 percent), but a surprising 13.3
percent of those arrested for serious crimes were aged 13-15. Taking as
the base population the male civilian labor force in 1992 (69.2 million)
gives a ratio of arrests per man in the labor force of .14 overall and of
arrests for index crimes of .032 per man. Since 30 percent of the male
workforce is 45 or over, the ratio of arrests per labor force participant
below that age is substantially higher. Using the crime module of the
National Longitudinal Survey, I calculate that there are 2.3 arrests per
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young man arrested in a given year. Dividing the ratio of arrests per
man by 2.3 suggests that the number arrested was about 6 percent of
the male workforce in 1992, and the number arrested for index crimes
was 1.4 percent of the male workforce.
The fourth source of data on criminal behavior is number of crimes
committed. From (1), it is apparent that given an estimate of the aver
age number of crimes per criminal, we could use the number of crimes
on the UCR or victimization surveys to determine the criminal partici
pation rate. There are two sources of data on the number of crimes per
criminal. Some surveys of prisoners ask inmates for detailed histories
of crimes, arrests, and so on—which can be used to estimate crimes per
period of time. These surveys yield estimates on the order of 12 to 15
crimes per year (Piehl and Dilulio 1995). Some surveys of youths,
including the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), ask sim
ilar questions of those who are not incarcerated. Using the NLSY, I cal
culate that the average number of crimes per young man who admitted
to crime was 6.6. Given the number of crimes presumptively commit
ted by men, this implies that 2.6 percent as many men committed
crimes as were in the workforce in 1992.2
Whichever of these estimates one prefers, it is clear that a large pro
portion of American men, particularly young men, are involved in
criminal activity.

The Trend in Incarceration and Criminal Propensity
Exhibit 1 shows that from the mid-1970s or so through 1993 the
number of persons in prison or jail in the United States increased mas
sively. The rate of increase in the 1980s averaged 8.5 percent per year,
so that in 1993 there were over three times as many persons in prison
or jail as in 1976! The combination of an increasing number of crimi
nals incarcerated and unable to commit crimes and a roughly constant
UCR crime rate implies that the number of crimes committed by the
noninstitutional population rose; either criminal participation among
nonincarcerated men went up, or the number of crimes per criminal
went up to compensate for the incarceration of so many criminals. The
falling rate of victimization in the victimization survey could yield a
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contrary conclusion, but in fact the predicted drop in victimizations
due to incapacitation exceeds the actual drop by so much as to imply a
large increase in the rate of criminal participation (Freeman 1994).
Exhibit 1. Prison and Jail Population in the United States, 1947-1992
1,300,000 -
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1992. Sourcebook of Crimi
nal Justice Statistics 1991, pp. 611,636 and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statis
tics Bulletin by Darrell K. Gilliard and Alien J. Beck. 1994. Prisoners in 1993, June, NCJ147036.
NOTE: Estimates of jail population before 1983 based on pnson population.

For the period 1977 (prior to the large increase in the jail and prison
population) to 1992,1 have estimated the trend in criminal activity by
the noninstitutional population. I calculated the reduction in the number
of crimes that the increased number of prisoners should have produced
under hypotheses about the number of crimes the newly incarcerated
would have committed on the street. Then I compared this expected
number of crimes to the actual number of crimes in the UCR or victim
ization survey. The ratio of crimes committed to the predicted number
gives an index of the Propensity to Commit Crime—a mixture of crim
inal participation and intensity of criminal activity that reflects the over
all involvement in crime by the noninstitutionalized population.
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The following example shows precisely how I calculated the index.
Assume a population of 100, in which there are 40 crimes committed
per year, giving a crime per person of .40. If each criminal commits 10
crimes, there are 4 criminals in the population. When the government
apprehends and imprisons 2 criminals, the number of crimes should,
all else the same, fall to 20, and crimes per person would fall roughly
in half, to .204 (= 20/98). Any crime rate beyond .204 implies an
increase in the index of crime propensity. If 30 crimes were committed,
the propensity would have risen 50 percent; if 40 crimes were commit
ted, the propensity would have risen 100 percent. If the number of
crimes committed per criminal was constant, the criminal participation
rate must have risen by those amounts. Incapacitation "created oppor
tunity" for new entrants into crime.
Exhibit 2 gives my estimates of criminal propensity from 1977 to
1992. Based on UCR data, I assume 10 crimes committed per person
incarcerated. The calculations indicate that the increase in the prison/
jail population should have more than halved the crimes committed per
male. But between 1977 and 1992 crimes per male rose, albeit mod
estly. Reconciling these trends, I estimate that the propensity for crimi
nal activity by noninstitutionalized men increased by 163 percent! My
suspicion is that most of this rise is due to an increase in the criminal
participation rate. Also reported in exhibit 2 are similar calculations
using the victimization data. Because there are more victimizations
than UCR crimes, I assume the number of victimizations per criminal
to be 30. In this case, I estimate that criminal propensity increased by
80 percent from 1977 to 1992. Alternative estimates of crimes per
incarcerated person would affect the extent of the rise in propensity but
not its direction.
Exhibit 3 uses supply-demand schedules to show alternative ways to
account for the upward trend in criminal propensity. The "demand
curve" in the diagram is not citizens' demand for being mugged,
robbed, or murdered (though for some crimes, such as drug purchases,
it could be so interpreted) but a schedule of criminal earnings opportu
nities. The schedule slopes downward because more criminals presum
ably reduce the potential rewards from an additional criminal act. The
supply curve is depicted as a response to criminal earnings; it will shift
outward if legitimate earnings fall and inward if they increase. In panel
A, the supply curve of crime is upward sloping. When more criminals
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are imprisoned, the supply shifts inward, which raises the wages of
criminals. Assuming unchanged criminal opportunities, the only way
to maintain a given number of crimes is for the noninstitutionalized to
commit more crimes, shifting the curve back to its original position.
Panel B shows that an increase in the criminal opportunities curve—
due, say, to an increased consumer demand for drugs, for instance—
could have a similar effect, maintaining the number of crimes at higher
rewards, despite huge incarceration. Panel C gives a qualitatively dif
ferent picture: the elasticity of supply to crime in this case is infinite
(presumably because crime pays off much more than legitimate work).
This means that there is no incapacitation effect on crime: the police
arrest Joe for dealing drugs on main street and presto! Harry takes
Joe's old place on the street. Given that economists rarely find infinite
elasticities, I regard this as an unlikely situation, but it highlights the
point that the more elastic the labor supply curve the less effect will
incarceration have on the crime rate.
Exhibit 2. Index of Propensity for Crime, 1977-1992 (1977=1.0)
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SOURCE: Calculated by dividing the actual number of crimes by the expected number of crimes,
where the expected number is estimated by taking the 1977 number of crimes minus the increased
number of male inmates from 1977 to the given year times the postulated number of crimes that
inmates would have committed: 10 in the UCR and 30 in the victimisation survey. The graph in
Freeman (1994) using these data divides the crimes by the male population 16 and over.
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Exhibit 3. Supply of Crime, Criminal Opportunities, and Incapacitation
A. Upward sloping supply with incapacitation
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earnings
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B. Increased criminal opportunities
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C. Infinite elasticity; no incapacitation effect

Crime
earnings

Supply
Crime opportunities
# crimes
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In short, economics suggests that we look for an explanation of the
persistent high level of crime despite mass incarceration in potential
increases in the rewards to crime and a highly elastic supply curve of
youths to crime.

Changes in Relative Rewards to Crime
As a first approximation, consider the crime decision as a dichotomous choice between legitimate and criminal work. The person con
sidering crime compares the present value of earnings from crime, net
the loss of earnings due to being apprehended and imprisoned, with the
present value of earnings from legitimate work; weighs the riskiness of
crime; and makes his decision. Assuming that the marginal criminal is
risk-averse, there will be a compensating differential premium from
crime. The three factors that enter the calculus are legal earnings, risks
and extent of penalties, and illegal earnings.
From 1973 through the 1990s, the real earnings of the less-skilled
young men who constitute the bulk of the crime-prone population fell
sharply. In the 1980s, the position of these men in the earnings distri
bution also fell as overall income inequality skyrocketed. Moreover,
despite the putative job-creating effects of pay reductions, their hours
worked also fell and their employment/population rate fell relative to
that of the more skilled. The magnitude of the worsened job market
opportunities for less-skilled young men was sufficiently large—drops
in real earnings of 20-30 percent, accelerating in the 1990s (Mishel and
Bernstein 1994)—to have at least potentially raised their propensity to
choose crime.3
Working in the opposite direction is the increased likelihood that an
individual involved in crime would be incarcerated in the 1980s. Jus
tice Department data suggest that the clearance rate for crimes known
to the police has been relatively constant at about 20 percent (U.S.
Department of Justice, Sourcebook, 1994, table 4.24). The combination
of a rising rate of imprisonment, constant clearance rate, and stable
crime rate implies that those apprehended for crimes were incarcerated
more frequently or longer. As time in prison has trended-downward, the
data imply a greater probability of incarceration upon apprehension for
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crime. Indeed, Langan (1991) estimates that the chance that someone
who commits a crime would be imprisoned rose for individual crimes
from 1974 to 1986: for robbery, it increased by 47 percent (from .19 in
1974 to .28 in 1986); for burglary, by 61 percent (.095 to .153); for lar
ceny, by 59 percent (.017 to .027); for drugs by 108 percent (table 4).
Mendel (1995) reports that between 1975 and 1989 the expected prison
time for a violent crime nearly tripled (p. ii). The increased probability
of incarceration should, all else the same, lower the present value of
crime.
What is the net effect on the returns to crime versus legitimate work
from the increased probability of incarceration upon arrest and the
reduction in legitimate earnings for crime-prone youths? This is a diffi
cult question, whose answer depends on the crime, whether or not it
involves violence as well as property crime, and so on. My back-ofthe-envelope calculations suggest that the 30 or so percent drop in
legitimate earnings dominates the increased probability of incarcera
tion. The largest increase in imprisonment rates shown by Langan is
.091 for robbery. If the person imprisoned is locked up for 1.25 years
(median time served before release from prison in 1986 was 15 months
according to Langan 1991, table 1), the loss in lifetime earnings from
increased chance of incarceration for robbery would be, roughly, 11
percent (1.25 x .091). This falls short of the 30 percent drop in real
earnings from legitimate work. Since time locked up will differ
depending on repeat offenses, however, and since imprisonment
reduces future legal employment opportunities and possibly increases
future illegal opportunities, this is an exceedingly crude calculation. At
the minimum, however, it suggests that the increased chance of incar
ceration did not "dominate" the reduction in legitimate earnings in the
returns to crime calculation.
Although criminal earnings are—for various reasons—difficult to
estimate, it is difficult to argue that they have fallen in real terms since
the 1970s.4 The limited evidence that I have examined suggests the
opposite, at least for youth. This information consists of responses to
survey questions on perceived criminal and legitimate earnings and
employment opportunities at the outset of the 1980s and at the end of
the decade. In 1980 the NBER Inner City Youth Survey asked youths in
Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia whether they thought they could
make more "on the street" than in a legitimate job. It also asked them
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about their perceptions of the availability of criminal opportunities.
The 1989 Boston Youth Survey, conducted at the peak of the booming
"Massachusetts Miracle" job market, asked the same questions.
Between these dates, the proportion of youths who reported that they
could earn more on the street went up, from 31 percent in the three cit
ies and 41 percent in Boston in 1980 to 63 percent in Boston in 1989.
Similarly, the proportion who said they had "chances to make illegal
income several times a day" roughly doubles over the period, to reach
nearly 50 percent in 1989 (Freeman 1992).
Consistent with this, youths who made money from crime in the
1980 NBER Survey of Inner City Youth reported average annual crimi
nal earnings of $1,807 per year, whereas in the 1989 Boston Youth Sur
vey youths reported average criminal earnings of $3,008—which,
deflated, implies a real increase of some 5 percent.5 These annual crim
inal earnings are, the reader will note, hardly large numbers. Even
those who said they committed crimes weekly in 1989 reported earn
ings of $5,376 over the year—hardly the stuff of riches. Still, trans
formed into "hourly pay," these figures imply hourly earnings from
crime of around $10.00 for criminal activity in Boston in 1989. This
exceeds the $7.50 youths reported from legitimate work and substan
tially exceeds take-home pay from legitimate work, after social secu
rity and tax deductions. Estimates of earnings for adult criminals tell a
similar story. Reuter surveyed drug dealers in Washington, D.C. and
found that they earned $2,000 per month net of expenses, which he
translated into $30.00 per hour, making drug selling "much more prof
itable on an hourly basis than are legitimate jobs available to the same
person" (Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990, p. viii). He further esti
mated that the illegitimate earnings of drug dealers exceeded their
legitimate earnings by enough to make it financially worth their while
to spend one year in jail for every two years they sold drugs. In the
1986 Inmate Survey I found that criminals who said all of their earn
ings came from crime made $24,775 per year (Freeman 1993), a figure
comparable to Reuter's $2,000 a month; but so few criminals reported
that all their earnings were from crime, this is an unrepresentative sta
tistic. Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) stress that criminal earnings from
burglary/theft, robbery, and swindling are not that high and may fall
short of the legitimate earnings available to those criminals (though not
necessarily on an hourly basis).
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My bottom-line assessment is that the returns to crime increased rel
ative to those from the job market for crime-prone less skilled men in
the 1980s, and that the hourly rewards to crime exceeded the hourly
rewards from work. Assuming this to be the case, the next question is
whether the magnitude of supply response to the change in returns is
large enough to have contributed significantly to the observed trends.

Supply Responses
There are five pieces of evidence that suggest that supply responses
may be sufficiently large to play a role in the rise in criminal propen
sity.
1. The demographics of the criminal population
Those who commit crimes consist disproportionately of persons
with low legitimate earnings prospects—the young, the less-educated,
persons with low test scores, etc. As long as these people do not have
commensurately lower criminal earnings prospects and as long as they
respond to differential legal/illegal incentives, this distribution is quali
tatively what virtually any labor supply model would predict. In fact,
evidence from the NLSY suggests that greater schooling, age, and test
scores pay off more in the normal job market than in crime, so that the
observed demographics of the criminal population is consistent with
differing rewards for characteristics and responses by individuals to
those characteristics.6
2. The estimated effect ofjoblessness on crime
Literature reviews (Chiricos 1987; Freeman 1983, 1994) find that
higher unemployment is associated with greater crime. Most studies
comparing crime rates and unemployment rates across areas find that
high unemployment areas have high crime rates, though coefficients of
response are not large, and an occasional study finds little relation.
Most time series studies also find that unemployment or related mea
sures of aggregate labor market activity are associated with rises in
crime, but cyclical changes in labor market tightness cannot explain
secular changes in criminal propensity. Perhaps most striking, compar
isons of individuals show that those who commit crimes are more
likely to do so when they are unemployed. This is consistent with a
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joblessness effect on crime though it could simply reflect the timing of
criminal behavior. Finally, longitudinal evidence on the correlates of
violent criminal behavior over time shows that persons who have
engaged in "serious violent behavior" are more likely to terminate this
if they are employed than if they are unemployed (Elliot 1994, table 1).
3. Estimates of the effect of inequality on crime
Some studies have explored the relation between inequality in a
geographic area and the rate of crime. Given that criminals are lowskilled, greater inequality is a plausible indicator of the rewards to
crime (robbing the wealthier) compared to low-skill work. Most stud
ies find that more inequality is associated with more crime (see the
reviews by Chiricos 1987; Freeman 1983, 1994). Land, McCall and
Cohen (1990) even report that homicide rates are correlated with mea
sures of inequality across cities. In the most comprehensive work to
date, Lee (1993) found a substantive positive relation between inequal
ity and crime rates across SMSAs in 1970 and 1980. His estimated
effect of inequality on crime suggests that the increased inequality in
the 1980s induced a 10 percent increase in the UCR, which falls far
short of the observed rise in the propensity to commit crime in figure 2.
When Lee compared changes in inequality and crime among SMSAs,
however, he found no relation, possibly because of the decreased sig
nal-to-noise ratio in changes in inequality, but also possibly because
the cross-area relation reflects an omitted area variable rather than a
true inequality-crime link.
4. Estimates of the crime behavior of individuals
Studies that examine the effects of incentives on the criminal behav
ior of individuals are potentially the most compelling. In the first such
major study in economics, using the NBER Inner City Youth Survey,
Viscusi (1986) found that perceptions of risk combined with earnings
opportunities influence the supply of young blacks to crime. Using the
same data, I found a significant positive relation between criminal par
ticipation and whether individuals perceived that they could earn more
on the street than in the job market (1987). More recently, Grogger
(1994) estimated an econometric model of the crime behavior of young
men in the NLSY that makes extensive use of the fact (to be examined
shortly) that many youths who engage in crime also work. His esti
mated supply elasticity to crime is roughly unity: a 10 percent decrease
in the real wages of youths would increase their crime rate by nearly 10
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percent. Applying this elasticity to the observed drop in real earnings
of less-skilled young men, he predicts a 23 percent increase in crimes
committed by these youths from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s,
which he points out is of comparable magnitude to the 18 percent
increase in the index arrest rate for the young over the period.
These studies, particularly Grogger's, should move priors toward the
job market explanation of the rise in criminal propensity. But none of
the studies are smoking guns. Viscusi and Grogger used sophisticated
structural models—economists' lenses as it were—for viewing the evi
dence. My analysis used self-reported incentives and could simply be a
consistency check: yes, people involved in crime thought it paid off
better than those who did not. Is it possible to provide something
more?
The NLSY asked one question in its 1980 crime module that can be
used to examine supply responsiveness to the relative rewards to crime.
The question asked respondents the proportion of their income that
came from illegal activity. Holding fixed time worked at legitimate
jobs, and the number of crimes committed, persons whose income con
sists disproportionately of illegal earnings will have higher criminal
pay relative to legitimate pay. They should thus be more deeply
involved in crime than others, and all else the same, end up incarcer
ated in the future.7
In the NLSY the proportion of income from illegal sources in 1980
does in fact help explain incarceration years into the future. Exhibit 4
documents this claim with a simple linear probability analysis in which
the dependent variable is being interviewed in jail in 1983, 1986, and
1989 for a sample of young men who reported some criminal earnings
in 1980. For simplicity of presentation, I include only two regression
controls: the numbers of crimes committed and weeks worked in the
past year. Calculations that include persons who report no criminal
income or that add additional controls tell the same basic story: the
higher the relative pay from crime in 1980, the greater the chance a
young man is incarcerated in ensuing years. The magnitude of the rela
tive criminal earnings effect varies among the years, seeming to rise
over time: it averages around 0.10, which given the proportion who go
to jail (.03) and the mean proportion of income from crime (.20),
implies an elasticity of supply to relative rewards on the order of 1.5.
This is in the same ballpark as Grogger's estimate, and implies that the
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decline in the legitimate wages of youths might account for roughly
one-third of the increased criminal propensity
Exhibit 4. Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Illegal Income on
Future Incarceration
Mean of dependent variable
Percentage of income that is illegal,
1980
Control variables
Number of crimes committed (7100)
Weeks worked 1980 (7100)
R2
F

Number of observations

Jail 1983
.03
.05
(.03)

Jail 1986
.04
.10
(.03)

Jail 1989
.04
.14
(.03)

.02
(.10)
-.03
(.03)
.01
4.64
938

.04
(-01)
-.01
(.03)
.04
11.30
790

.07
(.01)
.03
(.04)
.10
29.50
772

SOURCE: Calculated for sample of out of school youths in NLSY who reported some illegal
income in 1980.

5. The labor supply behavior of men with falling real earnings Topel
(1993) and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) have shown that time
worked by men in the lower deciles of the earnings distribution fell in
the 1980s as their real earnings fell. This relation has the flavor of a
labor supply response to falling real earnings. Interpreted in this way,
they estimate that the elasticity of labor supply on young men in the
lower deciles of the earnings distribution is on the order of 0.20 to 0.30
(table 9). While, as I shall shortly document, many youths commit
crimes while working, and while the supply of time to crime is not the
simple complement of the supply of time to work, the finding that lowpaid men worked less as their real wages fell is consistent with the
claim that as real wages fell these men were more involved in crime.
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Work and Crime: A Foraging Model
Treating the decision to engage in crime as a dichotomous choice
between legal and illegal work misses an important aspect of criminal
activity. Because most criminals are self-employed, and because the
U.S. job market is characterized by considerable mobility and flexibil
ity, it is easy to combine work with crime at a point in time or to move
between the two activities over time. Joe holds a job, and mugs and
robs someone he meets on a dark empty street, sells some drugs on the
weekend, or steals from his employer. Maybe he sells drugs for a
while, decides the street is too dangerous, gets a legitimate job for a
while, loses that job, and goes back to selling drugs. Ethnographic
research by Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990), Pagan (1991), and
Hageborn (1994) shows that legal and illegal work often overlap
among young drug sellers.8
To see how much overlap exists between legal and illegal work, I
have examined the work activity of persons involved in property crime
in the NLSY. My analysis supports the view that crime and work are
not exclusive activities, save possibly for those sufficiently involved in
crime that they end up in jail or prison in the near future. Exhibit 5
records the employment status of young men according to four mea
sures of criminal activity: admitted committing a crime, earning illegal
income, being charged with a crime, and ending up incarcerated in the
following year. The sample is limited to out-of-school youths not
involved in military service. There are differences in employment
between those involved in crime and those not involved in crime: a 3point difference between those who committed and those who did not
commit crime; a 7-point difference between those with positive
incomes from crime and those without such income; a 13-point differ
ence between those charged with crime and those not charged. But
these differences are far below the magnitudes that would support a
crime-employment dichotomy. The only grouping that yields some
thing close to that is between youths who end up incarcerated a year
later and the rest of the sample—a 35-point difference in employment.
Ecology models of foraging behavior (Stephens and Krebs 1986)
offer an insightful way to analyze the tendency for youths to engage in
both illegal and legal work activities, either simultaneously or by mov
ing back and forth between them. These models apply economic opti-
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mizing analysis to the problems faced by animals that forage for food.
The animal must make several decisions in a short period of time:
whether to "prey" on a particular food source it encounters or turn that
prey down to search for better prey; whether to exploit opportunities in
a given patch or search for new opportunities; and so forth. The paral
lels with youths "foraging" for earnings, legal or illegal, are striking.
Youths must decide whether to mug someone they meet on the street;
take a short-term job when they encounter an offer; burgle in the local
community or try some adjoining area; sell drugs to employees, if
working, or to customers in a street market.
Exhibit 5. Employment in Survey Week by Criminal Behavior of Out of
School Non-Military Youth
Employed at survey week
Criminal group (#of observations)_________1980______
Admitted committing property crime in 1980 survey
70.3
Yes (2,369)
73.3
No (1,847)
Reported positive illegal income
66.0
Yes (952)
73.2
No (3,265)
Charged with crime
58.6
Yes (744)
71.5
No (3,279)
Jail in following year
30.4
Yes (46)
No (4,223)__________________________65.5_____
SOURCE: Tabulated from NLSY, with youths in school coded as missing. In these tabulations I
have also excluded those in the military. Inclusion of youths in the military reduces the employ
ment difference between those who reported crime and those who did not (strengthening the argu
ment in the text) but does not noticeably affect the difference in employment rates for those in jail
the following year. The admitted crimes figures are based on people who said they committed any
of the following crimes in the past year: shoplifting, stealing, using force to obtain things, selling
drugs, conning someone, stealing automobile, breaking into building, aiding gambling operation.
This leaves out some violent nonproperty crimes. Their inclusion increases the numbers commit
ting crime without changing the results.
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The foraging models direct attention to differing "reservation
wages" to various money-making activities and the determinants
thereof. When returns fall below the reservation wage, the youth will
reject an opportunity and go on to something different. According to
the NBER Inner City and Boston Youth surveys, young men in innercity poverty areas encounter many illegal and legal opportunities in a
relevant time period: McDonald's may be hiring this week; Jones Con
struction may need a laborer; robbers may need someone to fence sto
len goods; an elderly woman may wander along the wrong street; a car
with an expensive stereo system may be parked in an alley. In a world
where short-run legal and illegal earnings opportunities arrive more or
less randomly, it is natural for individuals to move between them, com
mit crimes while working, or take a legitimate job if one happens to be
available even when engaged in criminal activities. If this hypothesis is
correct, and the behavior of crime-prone youths is similar to that of for
aging animals as opposed to that of adults with permanent careers, the
supply of youths to crime will be quite elastic, consistent with the
observed failure of incapacitation to reduce crime.

Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that increased incarceration of criminals
has failed to arrest the nation's massive crime problem because of an
offsetting increase in the crime propensity of noninstitutionalized men.
I presented evidence that part of the problem seems to lie with the dete
rioration of the job market for less-skilled young men. It would be fit
ting to conclude by offering a program or policy that would improve
the job prospect of the less skilled, and thus deter crime. While some
programs for reducing juvenile delinquency have modest beneficial
effects and some crime prevention programs may work (Mendel 1995),
I do not believe at this time we have a blueprint for successful job-cre
ating or job-enhancing programs that would offset the fall in the mar
ket for the less-skilled and thus reduce crime. What we do have is
evidence that incarceration, which is highly costly (a year in prison
costs as much as a year at Harvard, as they say), has not reduced the
rate of crime (UCR) or has reduced it less than we would have
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expected (victimization survey). The expense of incarceration is such
that it behooves the nation to experiment with, and study carefully, pro
grams to enhance the legal earnings opportunities of crime-prone
young men and to try other modes of crime prevention. Even a mod
estly successful employment program that induced some to forego
crime is likely to meet any plausible benefit-cost test, from the savings
in the cost of incarceration as well as in the lower crime rate.

NOTES
1. The 1993 jail figures are estimated from 1992 data; the numbers probated and paroled are
estimated from 1990 data. The estimates simply assume that the ratios of the missing data to the
number in prisons remained constant over time.
2.1 assume that 80 percent of crimes are committed by men, since approximately 80 percent
of arrests are of males. The number of crimes in 1992 was roughly IS million. Dividing 15 million
by 69 million men in the labor force and multiplying by 80 percent yields an estimated crime per
man in the workforce of 0.17. Dividing this by 6.6 gives the figure in the text.
3. The exact magnitude of the decline in real/relative earnings depends on the specific measure
of earnings chosen, the deflator, years picked, the age and skill group chosen, etc., but it is invari
ably large.
4. One reason is that most criminals are self-employed, and thus do not face a market wage but
rather an earnings opportunity schedule in which hourly pay depends on the hours of work they
choose. In the Boston Youth Survey, those who committed a single crime in the past year earned
$752, whereas those who reported committing crimes once a week or more earned $5,376, or
$100 or so per week—considerably less per crime. A second reason is that self-reported criminal
earnings may be inaccurately reported: Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) suggest that the incomes
that inmates claim to have earned from various crimes are far higher than those crimes could plau
sibly yield.
5. Here, I take an average of the 1979 and 1980 deflators for the earnings in the Inner City Sur
vey, since the survey covered both years. Using the 1979 deflator gives an estimated 3 percent
drop in earnings, which is far short of the drop in legitimate earnings.
6. Since criminal earnings are poorly measured, it is not easy to document this claim. In the
NLSY I regressed the share of income from illegal sources on number of crimes reported, weeks
worked in the year and three human capital measures: years of schooling, age, and AFQT score.
The coefficients on all three human capital measures were negative and significant, implying that
schooling, age, and AFQT lowered illegal income relative to legal income.
7. Because the NLSY has never repeated the crime module, evidence on future crime behavior
is limited to whether or not the respondent was interviewed in jail or prison.
8. The "doubling up" of legal work and cocaine sales in the Pagan and Reuter, MacCoun and
Murphy studies indicates that for many young men, illegal work may be temporary or transitional
work that supplements difficult low-wage or otherwise unsatisfactory work. For others, legal work
provides options to riskier illegal work, or perhaps broadens markets for sellers of illegal goods or
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Explaining Tax Compliance
James Aim
University of Colorado at Boulder
"Always try to be honest. It will gratify some, and astonish all the rest."
Mark Twain

The Puzzle of Tax Compliance
Tax evasion is an economic crime, perhaps the most common eco
nomic crime, and it appears to be a large and growing problem, both in
the United States and elsewhere. Despite obvious difficulties in mea
surement, the Internal Revenue Service (1990) estimates for the United
States that the tax gap, or the amount of unpaid federal income taxes,
was between $83 billion and $93 billion in 1987 and had grown at an
average annual rate of over 10 percent over the last two decades; more
recent estimates by the Internal Revenue Service (1993) put the tax gap
in 1991 at over $111 billion. Similar work for other countries suggests
that tax evasion is an even more severe problem elsewhere (Tanzi
1982; Feige 1989). Such underreporting has a variety of harmful
effects: it reduces the tax revenues of the government, it affects public
provision of goods and services, it creates misallocations in resource
use, it alters the distribution of income in unpredictable ways, it
increases feelings of unfair treatment by government, and it generates
disrespect for the law.
Still the puzzle of tax compliance (at least for economists) is not so
much "Why is there so much cheating?" Instead, the real puzzle is "Why
is there so little cheating?" This may seem surprising. However, most
people pay most of their taxes most of the time, even though the chances
of detection are quite small and the penalties on evasion are also
extremely light. For example, in the United States in recent years less
than 1 percent of all individual income tax returns are audited by the
Internal Revenue Service, and the penalty on even fraudulent evasion is
only 75 percent of unpaid taxes. Most economic models of taxpayer
behavior conclude that there should be much more tax evasion than is
103
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actually observed. The puzzle of tax compliance—and the challenge
facing people working in this area—is to explain why people pay taxes.
The study of tax compliance has grown enormously in the last
twenty years. Still, there is much about compliance that is not under
stood. My purpose in this lecture is to discuss some work my col
leagues and I have done that attempts to explain the factors underlying
tax compliance behavior. My basic conclusion is that the explanation
of compliance requires us to recognize the myriad range of factors that
motivate individual behavior, factors that go much beyond the standard
economics-of-crime approach that economists typically invoke, to
include theories of behavior suggested by psychologists, sociologists,
and other social scientists. Admittedly, such a broadening in the scope
of analysis is a difficult one for economists to make. However, unless
this approach is taken—and experimental economics can help here—
we will not be able to explain the levels of compliance actually
observed or to devise policies to increase compliance.
The next section discusses the major elements that I believe must be
included in any theory of tax compliance. It is followed by a section
explaining one of the methods that many people have found useful in
explaining compliance: experimental economics. The section after that
presents some of the results of experimental studies performed by my
colleagues and me. The last section discusses some conclusions and
observations.

Theories of Tax Compliance
This section outlines the major elements that, I believe, enter the tax
compliance decision of individuals. These factors include the standard
elements of audit and penalty rates. However, they also include several
factors suggested by alternative theories of behavior under uncertainty.
They are summarized in table 1.
Table 1. Main Factors in Tax Compliance Behavior

• Detection and Punishment
• Overweighting of Low Probabilities
• Burden of Taxation
• Government Services
• Social Norms
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Detection and Punishment
The dominant economics approach to the analysis of tax compliance
follows the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker
(1968) and first applied to tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). In its simplest form, this approach assumes that an individual
receives a fixed amount of income /, and must choose how much of this
income to declare to the tax authorities and how much to underreport.
The individual pays taxes at rate t on every dollar D of income that is
declared, but pays no taxes on underreported income. However, the
individual may be audited with some fixed probability p; if audited,
then all underreported income is discovered, and the individual must
pay a penalty at rate/on each dollar of deficient taxes, where/includes
the unpaid taxes. If underreporting is detected, the individual's dispos
able income equals
D),

(1)

while if underreporting is not detected income is
IN = I-tD.

(2)

Expected utility theory then suggests that the individual will choose
declared income to maximize the expected utility EU(I) of the evasion
gamble
EU(I) = PU(1C) + (1 - />)£/(/„),

(3)

where E is the expectation operator and utility U(I) is assumed to be a
function only of income.
It is straightforward to show that an increase in the probability of
detection p and the penalty rate /unambiguously increase declared
income D. Surprisingly, an increase in the tax rate / generally has an
ambiguous effect on declared income; however, under standard
assumptions about an individual's attitudes toward risk, a higher tax
rate actually increases declared income.
This basic model has been extended in a variety of dimensions
(Cowell 1990). In particular, the assumption that the probability of
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detection is fixed for an individual (a random audit strategy) can be
relaxed by allowing the audit agency to use information from the tax
payers' returns in determining whom to select for audit and by examin
ing the interaction of the taxpayers and the government collection
agency in a game theory setting. Such "endogenous audit selection
rules" are a central part of the enforcement strategies of many coun
tries. Nevertheless, the essential features of this economics-of-crime
model have largely remained the same.
Now this approach gives the sensible result that compliance depends
upon enforcement. It is essential to recognize, however, that this
approach also concludes that an individual pays taxes because—and
only because—of the fear of detection and punishment. Again, this is a
plausible and productive insight, with the obvious policy implication
that the government can encourage greater tax compliance by increas
ing the audit and penalty rates. However, I know of no serious student
of tax compliance who believes that tax compliance can be explained
entirely by the level of enforcement. As noted earlier, the levels of
audit and penalty rates are set at such low levels in most all countries
that a purely economic analysis of the tax evasion gamble implies that
most individuals would evade if they are "rational" because it is
unlikely that cheaters will be caught and penalized. However, such
behavior is simply not observed, even in the most evasion-ridden econ
omy.
Put differently, the standard economics approach to the analysis of
tax compliance has some serious flaws as an explanation for observed
compliance choices of individuals because it concludes that individuals
should pay far less in taxes than they in fact do. It is clear that the indi
vidual compliance decision either must be affected by other factors not
mentioned by expected utility theory or must be affected in ways not
captured by the theory.
Overweighting of Low Probabilities

Another factor is suggested by recent theoretical work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and others, who argue that many individuals
can overweight low probabilities, such as those relevant for tax compli
ance. Suppose, for example, that the true probability of an audit is 1
percent. In making their decision, however, many individuals, even
when fully informed, will systematically behave as if they think the
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probability exceeds 1 percent, at least when their behavior is viewed
from an expected utility perspective. Overweighting of low probabili
ties may therefore provide an additional explanation for tax compli
ance. If taxpayers give more weight to the probability of an audit than
they ought to relative to an expected utility model, then compliance
will be greater than the level suggested by the standard economics
approach.
In fact, there is overwhelming empirical and experimental evidence
that many (though not all) individuals overweight low-probability
events: in their purchase of flood and earthquake insurance, in their
willingness to pay to avoid exposure to hazardous substances, in their
purchase of lottery tickets, and so on (Machina 1987; Davis and Holt
1993). It can be shown that such overweighting leads to greater com
pliance than predicted by expected utility theory.
The Burden of Taxation
A standard explanation for the rise of the underground economy is
the general increase in the burden of taxation that has characterized
most modern economies (Tanzi 1982; Feige 1989). In the face of
higher burdens on reported income, it is argued that individuals will
respond by reporting less income.
Now it must be remembered that the economics-of-crime approach
does in fact conclude that tax compliance is affected by the level of tax
rates. However, the theoretical and empirical strands of literature give
different answers about the response of declared income to tax rates.
As noted earlier, the typical theoretical result is that compliance actu
ally rises as the tax rate rises. On the other hand, most empirical work
finds that a higher tax rate discourages tax compliance (Clotfelter
1983; Aim, Bahl, and Murray 1990). Although there is no doubt that
compliance depends in some way on the burden of taxation, the precise
way in which compliance responds to changes in the burden of taxa
tion needs further analysis.
Government Services
Another factor in the compliance decision is the use of the taxes.
However, the role of government expenditures in the tax compliance
decision has until recently been neglected. As emphasized by Cowell
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and Gordon (1988, p. 305), "this seems a curious oversight, since
while the government taketh away, it also giveth back, and the latter
activity surely exerts some influence on evasion." The compliance
decision of an individual therefore seems likely to depend in some way
on the individual's receipt of government expenditures.
There is some work that is relevant here. A standard argument in
public economics is that voluntary private provision of public goods
will be inefficiently low because each individual will have an incentive
to "free ride" on the private purchase of others (Samuelson 1954). In
the context of tax compliance, this result suggests that most people will
cheat. However, casual observation suggests that the likelihood of
complete free riding is greatly overstated because instances of volun
tary provision of public goods are widespread. Perhaps based upon
these examples, there is now a large and growing literature (Axelrod
1984; Bagnoli and McKee 1991) that argues that voluntary provision
of public goods may not always play as a "prisoners' dilemma" game;
that is, in many instances, individuals will in fact voluntarily contribute
to a public good, or pay their taxes. This generally occurs when provi
sion is both repeated and interdependent. In such a setting, one individ
ual's decision to contribute—or to comply—depends upon his or her
perception of what others will contribute, both now and in the future. If
the individual believes that his or her contribution is in some sense
essential (or "pivotal") to the provision of the public good, then free
riding is no longer the unique dominant strategy for the individual.
Instead, cooperation may become optimal.
This approach suggests that individuals may voluntarily pay taxes in
part because they recognize that payment is necessary to get others to
contribute and so to get government services that are valued.
Social Norms
A last factor is "social norms," which I believe may well be the most
important factor. It is clearly difficult to be very precise on the exact
meaning of social norms (Roth, Scholz, and Witte 1989). However,
there is overwhelming evidence that many countries with roughly the
same fiscal system also have far different compliance experiences. The
only possible explanation that I can suggest is that these countries have
different notions of what is socially acceptable behavior; that is, they
exhibit different social norms.
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To illustrate, there is much survey evidence (Westat 1980; Yankelovich, Skelly, and White 1984) that suggests that compliance is
strongly affected by the strength of and commitment to the social norm
of compliance. These surveys conclude that:
• those who comply tend to view tax evasion as "immoral"
• compliance is higher if a "moral appeal" to taxpayers is made
• the low social standing of tax evaders may be a more effective
deterrent than formal sanctions
• individuals with tax evaders as friends are more likely to be evad
ers themselves
• compliance decreases with perceptions of unfair treatment
• evasion is associated with feelings of distrust and alienation
•compliance is greater in societies with a strong sense of social
cohesion.
Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that some people won't pay their
taxes if they dislike the way their taxes are spent, if they feel they have
no say in the decision process, or if they feel that government is unre
sponsive to their wishes. Some quotes from taxpayers illustrate these
feelings (Yankelovich, Skelly, and White 1984):
• "I wouldn't mind it so much if I could designate where my tax dol
lars went to. I resent having to find out why frogs in South America
croak and things like that."
• "When we pay taxes, we like to know what it's going for."
• "Allow people to earmark a portion of their tax payments. Give
them choices."
It seems clear to me that such sentiments pay an important, perhaps a
dominant, role in tax compliance.
Social norms can be affected by a variety of government institutions
and policies. There is much behavioral science evidence that implies
that greater individual participation in the decision process will foster
an increased level of compliance, in part because participation implies
some commitment to the institution and such commitment in turn
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requires behavior that is consistent with words and actions. This notion
implies that one dimension by which social norms can be affected is
via individual participation in the decision process, say, by voting.
Compliance seems likely to be higher when the use of tax revenues is
decided by majority rule than when the (same) use is imposed on the
group; further, knowing the outcome of the vote reveals information to
each taxpayer about the level of group support for the collective deci
sion, and this information may be useful to individuals in projecting
the group behavior. Government decisions that are imposed are
unlikely to generate such feelings of participation or to provide such
information. Consequently, if taxpayers feel that they have voice in the
way their taxes will be spent, then they are likely to feel more inclined
to pay their taxes.
Another dimension by which social norms may be affected is the
level of popular support for the government program. Widespread sup
port tends to legitimize the public sector, and so imposes some social
norm to pay taxes. This support may be obviously revealed through the
voting process. However, the level of support seems likely to affect
compliance even when the choice of the public good is imposed on
members of the group. Consequently, it seems likely that there will be
more tax compliance when the public good imposed on a community is
popular, even if individuals are unable to articulate directly their sup
port via voting.
Still another dimension by which social norms can be changed is the
community commitment to enforcing the tax laws. If the perception
becomes widespread that the government is not willing to detect and
penalize evaders, then such a perception legitimizes tax evasion. The
rejection of sanctions sends a signal to each individual that others do
not wish to enforce the tax laws and that tax evasion is in some sense
socially acceptable. The social norm of compliance disappears. Such
an outcome is common in many countries, such as the Philippines and
Italy where it seems to be accepted that tax evasion is the norm.
Summary

These factors are clearly only some of the elements in the individual
compliance decision, and there are numerous other factors that affect
this decision: uncertainty about the fiscal system, the use of paid pre-
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parers and advisors, the withholding of taxes, rewards for honest decla
rations, the potential for tax amnesties, the joint choice of tax
avoidance and tax evasion, and so on. Nevertheless, I believe that these
factors together play dominant roles in tax compliance. Methods to
investigate the importance of their roles are discussed next.

Experimental Methods and Experimental Design
There are essentially two broad methodological alternatives to the
use of experimental methods in the study of tax compliance: theoreti
cal and empirical methods. Each has generated insights, but each is
also subject to some serious problems. Before discussing the experi
mental approach to compliance, it is useful to begin by outlining the
strengths and, more important, the limitations of theoretical and empir
ical analyses as a way of justifying the use of experimental methods as
an additional tool in the study of tax compliance.
Theoretical Approaches

Virtually all theoretical work on tax compliance relies in some form
on the expected utility model. This approach has generated many
insights, especially regarding how an individual responds to greater
enforcement activities and how government can optimally choose its
enforcement strategy. However, this literature is in a sense too com
plex. It is only in the simpler models that clear-cut analytical results
can be generated on the compliance impact of basic policy parameters.
When more complex dimensions of individual behavior are introduced,
the theoretical results generally become ambiguous. It is doubtful that
theoretical analysis will yield more meaningful results in the future.
Paradoxically, the theoretical models of individual choice are also
too simple. There are numerous factors that affect the reporting deci
sions of individuals, but theoretical models are capable of including
only a few.
Most important, and as emphasized above, the limited ability to
incorporate many relevant factors or to incorporate them in a meaning
ful way has meant that theories based upon expected utility theory are
unable to explain the level of tax reporting. In particular, these models
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generally imply that rational individuals should pay far less in taxes
than they actually do. This is not a mere quibble. It goes to the heart of
the standard approach to explaining compliance.
Empirical Literature
The obvious difficulty in applied work is the absence of reliable
information on individual reporting behavior. This information is hard
to come by, either for the Untied States or for other countries: it is dif
ficult to measure something that by its very nature people want to con
ceal. This difficulty has not stopped researchers. However, there are
obvious problems with the data that make much of this empirical work
somewhat suspect.
For example, most empirical work for the United States has utilized
data provided by the IRS through its Taxpayer Compliance Measure
ment Program (TCMP), which contains a detailed line-by-line audit of
a stratified random sample of roughly 50,000 individual tax returns
conducted on a three-year cycle. These audits yield an IRS estimate of
the taxpayer's "true" income so that a measure of individual tax eva
sion can be calculated. However, until recently most researchers have
not had access to the individual data, and instead have been forced to
use TCMP data aggregated to the three-digit zip code level, an aggre
gate measure likely to comprise disparate elements of underreporting
that reflect very different motivational factors. TCMP data also have
some well-recognized deficiencies: the audits do not detect all underreported income, nonfilers are not captured, honest errors are not identi
fied, final audit adjustments are not included, and there are few
noneconomic factors to which the data can be linked. The use of
TCMP data for empirical estimation of the determinants of compliance
behavior is therefore problematic. Data for other countries are even
more flawed.
To avoid the problems with the TCMP data, some researchers have
used aggregate measures of evasion, such as the gap between income
reported on tax returns and income in the national income accounts. By
necessity, these studies focus on the aggregate, not the individual,
response. Other researchers have used surveys of taxpayers, in part to
assess factors such as perceptions of the probability of detection, the
fairness of taxation, and the responsiveness of government in the
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respondent's reporting decision. Unfortunately, these surveys are also
subject to a number of methodological problems. Individuals may not
remember their reporting decisions, they may not respond at all, or
they may not respond truthfully. Surveys are also unable to control for
many relevant determinants of compliance, and, given their response
rates, surveys may not be representative of the population at large.
Finally, they cannot determine the direction of causality between com
pliance and its determinants; that is, statements regarding the unfair
ness of a tax may result from a rationalization of noncompliance rather
than be the cause of noncompliance.
Experimental Economics

Difficulties with the existing theoretical and empirical literatures
have led to the use of experimental economics in compliance research,
not so much as the only approach but as an additional approach. The
use of laboratory experiments in economics began in the early 1960s
with the work of Smith (1962, 1964) on resource allocation under
alternative forms of market organization. Growth in its applications
came with the establishment of a well-defined framework for experi
mental work by Smith (1976, 1982) and Wilde (1980), and it is now
widely accepted as a methodological approach in the analysis of theory
and policy. Davis and Holt (1993) survey much of the experimental lit
erature.
As discussed by Aim (1991), laboratory experiments seem particu
larly well suited for the study of some aspects of the taxpayer reporting
decision. Unlike theoretical work, experiments are not as constrained
by the same degree of simplification required in analytical studies of
reporting, which allows the impact of numerous factors not amenable
to theoretical work to be examined. Unlike empirical work, experi
ments generate data under different settings in which there is control
over extraneous influences. As discussed below, there are some obvi
ous limitations of experimental methods. However, given the weak
nesses of other methodologies, there are compelling reasons for the use
of experiments.
Creating a microeconomic system: induced value theory

Experimental economics involves the creation of a real microeco
nomic system in the laboratory, one that parallels the naturally occur-
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ring world that is the subject of investigation. The essence of such a
system is control over the environment, the institutions, and the prefer
ences that subjects face. Of these, control over preferences is particu
larly crucial. As stated by Smith (1976, p. 275), "such control can be
achieved by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary
value on actions."
Smith (1982) identifies several (sufficient) conditions that must be
satisfied for control over preferences to be established: (1) "nonsatiation"—subjects must prefer more to less; (2) "saliency"—the rewards
received by subjects must be related to their decisions, so that subjects
recognize that their actions affect their outcomes; (3) "reward domi
nance"—rewards must be large enough to offset any subjective costs or
benefits that subjects place on participation in the experiment, which
requires the payment to subjects of an amount comparable to what they
could earn outside the laboratory; and (4) "privacy"—each subject
must know only his or her own payoffs so that they do not receive any
subjective value from the payoffs of other subjects.
Several procedures should also be followed in experimental eco
nomics. For example, the experiment should be administered in a uni
form and consistent manner to allow replicability. The experiment
should not be excessively long or complicated, since subjects may
become bored or confused. Subjects must believe that the procedures
described to them are the procedures actually followed. The instruc
tions provided to subjects should be understandable, should avoid the
use of examples that lead subjects to anchor on certain choices that are
the subject of the experiment, and should be phrased in "neutral" rather
than "loaded" terms, to mask the context of the experiment and to
avoid direct reference to the real-world phenomena under investiga
tion. Neutrality increases the experimenter's control over subject pref
erences and avoids leading subjects to invoke different "mental
scripts," which may enable them to fill in (potentially) missing infor
mation in the instructions but which also may unpredictably influence
their choices. It is sometimes claimed that the use of neutral instruc
tions limits the ability to generalize from the experimental to the natu
rally occurring setting. In fact, however, it is not possible to generalize
beyond the laboratory unless one uses neutral instructions, since the
experimenter cannot control (or induce) the values that subjects associ
ate with loaded terms.
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Experimental work on taxpayer compliance
The basic design of most compliance experiments is similar, and is
summarized in table 2. Human subjects in a controlled laboratory are
told that they should feel free to make as much income as possible. At
the beginning of each round of the experiment, each subject is given
income and must decide how much income to report. Taxes are paid at
some rate on all reported, but not on underreported, income. However,
underreporting is discovered with some probability, and the subject
must then pay a fine on unpaid taxes. This process is repeated for a
given number of rounds. At the completion of the experiment, each
subject is paid an amount (the accumulated earnings) that depends on
his or her performance during the experiment. Into this microeconomic
system, various policy changes can be introduced: changes in audit
probabilities or audit rules, in penalty rates, in tax rates, in public good
provision, and in institutions that affect social norms. Some results
from experiments run by my colleagues and me are discussed in the
next section.
Table 2. Basic Design of Tax Compliance Experiments
• Student subjects are used.
• Subjects are fully informed.
• Subjects are organized into groups that stay together throughout the
experiment.
• The known number of rounds is predetermined but unannounced.
• Subjects receive income in each round.
• Subjects must choose in each round how much income to declare.
• Declared income is taxed; in those experiments with a public good, all
taxes finance the public good.
• Undeclared income is not taxed, but subjects face some chance of audit
and penalty.
• Subjects are paid their accumulated earnings at the end of the experiment,
generally $10 to $30 depending upon their performance.
• Parameters are set at their "real-world" levels.
• Experiments are fully computerized, and last one hour.
• Variations include changes in audit rates and rules, in fine rates, in tax
rates, in public good provision, and in subject participation via voting on
the fiscal system.
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Limitations of experimental economics
There are sound reasons for caution in interpreting and generalizing
experimental results. Some early compliance experiments did not fol
low now widely accepted procedures of the experimental paradigm,
such as the use of repeated experiments and neutral instructions. Much
early work also lacked realism because values of the various policy
parameters did not approximate real-world values.
Although more recent experimental research has generally
addressed these problems, some concerns remain, some of which are
more real than others. A common criticism of experimental economics
is that the student subjects typically used may not be representative of
taxpayers. However, there is now much evidence that the experimental
responses of students are no different from the responses of other sub
ject pools (Plott 1987); there is also no reason to believe that the cogni
tive processes of students are different from "real" people. Another
common criticism is that it is not possible to control for many relevant
factors in the laboratory. However, if one cannot control for such fac
tors in the laboratory where the experimenter establishes the institu
tions, the rules, and the reward structure, then one cannot hope to
control for these factors in the "naturally occurring world."
Of more legitimate concern, the results may well be sensitive to the
specific experimental design, so that replication is crucial. It is also
possible that subjects may modify their behavior simply because they
know that they are participating in an experiment. Most important,
there is a certain artificiality in a laboratory setting. A decision to
report $2 in an experiment is clearly different from a decision to report
actual income on an annual tax return, even if the laboratory incentives
are salient. In particular, the laboratory setting cannot capture a cata
strophic loss such as jail, and it cannot capture the social stigma that
some surveys suggest is an important factor in taxpayer reporting. In
short, one must use the results from laboratory experiments with some
care. However, such use depends largely upon the purpose of the
experiment. According to Roth (1987), experiments can be classified
into three broad categories that depend upon the dialogue in which
they are meant to participate. "Speaking to Theorists" includes those
experiments designed to test well-articulated theories. "Searching for
Facts" involves experiments that examine the effects of variable about
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which existing theory has little to say. "Whispering in the Ears of
Princes" identifies those experiments motivated by specific policy
issues. To date, most experiments on taxpayer reporting fall into the
first two categories. Although this now seems to be changing some
what, it is likely to be some time before a serious and ongoing dialogue
with the princes of the IRS is established.

Experimental Evidence on Tax Compliance
There are a number of excellent experimental analyses of tax com
pliance, such as Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991), Collins and Plumlee
(1991), and Webley et al. (1991). However, I will limit my discussion
to some experimental results from papers by my colleagues and
myself. It is somewhat difficult to compare these results because the
specific experimental design often differs for the papers. For example,
the number of periods subject to audit varies over the studies, the pen
alty rates also varies, and tax payments are sometimes used to provide
a public good. Nevertheless, in their entirety these papers give, I
believe, a good indication of the importance of the various factors dis
cussed above in the tax compliance behavior of individuals. The exper
imental results are summarized in table 3.
The Impact of Detection and Punishment
Audit rates and rules
Several papers have varied the probability of detection p, in which
the probability is assumed to be random and independent of any tax
payer decisions (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 1992; Aim, Jackson,
and McKee 1992b; Aim, Cronshaw, and McKee 1993). In general, the
results for these "random audit rules" clearly indicate that compliance
increases with a greater audit rate, with an estimated declared incomeaudit rate elasticity of 0.17. However, the increase in compliance
appears to be small and nonlinear. This suggests the important result
that there are limits to how much government can increase compliance
by increasing the probability of detection.
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Table 3. Experimental Results: Average Compliance Rate
Audit rates and rules
p = .lO
20.0%
50.3%
67.5%
31.7%

p = .Q5
27.7%

33.2%
= .30
34.3%
CFA

80.8% 51.6%
Penalty rates

£=!

37.6%

CBA
55.9%

Paper-design
A: Public good/single period audits// = 15// = .40
Paper-design
B: No public good/back audits//= 2/t = .30
Paper-design
C: No public good/single period audits#"= 2/t = .30
Paper-design
C: No public good//= 2/t = .30

£-3
Paper-design
32.1%
33.2%
36.5%
B: No public good/back audits/p = .04/f = .30
Overweighting
There is substantially greater compliance at low probabilities than is predicted by
risk-neutral behavior in papers A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Tax rates
?=.io /=.3Q
Paper-design
37.6%
20.0%
33.2%
D: No public good/back audits/f = 2/p = .04
Government services
m=0
m=2
m=6
Paper-design
43.5%
53.7%
59.2%
A: Single period audits//= l5/p = .02//= .40
m=0
m=2
Lottery Reward
Paper-design
33.2%
37.4%
51.3%
44.8%
B: Back audits//= 2/p = .04// = .03
Social norms
MRD MRS JFC INC NPG Paper-design
45.2 41.1 33.7 8.1 33.7 E/back audits// = 2/p = .04/t = .30
Voter rejection of greater enforcement via majority rule is followed by near-zero
compliance, while voter acceptance of greater enforcement via majority rule with
"cheap talk" is followed by near-complete compliance, in paper F.________
Paper A:
Aim, McClelland, and Schulze ( 1 992).
Paper B :
Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 992b).
Paper C:
Aim, Cronshaw, and McKee ( 1 993).
Paper D:
Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 992a).
Paper E:
Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 993).
Paper F:
Aim, McClelland, and Schulze ( 1 993).

Explaining Tax Compliance

119

Another paper has varied the nature of the audit rule (Aim, Cronshaw, and McKee 1993). A central and obvious feature of the compli
ance process in most countries is that the government tax agency uses
information from the tax returns to determine strategically whom to
audit. Such a policy means that the probability of audit is not fixed and
random but instead is variable and endogenous, dependent in part on
the behavior of the taxpayer (and the tax agency).
Different "endogenous audit rules" are examined in experiments in
this paper. One rule assumes that an audited individual found to be
noncompliant in the current period will be audited with certainty for a
number of future periods ("Conditional Future Audit" rule, or CFA).
Another rule requires that an audited individual will face some back
audits if found to be noncompliant in the current period ("Conditional
Back Audit" rule, or CBA). A third rule imposes a cutoff ("Cutoff
rule, or CO); a taxpayer who reports less than some cutoff level of
income will be audited with certainty.
Experimental results indicate that endogenous audit rules are able to
generate compliance significantly greater than random audit rules,
even when the random audit rate is 30 or 50 percent. The cutoff rule
CO is the most effective in increasing compliance, although it requires
a large number of audits. Making back audits conditional on current
declarations (or CBA) is also able to increase compliance significantly,
and the audit rate is far lower than the cutoff rule. A conditional future
audit rule CFA appears to be the least effective of the endogenous
rules, although compliance still exceeds that under all random audit
rules.
These results suggest that:
In the relevant range of audit rate changes, compliance increases
marginally and nonlinearly with increases in the probability of
detection. Also, compliance is significantly greater with endoge
nous audit selection rules than with random audit rules.

Work by other experimentalists generally gives similar results.
Penalty rates

Variations in the penalty rate/are also examined in Aim, Jackson,
and McKee (1992b). Experimental results indicate that individuals pay
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slightly more in taxes when the penalty on detected evasion increases.
Therefore:
In the relevant range of penalty rate changes, compliance
increases marginally with increases in the fine rate on unpaid
taxes.
However, the impact is quite small, with a reported income-fine rate
elasticity of only 0.04.
The Impact of Overweighting
Several experiments across all studies are designed explicitly to test
for the presence of overweighting of low probabilities. In these experi
ments the parameters—especially the probability of detection—are
sometimes chosen such that the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral indi
vidual is to report zero income. Nevertheless, the experimental results
clearly indicate that there is far more compliance than is predicted by
expected utility theory, a result consistent with overweighting.
These results suggest that:
Many individuals substantially overweight low probabilities.
Although greater compliance may well be implied by other factors as
well, these results are similar to much other experimental work on
behavior at low probability events.
The Impact of Taxation
Another set of experiments varies the tax rate t on declared income,
from 10 to 30 to 50 percent, and the level of compliance falls signifi
cantly with tax rate increases (Aim, Jackson, and McKee 1992a). The
declared income-tax rate elasticity is estimated to equal -0.52. There
fore:
Compliance decreases with increases in the tax rate.

These results are consistent with most empirical evidence, even though
much theoretical work concludes that compliance should rise with
greater tax rates.
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The Impact of Government Services

In several papers a public good is present whose magnitude depends
upon the tax payments of all subjects (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze
1992; Aim, Jackson, and McKee 1992b). These tax payments are
summed across the subjects, this sum is increased by some multiple m
to reflect the (potential) consumers' surplus that individuals derive
from government provision of a public good, and the resulting amount
is then divided equally among the subjects. Note that a multiplier
greater than 1 implies that individuals as a group receive more than
they pay in taxes.
All experiments clearly indicate that compliance is greater in the
presence of the public good than in its absence; also, compliance
increases in a nonlinear way with the multiplier m.
Some additional experiments also vary the nature of the positive
inducement given to taxpayers: by making audited and fully compliant
taxpayers eligible for a "Lottery" whose expected value equals the
average subject per round income, or by giving audited and fully com
pliant taxpayers an immediate "Reward" of comparable value. In both
cases the presence of a positive inducement leads to greater compli
ance.
These results suggest that:
Compliance increases when individuals receive something for
their tax payments.

There is some evidence that tax agencies around the world are starting
to pursue such a "kinder, gentler" strategy.
The-Impact of Social Norms
Manipulating social norms is perhaps the most difficult task facing
experimentalists, and there are few studies in which such control has
been achieved. Nevertheless, some of my work has, I believe for the
first time, been able to induce predictable changes in social norms,
with resulting impacts on tax compliance.

One study examines the effects on compliance of the uses of tax rev
enues and the decision process by which these uses are chosen (Aim,
Jackson, and McKee 1993). In some experiments subjects must choose
between using their tax payments on one of two alternative public
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goods; the level of support for the public good alternatives also varies
between strong and weak support for the public good. These experi
ments are denoted MRD (for "Majority Rule over Diverse" choices, in
which the level of support for the preferred outcome is known to be
quite strong) and MRS (for "Majority Rule over Similar" choices, in
which the level of support for the preferred outcome is known to be
quite weak). In other experiments subjects are not allowed to vote on
public good provision, and a public good of variable popularity is
instead imposed on the group. These experiments are denoted IFC (for
"Imposed Favored Choice," in which the imposed public good is
known to be popular) and INC (for "Imposed Nonfavored Choice," in
which the imposed public good is known to be unpopular). Finally, in
one experiment there is no public good (or NPG, for "No Public
Good"). The experiments are structured so that the same use of tax rev
enues occurs in all experiments except INC and NPG.
These experimental results indicate that compliance is significantly
greater when subjects choose via voting the use of their taxes than
when the identical use is imposed upon them; compare MRD versus
IFC and MRS versus IFC. Further, compliance is somewhat greater
when the vote is decisive than when the vote is close (MRD versus
MRS). Finally, compliance is significantly lowered by the imposition
of an unpopular program (IFC versus INC); in fact, compliance is
lower with an imposed, unpopular public good than in the complete
absence of any public good (INC versus NPG). These results clearly
show that government can change the social norm of compliance by
ensuring that individuals have a say in the decision process and by
spending taxes in ways consistent with citizen preferences. Such poli
cies have seldom been thought to be part of general strategy for tax
compliance, but nonetheless they appear to be effective tools.
A second study allows subjects to vote via majority rule on the
enforcement regime that they face, such as the tax, audit, and penalty
rate (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 1993). These results are still
somewhat tentative. However, I believe that this voting allows the sub
jects to alter the social norm of compliance. In particular, in all cases
(except one, as discussed in a moment) subjects vote against greater
enforcement such as higher audit or penalty rates, even when it is indi
vidually and socially optimal to increase enforcement. Following these
votes tax compliance falls virtually to zero, even though compliance
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prior to the vote is quite substantial. Rejection by the group of greater
enforcement sends a clear signal to each individual that tax evasion
will be tolerated and accepted; that is, rejection changes the social
norm of compliance, and individuals respond accordingly.
Social norms can also be affected by communication among mem
bers of the group, however. In an additional experiment in this paper,
subjects are allowed to talk with one another before the vote on
enforcement is taken (or "cheap talk")- In these discussions subjects
quickly discover that it is in their interests to impose strict sanctions on
free-riders, in order to increase their share of the public good. They
then vote overwhelmingly in favor of greater enforcement, and tax
compliance following the vote approaches 100 percent. Again, I
believe that the cheap talk in combination with the vote allows individ
uals to change the social norm, in this case to demonstrate that evasion
will not be accepted.
These conclusions are striking:
Social norms can be changed by fiscal institutions. Compliance is
increased when individuals participate via voting in the process by
which the use of tax revenues is decided, when the outcome of the
vote reveals widespread support for the program, and when the
use of tax revenues is popular even if imposed. Also, compliance
is decreased when there is a social expression via voting of a will
ingness to tolerate tax evasion, and compliance is increased when
there is a social expression via voting of an unwillingness to toler
ate tax evasion.

There is also some experimental evidence that tax amnesties may
change social norms (Aim, McKee, and Beck 1990).
These conclusions suggest a variety of alternative government poli
cies toward tax compliance that are only now beginning to be used.

Summary and Conclusions

People exhibit much diversity in their behavior, and they are moti
vated by a variety of factors. There are individuals who always cheat
and those who always comply, some who maximize the expected util
ity of the tax evasion gamble, others who seem to overweight low
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probabilities, individuals who respond in different ways to changes in
their tax burden, some who are at times cooperative and at other times
free-riders, and many who are guided by social norms.
These findings in total suggest that a government compliance strat
egy based only on detection and punishment may well be a reasonable
starting point but not a good ending point. Instead, what is needed is a
multifaceted approach that emphasizes enforcement, but that also
emphasizes such things as positive rewards from greater tax compli
ance, the wise use of taxpayer dollars, and individual participation in
the decision process. What is also needed, however, is a theory of tax
compliance that incorporates the remarkable diversity in individual
behavior exhibited by these experimental analyses of taxpayer compli
ance. Whether any such theory can be developed that explains the
behavior of all individuals at all times, or even one that explains the
actions of the same person at all times, is hard to determine. However,
until this effort is made, I think it unlikely that we will come much
closer to explaining the puzzle of tax compliance.
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Beating the System?
Ann Dryden Witte
Florida International University
and
Wellesley College

What is the Underground Economy?
The underground economy is a pervasive entity. It will always be
with us. The formal or recorded economy is the new kid on the block.
The formal economy only came into existence as we began to try to
measure, broadly tax, and regulate economic activity. It is a creature by
and large of the post-World War II period. We began to have broadbased taxes and benefits systems (during the 1930s and World War II),
extensive regulations (mainly a post-World War II phenomenon) and
national statistical systems (beginning in the late 1920s and picking up
speed after World War II) mainly during the 1930s and 1940s.
It is the formal economy, the recorded, taxed, and regulated econ
omy, that is the recent arrival—not the unrecorded or underground
economy. This said, why are we concerned about this economy?
When and Why Did We Become Concerned
with the Underground Economy?

There have been two periods of concern about the underground
economy. The first period of concern occurred during and shortly after
World War II and was largely confined to the United States and Can
ada. The large increases in taxes and regulations needed for the war
effort drove much activity underground.
The second period of concern began in the late 1970s and spread
from the United States to most of the developed world. By and large
the underground economy has been of little concern in Third World
countries (other than to the taxing authorities). Many developing coun
tries (e.g., Brazil) even make government loans to enterprises that
operate largely underground. As a source of employment and entrepre-
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neurial activity, the underground economy is more often cultivated
than criticized in Third World countries.
The most recent period of concern about the underground economy
in the developed world began with a series of articles in the popular
press during the late 1970s claiming that there was a large and rapidly
growing underground economy. Politicians quickly picked up on this
because it appeared to provide a "painless" method of dealing with the
deficit (annual deficits in the United States averaging over $50 billion a
year began in 1975 and deficits of over $100 billion began in 1982).
The existence and claimed rapid growth of the underground economy
provided support for deregulation and lowering of marginal tax rates—
politically popular policies during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
My own saga with the underground economy illustrates the source
and nature of concern. In 1978,1 was sitting quietly in my office at the
University of North Carolina when I received a call from the Chief
Economist of the Joint Economic Committee. He requested that I write
a monograph on the "underground economy" for the Committee's Spe
cial Study on Economic Change. I replied that I would have to know
what this economy was before I could respond. His description sug
gested a diverse and complicated set of activities that appeared to have
little in common other than that they were somehow hidden from gov
ernmental agencies. The task seemed overwhelming and he wanted a
first draft in six months. It was a hot topic and the monograph needed
to be completed yesterday if not sooner. I asked for time to consider his
request. I was strongly inclined to say no, since it sounded like a topic
that would require a couple of years to deal with adequately.
As it happened, I was meeting with a mathematical economist, Carl
Simon (Department of Economics, University of Michigan), for lunch
to discuss a saddle point problem. Since I was late, I provided a
detailed description of the phone call by way of apology. To my amaze
ment, Carl indicated that he would love to undertake such a project
with me. He solved my saddle point problem and I agreed to do the
monograph jointly with him.
Substantial Interest by Other Agencies
At the same time that the Joint Economic Committee was commis
sioning our study, other congressional committees (e.g., the House
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Committee on Ways and Means) asked for a study of nonfiling by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) and pressured the Internal Revenue
Service (BRS) into providing an estimate of unreported taxable income.
The IRS did not wish to undertake estimates but was required to do so
by Congress. These reports resulted in numerous congressional hear
ings during the early 1980s which provided valuable support for the
deregulation and detaxation movements that accompanied the Reagan
presidency.
A Dispassionate Look at the Underground Economy Today

It has now been over fifteen years since the rediscovery of the under
ground economy. There has been much research on the topic. The
political passions that originally inspired renewed interest in the under
ground economy have cooled, at least somewhat. We are now at a point
to step back and consider the nature and importance of this economy.
In 1982, Carl Simon and I published a book, an expanded and updated
version of our study for the Joint Economic Committee, on the under
ground economy (Simon and Witte 1982). The editor gave the book the
title Beating the System. With the advantage of hind sight and an addi
tional fifteen years of research, I would like to consider whether those
in the underground economy are beating the system. I will discuss the
impact of the underground economy on those who participate little, if
at all, in its activities, as well as on those who are members of this
underground.

What Kind of Activity Occurs in the Underground Economy?

Activities in the underground economy can usefully be divided into
three categories: (1) "pure" tax evasion, (2) the irregular economy, and
(3) illegal activities. The nature of these activities and the reasons for
our concern are quite different for the three types of activity, and so I
will discuss each type of activity separately before trying to reach gen
eral conclusions concerning the underground economy.
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Pure Tax Evasion
Pure tax evasion, which is far from pure, occurs when individuals
and businesses fail to fully report earnings from perfectly legal activi
ties carried out in businesses that are properly registered and recorded
in our national statistics. It also occurs when individuals and busi
nesses overstate the deductions to which they are entitled.
Perhaps half of all Americans engage in "pure" tax evasion. How
ever, most evasion is rather small scale. We are a nation of tax-evasion
nibblers, although some individuals do take large gulps.
The level of evasion is very unequally spread throughout the popula
tion. The amount varies with type of income, amount of income, and
with attitudes toward laws and government.
Type of income
Wage and salary income is reported most accurately. We don't know
whether this stems from the law-abidingness of the middle class or
from the extensive system of withholding and information reporting.
"Paper trailed" income and income from which taxes are withheld are
far more fully reported than income that generates no information for
the IRS. Small businesses report a smaller proportion of their income
than do large corporations. Rent and royalty income is less fully
reported than dividend and interest income. (See U.S. Department of
the Treasury 1990 or U.S. General Accounting Office 1990 for details.)
Amount of income
The relationship between the proportion of true tax liability reported
and income is U-shaped. Tax compliance is highest for the middle
class and lower for both poorer and richer individuals. We do not know
the reason for the U-shaped relationship. People with high and low
incomes have more opportunities to underreport income than do the
vast middle class of wage and salary workers. For example, the poor
are often involved in the irregular economy which keeps few written
records. The better-off often have complex transactions which make
overstating deductions and understating income more difficult to
detect. The poor and the rich are often less accepting of mainstream
morals and ethics. This may make tax evasion more acceptable, at least
for some members of these groups.
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Attitudes toward laws and the government
There are large geographic differences in tax compliance, with the
Southwest and Southeast being least compliant and the Midwest and
Northeast most compliant. It is not clear why these geographic differ
ences exist. However, audit rates have traditionally been lower in the
Southwest, particularly southern California, so the tax gamble has a
larger expected return in this area. Research indicates that areas of
rapid growth are more noncompliant than stable areas. For example,
see Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1992).
A consistent finding in the tax compliance literature is that women
are more compliant than men. We do not know whether this stems from
greater socialization of women, their greater aversion to risk, or the
nature of their incomes.
Why are we concerned with pure tax evasion?
The most obvious answer is that we want everyone to "pay their fair
share." When some members of society pay less than their full tax lia
bility, the rest of us suffer. Government can respond to decreased tax
revenue in one of three ways. First, it can increase taxes so the rest of
us pay more. Second, it can cut expenditures so that everyone has
fewer publicly provided goods and services. Finally, it can finance gov
ernment expenditures by running large deficits. All of these potential
responses to tax evasion hurt those of us who are struggling to survive
in the formal economy.
The Irregular Economy

The irregular economy generally encompasses the production of
legal goods and services in unregistered and, hence, largely untaxed
and unrecorded, small businesses. Activities in the irregular economy
are an important form of underground activity.
What goods and services are produced in the irregular economy?
Production in the irregular economy consists mostly of personal and
household services. Typical personal services produced in the irregular
economy are child care, nursing services, legal, and accounting ser
vices. Household services such as gardening, remodeling, and auto
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repair also are frequently provided in the irregular economy rather than
by registered and licensed individuals.
Some goods and services are also produced in the irregular econ
omy. Examples include food, clothing, jewelry, recreation, and tour
ism. Evasion of taxes on petroleum products is quite large. Organized
crime, particularly the "Russian mafia," is heavily involved in tax eva
sion on gasoline and other fuels.
Firms producing in the irregular economy tend to be small. Hence,
production tends to occur in areas where economies of scale are lim
ited. The irregular economy also provides a gateway for some new
immigrants, legal and illegal, and for some new entrepreneurs.
While tales of sweatshops employing hundreds of illegal aliens
appear in the press, the more typical employment setting is an individ
ual moonlighting in the irregular economy. 1 The labor force for the
irregular economy comes largely from people who work full time in
the formal economy.
Costs and benefits of the irregular economy
To those in the formal economy. The confirmation hearings of early
Clinton nominees point up the prevalence of purchases from the irregu
lar economy by all strata of U.S. society. We would be hard-pressed to
run our households and provide for our personal needs without the.
irregular economy. This economy provides us with more convenient
and often less expensive (both in terms of time and money) goods than
the formal economy. The quality of goods and services provided by the
irregular economy tends to be highly variable, since the only quality
controls are word-of-mouth reports. Regulation and government infor
mation provide important quality control that is missing from the irreg
ular economy.
Irregular economic activity pays little if any tax. This means that
governments must tax the rest of us more, provide fewer services or
run large deficits—a privilege only allowed the federal government and
selected state and local governments.
To those working in the irregular economy. Jobs in the irregular
economy have advantages and disadvantages. For those moonlighting
in the irregular economy (the majority of this economy's labor force),
the economy has primarily benefits. Income is free of taxation, and
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work methods are left to the individual's discretion. Work may be more
informal and better integrated with the family and communal elements
of the individual's life than is possible with much formal employment.
Individuals working exclusively in the irregular economy are of two
basic types—those there by choice (e.g., retirees, welfare recipients,
mothers with small children, "free spirits") and those there for lack of
alternatives (e.g., illegal aliens, the unemployed without unemploy
ment benefits, new entrants to the labor force).
For individuals working exclusively in the irregular economy by
choice, the irregular economy provides an entrepot or a more agreeable
combination of work conditions and wages. Take for example the indi
vidual with small children. She may choose to work at home because
of an ability to combine child care with her work activities. Similarly,
the handicapped individual may find the home environment with its
familiarity or convenience more congenial than the more rigid and
structured work environments typical of the formal economy.
For those working in the irregular economy for lack of known alter
native, the irregular economy provides sustenance, but at a cost. The
cost is the foregone benefits available in the formal economy such as
health benefits. Work conditions can be harsh and benefits nonexistent.
Illegal Activities

To this point, we have considered mainly activities that run afoul of
our regulatory and tax laws, but not our criminal law. To close on what
might be considered a low note, I will now turn to activities that violate
our criminal laws. In spite of declining crime rates, crime is still one of
the topic of most serious current concern to the U.S. public. It also pro
vides the titillation of the forbidden.

In terms of economic activity, crime comes in two forms—illegal
transfers of goods and income, and production of illegal goods and ser
vices.

Illegal transfers of goods and services
The illegal sector has developed complex ways of transferring
income and goods among individuals just as our legal economy has.
Lacking the power to tax, the illegal economy transfers by means of
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force (e.g., "your money or your life"), or subterfuge (e.g., fraud, coun
terfeiting).
Like the irregular economy, the illegal transfer economy seems to
provide mainly part-time employment. Further, illegal transfers of the
"blue-collar" variety provide surprisingly low returns (see Reuter,
MacCoun, and Murphy 1990). Illegal transfers by subterfuge, such as
the notorious financial dealings of the 1980s, provide far larger returns
but to very few individuals. Economists are split on whether or not
activities such as "insider trading" increase or decrease market effi
ciency.
Production and distribution of illegal goods and services
The major goods produced and distributed illegally in our country
are illegal drugs. Illegal drugs run the gamut from substances believed
to have large-scale debilitating effects (e.g., heroin, crack) to those
considered by many to have relatively minor effects (e.g., marijuana).
As Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) have recently documented,
illegal drug sales provide good income for mainly part-time work.
However, drug dealing is a very risky endeavor with substantial
chances of arrests (over 1 in 5 per year) and death or injury (1 in 10 per
year).
As Reuter and his colleagues have described it, selling illegal drugs
is the preferred illegal form of "moonlighting" for many urban males,
particularly minority males. Drug dealing provides sporadic (mainly
nights and weekends), high-paying, part-time employment. Individuals
selling drugs daily in Washington, D.C. in the late 1980s typically
earned about $2,000 per month while individuals selling one day a
week or less had income supplements of $50 or less. The typical dealer
in Washington, D.C. is a black male between 18 and 29 years of age.
(See Pozo (1996) for a further discussion of drug markets.)
Our attitude toward drugs tends to be both emotional and schizo
phrenic. We have a spectrum of rules governing the sale and use of var
ious drugs. Some drugs (e.g., generic drugs) are sold in mainly
unregulated spot markets (i.e., you can buy them freely at your local
supermarket or drugstore). Others, such as tobacco and alcohol, are
singled out for special taxation (i.e., excise taxation) and purchase is
restricted to individuals who have reached a specified age. Prescription
drugs require that a medical doctor authorize use. Finally, there are a
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whole series of drugs (e.g., marijuana, cocaine, heroin) that we gener
ally make illegal either to sell or use.
Consider the two spectrums—one spectrum of regulation possibili
ties and one spectrum of taxation possibilities. Generic drugs would
fall at one end of the regulation spectrum and illegal drugs at the other.
Oddly, generic and illegal drugs both fall on the untaxed end of the tax
spectrum and alcohol and tobacco at the high end of this spectrum. If
one considers the placement of various drugs on these two spectrums,
it is very difficult to see a consistent set of priorities.
The debate about illegal drugs has mainly centered on the two
extremes of the regulation spectrum—legalization versus criminalization. This seems to narrow our options unnecessarily. For various drugs
that we currently make illegal, we may want to consider a number of
different positionings on the regulatory and tax spectrums. For exam
ple, one could imagine making marijuana a prescription drug and plac
ing an excise tax on use. For a compilation of recent papers on drug
laws, see Krauss and Lazear (1991).
Perhaps we need to think more carefully about the use of drugs and
the benefits that they provide users. Some drugs are designed purely to
treat disease. It is hard to imagine someone taking an antibiotic for the
fun of it. Others serve both treatment and sensory needs (e.g., pain
relief, relaxation). Valium is used by some as a tranquilizer, by some as
a muscle relaxant, and by some to produce a euphoric state. Still other
drugs seem to have mainly recreational or psychological benefits (e.g.,
alcohol, tobacco).
We also need to consider the external effect that drug use entails.
Consumption of some drugs imposes costs on society as a whole in the
form of higher medical expenditures, increased crime, or decreased
productivity. Consumption of others provides external benefits by low
ering medical costs, making people more psychologically healthy (e.g.,
less depressed, less aggressive), and more productive. Economists
would suggest that you encourage use of the drugs with positive exter
nal effects and discourage use of those with negative external effects.
Encouragement can come in the form of subsidies (e.g., governmentfinanced medical research or subsidized prescriptions such as under
Medicaid or Medicare). Discouragement can come in the form of taxa
tion, information campaigns (very effective for tobacco), restrictive
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access (e.g., age restrictions on purchase, requiring prescriptions), or
making the substance illegal either under the civil or criminal code.
If we placed all drugs on the regulatory and tax spectrums described
above and considered how the net benefits of each drug relates to its
position on the spectrums, we might find some surprising locations.
Such an exercise might also suggest innovative policies in an area
where thinking has been impacted for some time.
The major services produced in the illegal economy are gambling
(increasingly preempted by legal forms), prostitution, and loan shark
ing. While these industries are still quite large, all are believed to have
declined in recent years. Prostitution has been hard hit by AIDS and
more liberal social mores regarding premarital sex. The estimated
number of individuals working as prostitutes is believed to have
declined since 1980. Legalization of gambling and low interest rates
have taken a similar toll on the gambling and loan sharking industries.
(See Carlson 1990 for details.)
Costs and Benefits of the Illegal Economy
It is not hard to make the argument that the illegal economy as a
whole has costs that substantially outweigh the benefits that flow from
this economy. There is even a debate in economics regarding whether
or not we should count any benefits that result from infringement of
our criminal law. The issue is whether, when breaking the social con
tract, the individual has lost his or her right to be counted in the "social
welfare function." For a discussion of whose benefits should be
included in the social welfare function, see Trumbull (1990).
Even if we assume that the gains of individuals who break the social
contract are to be counted, it is hard to justify the illegal economy on
economic grounds. The transfer payments of the illegal economy are
quixotic at best and worsen the income distribution in many cases. Fur
ther, these transfers, on balance, lower productivity in the formal econ
omy.
The costs and benefits of the production of illegal goods and ser
vices are more difficult to assess. If we accept the proposition that our
criminal laws reflect strongly held moral beliefs, then the costs to soci
ety of illegal markets are substantial. However, it may be that at least
some current laws reflect the moral beliefs of previous generations. If
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so, these laws may no longer be justified on efficiency grounds. For
example, it may be that many citizens no longer support the sodomy
laws or adultery laws that remain on the books in many states.
From an economist's perspective, the relevant question might be: Do
the total costs of the activity outweigh the total benefits? This is, of
course, the traditional criterion of benefit-cost analysis. In some cases
the benefit/cost ratio seems clear. Most citizens would agree that child
prostitution imposes more costs than benefits on society and that it has
a high moral cost as well. Transactions between consenting adults are
more difficult to evaluate. When an adult prostitute makes a deal with
an adult client, the deal is clearly utility-enhancing for the parties to the
transaction. Most negative externalities from this transaction flow from
the fact that prostitution is illegal, not from the transaction per se.
There are clearly transactions between adults that yield sufficient
negative externalities that we wish to outlaw them. For example, it is
hard to justify legalizing without severely taxing or requiring prescrip
tions for such drugs as heroin. However, it seems wise to carefully con
sider the full spectrum of options (i.e., regulations and taxation) before
deciding that making something illegal is a reasonable thing to do. It is
also wise to consider the degree to which criminal prohibitions can be
enforced. Activities between consenting adults are notoriously difficult
to enforce. Making laws that are unenforceable may make us feel bet
ter. However, they have substantial hidden costs. They tend to decrease
respect for law and, hence, make other laws more difficult to enforce.

Beating the System?
Returning to the question with which we began the paper: Is the
underground economy beating the system?

Benefits and Costs to the Nibblers and Nonparticipants

Those of us who are only peripherally touched by the underground
economy are, I would contend, harmed more than we are benefited by
it.
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Pure Tax Evasion
We all bitch and moan about taxes, but pay a substantial amount of
what we owe. Some tax revenue is wasted or spent on things we would
rather not have, but much tax revenue is spent for things we value very
highly—e.g., law enforcement, water and sewers, education. Tax evad
ers lower the amount of tax revenue that our tax system would other
wise be able to produce. The public sector can respond in one of three
ways: (1) lower the level of goods and services provided, (2) raise
taxes on the rest of us, (3) in the case of the federal government,
increase the deficit.
Tax increases enacted to raise revenue lost to evasion tend to fall dis
proportionately on the wage and salary earnings of the middle class.
Tax evasion tends to redistribute income to low-income and highincome groups willing to falsify tax returns. This is an odd and rather
unpalatable form of redistribution. Tax evasion imposes an implicit tax
on honesty, a characteristic we would be better off subsidizing than
taxing.
Many tax evaders do truly beat the system, but their gain is at our
cost. While audit rates have fallen dramatically during the last two
decades from 10 percent in the late 1960s to under 1 percent today, the
amount of information-matching has gone up considerably and will
increase further with the IRS systems-modernization effort. The level
of penalties for evasion and the frequency of their imposition has gone
up dramatically as well.
Decreasing the current level of tax evasion appears to be a socially
desirable goal. How can we most cost-effectively achieve this goal?
Tax simplification and increased information-reporting coupled with
systems modernization seem most promising at this point. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) simplified our tax laws at least in some
ways. Tax laws passed since 1986 have, on balance, made our tax code
more complicated. They have also raised nominal tax rates on betteroff individuals. The last time this happened, both evasion and avoid
ance increased. Nominal tax rates were progressive, but the tax burden
did not fall disproportionately on the rich.
We need to have realistic expectations regarding the amount of tax
evasion that can be cost-beneficially combated, given our present tax
code. The amount is probably less than 20 percent. It would never be
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cost beneficial to uncover and punish most tax evasion. As with taxes
and death, we need to learn to live with a certain level of tax evasion.
The Irregular Economy

The irregular economy appears to be the least virulent or relevantly
most beneficial sector of the underground economy. This economy
provides goods and services as well as jobs that might not otherwise be
available. However, both the goods and services and the jobs tend to be
of highly variable quality.
This economy may be most successfully attacked by providing
alternative entrepot for new immigrants and new labor market entrants.
It may also be combated by providing lower levels of regulation and
increased benefits for participating in the formal economy. For exam
ple, the extensive reference and referral system of Massachusetts,
which provides customers, training, and services (e.g., accounting ser
vices) to child care providers, has led most child care providers, includ
ing providers of child care in their home, to obtain state licenses as
required by state law. Only approximately 5 percent of family day care
providers are unlicensed in Massachusetts. Other states that require
family day care providers to be licensed but don't provide benefits to
licensees have as much as 50 percent of providers failing to comply
with the law.
Some workers in the irregular economy beat the system. Others are
beaten by it. The general public may, on balance, benefit from the
existence of this economy, but the balance is a delicate one.
The Illegal Economy

This is largely an economy employing young males. It provides an
exciting alternative to the low-wage jobs currently available to young
males with high school educations or less. However, these jobs come at
high cost to the rest of us. The transfers of the illegal economy are very
costly in terms of lifestyle, antitheft devices, and fear. Goods generally
lose, not gain, value as a result of illegal transfers. This is reflected in
the low prices available from fences.
While illegal goods and services often provide net benefits to those
who purchase, the benefits may be short-lived and may come at sub-

142 Beating the System?

stantial cost to the general public. Effective policy to combat the illegal
economy may combine legalization of some goods and services (e.g.,
gambling, prostitution, marijuana) with stricter enforcement of others.

Conclusions
Everyone wants a fast buck. It is the American way. We are a nation
that began its existence with a revolt against government. We didn't
like taxation when the British imposed it upon us and we don't like it
much better now that we impose it upon ourselves.
We are a society of individualists who resent government interfer
ence in either our work or consumption choices. However, it has been a
long while since we have been a frontier society. We have come to rely
on government to provide goods and services, to regulate behavior, and
to enforce a commonly agreed upon social code. The underground
economy points up gaps in government enforcement and shows us the
limits of government.
Through our representatives, we make decisions regarding the
goods and services we wish our federal, state, and local governments to
provide. To finance these expenditures, we agree to a set of user
charges and taxes. Evasion of taxes is often in the individual's narrow
self-interest. He or she can enjoy publicly provided goods and services
without paying for them. In the jargon of economics, the individual can
be a "free rider." The tax evader is beating the system, but at the
expense of the rest of us.
As citizens, we require licenses to undertake certain types of busi
nesses (e.g., medicine, plumbing) and we regulate the way in which
businesses are allowed to operate (e.g., through environmental and
health and safety regulations). We do this to enforce minimum stan
dards. Individuals and firms operating in the irregular economy avoid
both licensing and regulatory requirements. In some cases this evasion
of regulatory requirements has no external costs. For some goods and
services, consumers may obtain adequate information regarding the
quality of products informally. In other cases, irregular activity has
high external costs and information regarding quality may be both hard
to obtain and unreliable. Unregulated firms may dispose of hazardous
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materials in ways that cause substantial social harm. Sweatshops may
provide hazardous and unhealthy work environments. Some unregis
tered child care providers may damage young children in ways that
have serious social consequences.
Some producers and consumers of the goods and services of the
irregular economy are beating the system and at little or no cost to the
rest of us. Others are beating the system, but imposing substantial costs
on the rest of us. We need to think carefully about what we license and
what we regulate. We should impose mandatory licensing only in areas
where informal information regarding quality is either likely to be
unreliable or costly to obtain. In other areas we may be better served by
allowing consumers to choose whether they purchase from licensed or
unlicensed providers. We should only regulate in areas where external
effects are large or where there are substantial asymmetries in power
(e.g., the sweatshop situation) or information (e.g., pharmaceuticals).
Our criminal laws reflect our society's generally held beliefs about
what behaviors are acceptable. We condemn certain types of transfers
(e.g., theft, fraud) because they offend our sense of fairness and
because they lower the productivity of our formal economy. We outlaw
the sale and consumption of certain goods and services because they
offend our moral sensibilities and/or because they have substantial neg
ative externalities.
The mores of our society have changed quite rapidly since the
1960s, with each generation developing its own sense of what is
socially acceptable. Our criminal laws change much more slowly. It is
hard to say if the rigidity of what Bagehot called the "cake of custom"
is, on balance, good or bad. Most violations of most of our criminal
laws, on balance, hurt us as a society. It is not even clear that many of
the participants in illegal activities (e.g., the young drug dealer or pros
titute) are in the long run beating the system.
Are those who participate in the underground economy beating the
system? From a short-run, narrowly individual perspective, they by and
large are. However, the system they are beating is a system that we set
up because we believed that it was by and large beneficial to society.
The tax laws, regulations, and criminal code evolve slowly and can be
affected by special interests. The underground economy will grow in
those areas where existing laws and regulations are inefficient or most
at odds with current mores. The underground provides an escape valve.
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It can also provide valuable information regarding rules and regula
tions that need to be reassessed.
Tax evasion peaked in the early 1980s because our tax laws had
rates and provisions that made evasion both relatively easy and very
beneficial. Since TRA86, levels of evasion have declined. TRA86
broadened the base of taxation by limiting loopholes. It also lowered
tax rates. The growth of the tax evasion component of the underground
economy during the late 1970s and early 1980s warned us that some
thing was wrong with our tax laws. Our response was to alter the tax
code, not to increase enforcement.
As a society, we would be wise to look closely at areas of rapid
growth in the underground economy. These growth areas may need to
be attacked by increased enforcement. For example, the growth of
crack use during the 1980s was effectively dealt with by a combination
of enforcement and education. However, rapid growth may warn us
that it is time to revise outdated and inefficient rules. For example, the
failure of many upper middle income nominees for federal posts to pay
nanny taxes did not lead to greater enforcement. It led to changes in tax
laws and regulations.
NOTE
1. A Michigan study found that SO percent of illegal vendors of goods and services had regular
jobs, and that only 5 percent were working off-the-books full time. It is estimated that over half of
all illegal aliens had income tax withheld and, hence, were working in the regular as opposed to
the irregular economy.
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The topic of this chapter is the informal economy, a diversified set of
economic activities that are vast and growing in many settings. 1 In the
industrialized countries, there appears to be growing consensus among
researchers who describe the informal sector as encompassing "those
actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institu
tional rules or are denied their protection" (Feige 1990, p. 990). Or,
alternatively, the informal sector includes "all income-earning activi
ties that are not regulated by the state in social environments where
similar activities are regulated" (Castells and Fortes 1989, p. 12).
These definitions do not advance an a priori judgment of whether such
activities are good or bad, leaving the matter to the investigator.
In the case of the developing economies, however, the "informal
economy" concept is less precise. This imprecision may originate from
the more diverse nature of these economies, and from the various theo
ries that purport to explain the existence and proliferation of these
alternative "centers" of production in developing economies.
This paper reviews and explores the various concepts of informal
production used to describe what many are observing in the less-devel
oped world. Alternative measures that have been employed to quantify
and characterize these sectors for the Latin American economies will
be presented and discussed.

Defining the Informal Economy in the Less-Developed World

The concept of the informal economy was born in the Third World,
out of a series of studies on urban labor markets in Africa by Keith
Hart. Popular entrepreneurship in Accra and other African capitals was
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clearly at odds with received wisdom from "the western discourse on
economic development" (Hart 1990, p. 158).
In a report to the International Labour Office (ILO), Hart outlined a
dualist model of income opportunities of the urban labor force by dis
tinguishing between wage employment and self-employment. Hart
emphasized the notable dynamism and diversity of the self-employed
and their activities which went well beyond "shoeshine boys and sell
ers of matches" (Hart 1973, p. 68). However, Hart's dynamic charac
terization of the informal sector was subsequently lost as the concept
became redefined and institutionalized within the ILO bureaucracy as
synonymous with poverty. The informal economy was taken to refer to
an urban "way of doing things" characterized by:
• low entry barriers in terms of skill, capital, and organization
• family ownership of enterprises
• small scale of operations
• labor-intensive production with outdated technology
• unregulated and competitive markets (Peattie 1980)
• low levels of productivity and a low capacity for accumulation
(Tokman 1982).
In later publications of the ILO's Regional Employment Programme
for Latin America (PREALC), employment in the informal sector was
consistently referred to as "underemployment" affecting those workers
who could not gain entry into the modern economy (PREALC 1985;
Garcia 1991). Eventually the informal sector became known as the
"excluded" sector in less-developed economies in numerous ILO,
PREALC, and World Bank studies of urban poverty and labor markets
(Sethuraman 1981; Gerry 1978; Tokman 1978).
The ILO's negative characterization of the informal sector has been
challenged by other students of the subject who see the informal sector
in precisely the opposite light. The alternative view is that informal
activities are a sign of the popular entrepreneurial dynamism,
described by Hart (1990, p. 158) as "people taking back in their own
hands some of the economic power that centralized agents sought to
deny them." The Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto reformulated
Hart's original theme in The Other Path (1989). De Soto defines infor-
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mality as the popular response to the rigid "mercantilist" state, found
dominant in Peru and other Latin American countries, that survive by
granting the privilege of legal participation in the economy to a small
elite. Hence, unlike its portrayal by ILO and PREALC as a survival
mechanism in response to insufficient modern job creation, informal
enterprise represents the irruption of "real" market forces in an econ
omy straitjacketed by favoritism and state regulation.
The massive population shifts from the countryside to the cities in
the decades before 1980 provided the demographic base for De Soto's
informal economy. The urban elites who were already in place were
hostile to the migrants because "each person who migrates to the capi
tal is in some way a potential competitor and it is a natural inclination
to try to avoid competition" (1989, p. 11). Rural migrants to Peru's cit
ies became informal workers due to the legal barriers that prevented
them from participating in the mainstream economy. Informal eco
nomic activity was originally a survival mechanism, but gradually it
expanded in response to the rigidities and limitations of the economy.
The provision of goods and services by the informal economy proved
to be cheap and efficient, leading to the conversion of unregulated
enterprise into the real economic core of many industrial and service
activities.
De Soto's call to dismantle state regulatory barriers so that popular
entrepreneurship could flourish found a receptive audience in a number
of international development agencies, some of which made his views
their own (Bromley 1990). However, this optimistic portrayal also gave
rise to empirical and theoretical contradictions. Whereas PREALC's
analysis overemphasized the marginal character of urban informal
activities and the associated poverty, De Soto's analysis leaned in the
opposite direction.
A third perspective, which we will refer to as structural articulation,
evolved in dialogue with the earlier work by Keith Hart and ILO
experts, as well as subsequent analysis of the phenomenon by PRE
ALC. In agreement with definitions of informality in other world
regions, structural articulation characterizes the phenomenon as
income-earning activities unregulated by the state in contexts where
similar activities are so regulated (Castells and Portes 1989; Feige
1990). This approach is similar to that of De Soto in that it emphasizes
the role of the state in the emergence and growth of the informal econ-
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omy. However, it departs from De Solo's view by viewing this sector as
linked to the formal economy, and it does not subscribe to the notion
that this sector is composed exclusively of survival activities. In place
of the dualistic images of Latin American urban economies, this third
approach describes unified systems that involve many connections
between formal and informal enterprises (Roberts 1993; Beneria 1989;
Fortes and Benton 1984).
The specific nature of these markets is not uniform across countries,
but varies with the degree and specifics of state regulations, the
requirements of modern firms, and the size and characteristics of the
labor force. This approach is labeled "structuralist" because it focuses
on the structure of formal-informal relationship in the economic sys
tem. The approach recognizes that the condition of excess labor supply
created by rural-urban migration has had more complex consequences
than the simple survival of the poor at the margins of the urban econ
omy. Two such consequences are particularly important: the functions
that informal enterprise plays in support of modern capitalist accumu
lation; and the creation of new niches in the labor market, correspond
ing to new positions in the class structure.
A first linkage of the informal and formal sectors is the supply of
low-cost goods and services for workers in formal enterprises. Unregu
lated small artisans and merchants engage in the provision of every
thing from cheap clothing and footwear to auto and residential repairs.
Foodstands, urban transport, gardening and landscaping, house clean
ing, and the sale of second-hand appliances are services supplied by
informal entrepreneurs. The consumption of basic goods by workers in
the formal sector seldom occurs through regulated market channels but
is generally supplied by informal sources. Cheaper informal goods and
services increase the consumption "yield" of wages earned in the for
mal sector of the economy (Peattie 1974; Roberts 1976).
From the standpoint of the economic system as a whole, the infor
mal market represents a subsidy to formal enterprises as it makes labor
costs lower than they would be if these sources of supply did not exist.
Informal enterprises increase the profitability of their formal counter
parts by allowing the latter to maintain lower wage levels. The urban
upper and middle class also avail themselves of informally provided
services like cheap domestic help, gardening, and personal services to
maintain enviable lifestyles (Fortes and Walton 1981, pp. 91-94).
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A still closer interface between the formal and informal sectors is
the common practice in large firms of using the informal labor pool to
allocate a variety of production and marketing tasks. Firms may hire
workers off-the-books or subcontract production, input supplies, or
final sales to informal entrepreneurs. The firm can thereby avoid legal
regulations that increase labor costs and decrease managerial flexibil
ity. To the extent that the costly workforce of formal enterprises can be
reduced by off-the-books hiring and subcontracting, final profits can be
significantly improved.
Because these arrangements are not in compliance with legal regula
tions, managers of firms are careful to conceal them from the authori
ties. For this reason, they do not appear in the official statistics, leading
users of official data to the erroneous conclusion that these informalformal linkages do not exist.
The structuralist view also stresses that the informal sector is inter
nally heterogeneous. The coexistence and interactions of the regulated
and unregulated activities opens opportunities for a number of people
to insert themselves as intermediaries. Informal entrepreneurs who per
form these intermediary roles commonly earn more than workers in
regulated firms. This results in an informal economy that is more than
the simple translation of surplus labor into survival activities.

Demographic Trends in Latin America
The demographic events that help give rise to the informal economy
in Latin America took place in the second half of the twentieth century.
In the 1950s, Latin America was a continent of rural dwellers with
more than half the population living in the countryside and the major
ity of the workforce consisting of peasants and farm workers. By 1990,
three out of four Latin Americans lived in cities, with the majority in
large urban centers. This extraordinary transformation is evident in
table 1, where the Latin American urban population distribution is
compared with that of all less-developed regions and that of the devel
oped countries. Overall, the table suggests that Latin America has
achieved levels of urbanization equal to those of the developed world
despite much lower per capita incomes.
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Table 1. Share of the Urban Population Within Total Population
(in percent)
Latin America
Less-developed regions
More-developed regions

1955
45.3
19.0
57.0

1965
53.3
23.4
63.6

1975
61.2
26.4
68.8

1985
68.5
32.8
71.6

1990
71.1
41.2
73.6

SOURCE: United Nations (1991b, tables A.I, A.5).
NOTE: Less-developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding
Japan), Melonesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. More-developed regions comprise North America,
Japan, all regions of Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the former USSR.

Significant country-by-country differences exist around these
regional averages, however. Table 2 illustrates these differences by
showing average annual rates of growth for the total population and the
urban population of 14 countries in Latin America in the 1950s and in
the 1980s. Also shown are the average annual rates of growth for the
potential economically active population (EAP) defined as those aged
15-64. At the beginning of this period, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay
were already highly urbanized and their population growth rates were
relatively low. Urban growth continued in these countries at a rate sim
ilar to that of the developed world and, by 1990, more than 85 percent
of their inhabitants were living in cities. Demographic transformation
in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru were dramatic by contrast, with
the share of the urban population growing from one-half or less in
1950 to about three-fourths by 1990.
The migrants who gave rise to such rapid rates of urban growth
throughout the post-World War II period did not encounter in the cities
anything commensurate with their economic aspirations. New indus
tries in that period did generate significant labor demand (Garcia
1982), but the size of that demand was swamped by the number of new
migrants. In 1950, modern nonagricultural employment absorbed 26.3
percent of the Latin American labor force. In the. next thirty years,
employment in that sector grew by an average of 4.1 percent per year,
about the same rate as the total nonagricultural EAP. By the end of the
period, therefore, the proportion employed in the modern urban sector
was the same as it had been three decades earlier. Estimates of the
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excess labor supply in cities during this period ranged from 30 to 60
percent of the urban EAP (Garcia and Tokman 1981; Fortes 1985).
Table 2. Demographic Trends in Latin America
and Selected Indicators

Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador

El Salvador
Guatemala
Mexico
Panama

Period
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90

Average annual rate of growth
Percentage
(in percent)
urban
Urban within total
Population
Total
population aged 15-64 population population8
3.0
1.6
1.9
73.6
1.8
1.3
1.3
86.2
2.0
39.3
2.5
2.2
2.7
51.4
4.2
2.6
5.3
2.8
3.1
44.9
3.4
2.5
2.2
76.9
3.7
2.0
2.2
69.6
2.1
2.2
1.7
85.6
2.6
5.5
3.0
48.2
2.9
2.2
2.9
70.3
4.5
3.0
3.7
36.6
3.7
3.2
2.8
53.6
2.4
4.6
2.9
34.4
4.4
3.4
2.7
56.9
2.3
2.9
38.3
3.3
1.7
1.5
2.2
44.4
2.6
3.8
3.0
35.7
2.9
2.2
2.9
42.0
4.8
2.6
3.2
50.7
3.2
3.6
2.3
72.6
2.8
2.9
3.9
41.2
3.1
2.8
2.2
54.8
(continued)
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Table 2. Demographic Trends in Latin America
and Selected Indicators (continued)
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Latin
America

1950-60
1980-90
1950-60
1980-90
1950-60

2.1
3.0
1.3
0.6
3.5

1980-90

2.5
2.2
1.3
0.6
3.9
2.7

1950-60
1980-90

2.8
2.1

3.2

5.3
3.0
1.5
0.8
6.3
3.6

46.3
70.2
80.1
85.5
66.6
90.5

2.5
2.8b

4.5
3.1

49.3
71.5

SOURCE: ECLA (1991,tables 1,2,3,5,7); United Nations (1991a, 1991b).
a. Definition of urban varies across countries. Figures are for the year ending the decade.
b. Figure is for the period 1980-85.

Measuring the Informal Economy in Latin America
The informal economy is difficult to measure, since it consists of
activities generally unrecorded in official statistics. All measurement
strategies attempted so far suffer from limitations. PREALC has relied
on proxies available in national censuses and in household surveys in
their attempts to determine the magnitude of the informal economy.
The approach consists of designating entire occupational categories as
informal on the basis of their presumed correspondence with the con
ceptual definition.
PREALC classifies the self-employed and their unremunerated fam
ily workers as "informal" because it is assumed that these workers
engage in low-productivity, low-pay activities. While domestic ser
vants were similarly so classified in earlier estimates, they have been
excluded from more recent figures for reasons that are not clear. On the
other hand, owners and salaried workers in small enterprises were
absent from earlier estimates of the informal sector, but they are
included in recent ones. How "small enterprises" are defined also var-
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ies across countries and years, ranging from businesses employing
"less than twenty" workers to "less than five."
Despite these changes and inconsistencies, PREALC is the only
agency that has prepared estimates of the informal sector for every
country in Latin America. Summary figures of these estimates for 1960
and 1989 are presented in table 3. According to PREALC, during this
period approximately 31 percent of the Latin American urban EAP
were employed informally. That this estimate is virtually unchanged
from 1960 to 1989 is noteworthy, given both the important changes in
Latin American economies and the shifting occupational categories
included in PREALC's definition of the informal sector.

Table 3. Estimates of Urban Informal Employment as a Percent of Urban
Economically Active Population
Country

1960

1989

Argentina

21.1

28.7

Bolivia

62.3

27.0

Brazil

27.3

28.6

Chile

35.1

30.0

Colombia

39.0

27.3

Costa Rica

29.3

22.0

Ecuador

35.2

n.a.

El Salvador

42.6

n.a.

Guatemala

51.6

n.a.

Mexico
Panama

37.4

34.8

25.3

n.a.

Peru

46.9

39.0

Uruguay

18.6

19.0

Venezuela

32.3

23.3

Latin America

30.8

31.0

SOURCE: PREALC estimates given in Garcia and Tokman (1981, table 1); Garcia (1991, tables
5,7,9); and Infante and Klein (1990, tables 2,4).
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Variations of the magnitude of the informal sector by country are
rather large. The estimated share of persons in the informal sector
within the total urban labor force ranged during the period from a low
of approximately 20 percent in the more-developed countries such as
Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela to about 40 percent in Peru and El
Salvador, to approximately 60 percent in Bolivia and Ecuador.
The organization created by Hernando De Soto, the Institute for
Liberty and Democracy (ILD), has not produced similar region-wide
estimates, but has concentrated on documenting the extent of informal
ity in metropolitan Lima, focusing on three sectors: housing, transport,
and petty commerce. ILD estimates that, in 1982, some 43 percent of
all housing in Lima was built informally, providing shelter to 47 per
cent of the city's population. The replacement cost of this housing was
calculated at US $8.3 billion. In commerce, over 91,000 street vendors
supported an estimated 314,000 people and generated gross sales of
US $322 million per year. In addition, according to ILD, 39,000 other
informal merchants built 274 street markets with an estimated value of
US $41 million, supporting 125,000 people. In transport, informal
entrepreneurs controlled over 90 percent of urban public buses. The
1984 replacement value of their fleet was estimated at US $620 mil
lion. The value of the related infrastructure (gas pumps, repair shops,
etc.) was estimated at US $400 million.
Other estimates made by De Soto and his associates include the
claim that in the mid-1980s, 61.2 percent of total work hours in Peru
were dedicated to informal activities; that 48 percent of the economi
cally active population was engaged in informal activities; and that the
latter accounted for 38.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), a
share projected to rise to 61.3 percent by the end of the century (De
Soto 1989: 12).2
It is worth noting that De Soto's definition of the informal sector
coincides roughly with the definition of the "underground" economy in
developed societies, although methods for measuring the latter have
not been applied systematically in Latin America. Underground activi
ties in developed economies have been defined as those activities that
take place outside the existing legal framework. Their aggregate value,
in terms of relative proportion of the GDP, have typically been esti
mated by macroeconomic methods (Feige 1990).
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It is possible that failure to apply macroeconomic methods to the
Latin American economies, despite the similarity of definitions, stems
from the lack of suitable data. For the more-advanced Latin American
countries, however, this difficulty is not insurmountable. The Center
for Economic Research of the Private Sector (CEESP) estimated the
size of Mexico's underground economy between 1970 and 1985 on the
basis of two macroeconomic methods. The first, adapted from Tanzi
(1980, 1982), estimates the currency required for the operation of the
legal (aboveground) economy and then subtracts this figure from actual
currency in circulation. The difference multiplied by the velocity of
money provides an estimate of the magnitude of the underground econ
omy. The ratio of that figure to observed GDP then gives the proportion
of the national economy represented by these activities. The method
depends on the identification of a base period in which the informal
economy is assumed to be insignificant.
Estimates of the Mexican underground economy based on Tanzi's
monetary method are reproduced in table 4, column 1. The Mexican
underground economy is estimated to be 25 to 30 percent of official
GDP in 1985, the last year for which these figures are available. Table
4 also presents estimates of the Mexican underground economy based
on the "physical input" method. With this method, the ratio of some
physical input of wide use (electricity consumption in this case) is cal
culated for the base period and then extrapolated to the present.
Assuming a relative constant ratio of electricity consumption to GDP,
it is possible to calculate the expected GDP for each year following the
base period. The difference between observed and expected GDP is
attributed to the underground economy. As seen in table 4, these meth
ods yield estimates of the informal sector ranging from 20 to 40 per
cent of GDP in the 1980s. CEESP notes that both methods show the
magnitude of underground activities as increasing steadily.
These macroeconomic estimates have been criticized on various
grounds. They do not differentiate between criminal activities and
informal activities proper. The latter involve goods and services that
are otherwise licit, but whose production and sale are irregular (Castells and Portes 1989). Hence, the huge estimates of informality that
are sometimes reached through these methods may be inflated by the
inclusion of large organizations that provide "illegal" goods and ser
vices (e.g., cocaine, prostitution). These underground operations are of
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a nature and size different from those of microentrepreneurs and arti
sans in the informal sector proper. Macroeconomic estimates have also
been criticized for being sensitive to the choice of benchmark (base)
year. Despite these limitations, macroeconomic methods provide the
best available approximations of the relative weight of unregulated
activities in national economies. Their application in Latin America is
still rare.
Table 4. Estimates of "Subterranean" Economy in Mexico as a Percent of
Official Gross Domestic Product, Calculated by Two Methods,
1970-85
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Monetary method
13.5
13.8
15.4
15.2
21.1
27.3
25.6
27.4
28.0
24.9
33.2
29.1
39.3
29.4
28.0
25.7

Physical input method
8.0
13.5
15.4
14.7
18.7
19.4
22.3
28.5
30.9
28.6
23.6
25.1
20.6
30.1
33.5
38.4

SOURCE: CEESP (1987, table 10).

Empirical work undertaken from a structuralist perspective has
focused mainly on documenting the relationships between the formal
and informal sectors of urban economies. For national estimates, this
school has relied on secondary figures on the proportion of the eco
nomically active population that is not covered by the social security
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system. Absence of coverage serves as a proxy for unregulated work.
Most estimates of social security coverage or exclusion are reported for
the total, not urban, economically active population. They also do not
differentiate between workers and microentrepreneurs. Further, cover
age by the social security system does not exclude the possibility that
workers engage in unregulated activities on the side; hence it underes
timates the actual magnitude of informality. Lastly, as Mesa-Lago
(1991) notes in his analysis of Latin American social security systems,
the quality of the data is generally poor and furthermore does not dif
ferentiate between types and levels of coverage.
Despite these limitations, a comparison of the figures on the EAP
excluded from legal labor protection and figures on "underemployed"
workers, provided by PREALC, is instructive. This comparison is pre
sented in table 5 for the Latin American economies. Except for Brazil,
where the extension of some assistance to the entire population led to
an official claim of near universal coverage, the uncovered percentage
of the EAP shown here consistently exceeds the PREALC estimates.
The range of the gaps is from a few percentage points to over 40 per
cent of national EAP. These gaps can be tentatively interpreted as an
approximation to the proportion of wage workers who labor under
irregular conditions, a category implicitly defined by PREALC as for
mal and by the structuralists as informal. For Latin America as a
whole, the difference is approximately 14 percent of the EAP in 1980.
One of the few large data sets that contain reliable information on
both employment category and social security coverage is the Mexican
government's Urban Employment Survey of 1989. The survey col
lected data on a representative sample of about 30,000 adult Mexican
workers in seven metropolitan areas, including the four largest cities.
As analyzed by Roberts (1993), this survey yields estimates of the pro
portion of the employed labor force working informally according to
the PREALC and structuralist definitions, as well as an internal differ
entiation of the informal sector by employment categories.
Table 6 presents results of a reanalysis of these data using the four
largest urban centers. Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and
Ciudad Juarez. The empirical definition of informality commonly
employed by PREALC yields estimates that are approximately half in
magnitude (19.6 percent) relative to those produced when the lack of
social security protection is the basis of categorization (46.8 percent).
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Inclusion in the PREALC estimates of owners of and workers in
microenterprises significantly reduces this difference (37.6 percent),
but the figures are still lower than those based on lack of coverage
(46.8 percent). The remaining gap is directly attributable to workers in
large firms who do not receive legal protection (46.8 - 37.6 = 9.2 per
cent).
Table 5. Estimates of Informal Sector in Latin America, 1980

Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Latin America

Economically active
population not covered Underemployed8 within
by social security
economically active
(percent)
population (percent)
30.9
81.5
13.0b
32.7
80.3
51.6
88.7C
78.7
88.4
66.9
85.6
59.5
81.1
47.7
62.7
34.2d
55.8
56.3e

25.7
74.1
44.5
28.9
41.0
27.2
40.6
63.3
49.0
50.9
49.7
40.4
52.1
45.5
55.8
27.1
31.5
42.2

SOURCE: Mesa-Lago (1985, p. 342, 1991, p. 50): Fortes, Blitzer, and Curtis (1986, p. 731);
PREALC (1982, pp. 34-81); Wilkie and Perkal (1985, table 1308); Wilson (1985, p. 254).
a. Defined by PREALC as the sum of self-employed workers minus professionals, unremunerated
family workers, domestic servants, and "traditional" rural workers.
b. Coverage in 1980 is based on selected assistance programs according to universalistic criteria
rather than tied to employment,
c. 1985 figure.
d. Based on a probability survey of Montevideo's working-class population in 1985. Official fig
ures report near-universal coverage based on selected programs extended to all citizens,
e. Weighted average.

The Informal Economy

161

Table 6. Estimates of Urban Informal Economy in Mexico Based on
Occupational Classification and Lack of Social Coverage, 1989
Share of informal employment within the urban economically active
population (percent)_____________________________
By occupation
Unremunerated family workers plus the self-employed
19.6
Above two categories plus workers in microenterprises and unregistered microentrepreneurs
37.6
By lack of coverage8
Entrepreneurs
7.2
Self-employed
14.0
Workers
25.6
Total
46.8
N________________________________22.019____

SOURCE: Roberts (1993, table 3).
a. Entrepreneurs, workers, and the self-employed without social security protection.

The breakdown of the informal sector by employment reveals that
microentrepreneurs, the best-paid class within the sector, represent
about 7 percent of the employed labor force in the largest cities in
Mexico. The self-employed comprise an average of 14 percent of the
urban EAP and 30 percent of those working informally. Unprotected
wage workers represent one-fourth of all urban workers and the major
ity (55 percent) of the informal labor force.

Summary
There exists a rich literature on the underground economy for the
industrialized economies. In contrast, understanding the informal
economy is more challenging for students of the less-developed econo
mies because researchers have been less consistent when defining
informal activities for this set of nations. The lack of consistency in
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describing the informal economy for the developing world may be a
result of the greater diversity found in the economic organization and
in the level of development of these economies.
Broadly speaking, three different descriptions of the informal econ
omy in the developing world can be found in the literature. The dualist
model adapted by the ILO characterizes the informal sector as a poor,
noncompetitive sector, employing those who fail to gain entry into the
modern "productive" sector. Using this approach it has been estimated
that about 30 percent of workers in Latin America are employed in the
informal sector.
In contrast, De Soto characterizes the informal sector as competition
emerging through and in spite of confining state regulations and an oli
gopolistic market structure. In this view, informal activities introduce
dynamism and strength into the economy. Using information gathered
from Lima, Peru, De Soto estimated that about 40 percent of Lima's
GDP is produced in informal markets.
Structural articulation is a third approach to the informal economy
in developing areas. As in the De Soto view, the avoidance of regula
tions gives impetus to this sector. However, unlike the ILO approach,
the formal and informal sectors are closely linked, and to a degree,
complementary to each other. The profitability of the formal sector is
enhanced due to the availability of low-cost inputs from the informal
sector and due to the possibility of subcontracting in the informal mar
ket, where costly regulations are easily skirted. Using information that
attempts to differentiate workers who are employed in jobs that are
regulated versus jobs that are not, it is suggested that, on average, more
than half the economically active population in Latin America are
informal workers.
NOTES
1. Much of the material in this chapter can be found in Fortes and Schauffler (1993) and Fortes
(1994).
2. The validity of these estimates has been questioned by Rossini and Thomas (1987), who
argued that they are inaccurate due to: the inappropriate use of monetary measures of transactions
counted in the GDP; poorly specified models; and mishandling of econometric methods.
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